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Historically, land development in North America meant the subdividing of vast tracts of 
land into individual building lots that formed cities and towns.1  The two principal characteristics 
of this kind of development were the grid layout of streets and the dominance of the house -- the 
individual abode -- as the central architectural element of the city or town.2 The grid layout 
facilitated future sale, since rectangular lots were easy to build on and could accommodate 
different uses.3  This scheme contrasts with that in European cities where churches, palaces and 
government buildings dominate the urban landscape, and cities are designed around these 
symbols of belief and power.4
The North American developer is no longer free to decide alone what development there 
should be.  A myriad of land use regulations and standards, both state and federal, must be 
complied with.  As more regulatory steps are required and as standards evolve, the process of 
development has become more lengthy and encumbered. A development may well involve 
obtaining scores of permits from almost as many agencies.5  Still, in large measure, the role of 
the developer remains dominant, beginning with the original concept and involving the 
assemblage of the materials, professionals and other participants, such as, lenders, investors, 
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2community leaders, necessary for making the concept a reality.  The developer may be the one to 
locate the site, determine its  suitability, articulate the development, negotiate with governmental 
officials, and oversee implementation.
Environmental laws, both federal and state, requiring either protective or remedial 
measures in the case of sites contaminated with or exposed to hazardous wastes, may render a 
development project either prohibitively expensive or illegal.6  Property that once was an 
industrial site, or a defense installation, or even a farm may present such risks. 
 Since the landmark 1926 decision by the Supreme Court, Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co.,7 where the constitutionality of municipal zoning regulations was upheld as incident 
to the police power when enacted pursuant to validly implemented land use plans that advance 
the legitimate public interest,8 all fifty states have enacted laws that enable (and many that 
require9) municipalities to regulate land use through comprehensive land use plans.10  The result 
is that a landowner cannot simply choose to use land as he desires, but must obtain permission 
for a particular use from the local government to ensure that the desired use is consistent with the 
comprehensive plan.   Thus, a landowner may be required to obtain a subdivision approval 
545, 578 (1978).
6In the federal regime, there is primarily the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et. seq., under which a developer who purchases a contaminated site 
may bear responsibility for its cleanup.  There are numerous other environmental regulatory laws that limit uses on 
land, including the Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 and the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 
U.S. C. § 7623, 7624, the Clean Water Act (covering wetlands and other bodies of water), 33 U.S.C. § 1252, et. seq., 
the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et. seq.; and the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451-
1464, to name a few. 
7272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
8Id. at 387, 390, 395-96.
9Ellickson & Been, Land Use Controls, Cases & Materials 87 (2d ed. 2000).
10See Erin Ryan,“Bargaining as a Response to the the Elusive Public-Private Balance” from Erin Ryan, 
“Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Conflicts, 7 Harv. Negotiation 
L.Rev. 337, 338 (2002). 
3before dividing a given parcel for development or a building permit before initiating new 
construction.
The traditional zoning process consists of the adoption of a comprehensive plan and the 
issuance of local zoning ordinances pursuant to the plan.  The adoption of local zoning 
ordinances is accomplished by a hearing and public participation. The standard zoning enabling 
acts require that zoning ordinances apply uniformly to all property within a district, in accord 
with the comprehensive plan.11 Characteristic of the Euclidean zoning model is the seeming rigid 
division of the land into discrete areas each assigned a particular use, e.g., residential, heavy 
industry, agricultural.  Early zoning theory anticipated that land use decisions would primarily 
occur through initial allocation of uses by the comprehensive plan and implementing ordinances, 
with only minor adjustments over time afforded by variances, special use permits and rezoning.  
However, nearly a century of zoning experience indicates a very different practice,12 such that 
current zoning practice little resembles the early notion of planned development.    The result is 
that numerous different uses may be permissible within a particular district and the special-use 
process, frequently provide only very generalized standards for issuance of a permit.  Rather than 
rigid adherence to the zoning map, the current bargaining model for zoning makes particularized 
decisions regarding the suitability of a proposed use and thus in effect administer land 
development on a case-by-case basis.13
Even when the existing zoning permits a proposed project, the development project that 
is only proposed may vanish with unanticipated changes in political and market conditions or in 
111 P.J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 5.01; Ryan at 352.
121 P.J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 5.01; Ryan at 348.
4the land use regulatory scheme.  These kinds of changes are risks that are difficult to anticipate 
and control. In most jurisdictions, absent a vested right to develop, the local land use regulatory 
body retains the right to alter and apply to a proposed development, newly enacted zoning or 
other land use requirements at any time and until quite late in the development process, indeed 
even up to the commencement of construction.14  The possibility of such changes can make the 
development process appear ad hoc and precarious and reliance on the traditional zoning 
adjustments such as variances or special use permits under criteria that are less than concrete, 
does little to minimize the risks to a developer.  
This article explores the new model of land use decisionmaking, that based upon 
bargaining with the landowner.   The fact of a bargain raises the issue of whether such bargaining 
amounts to “contract” zoning based upon a bilateral contract between the municipality and the 
13Ryan at 349.
14See e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm’n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 132 Cal. 
Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546 (1976).  There, under the authority of pertinent permits, the developer had undertaken 
studies for the development of the tract, proceeded to subdivide and grade it, completed or was in the process of 
constructing storm drains, culverts, street improvements, utilities, and similar facilities for the tract, and had spent 
more than $2 million and incurred liability of nearly $750,000 before being able to apply for a development permit 
from the Coastal Commission.  The Coastal Commission refused to issue a development permit and no building 
permit could be issued until a development permit was obtained.  The California Supreme Court ruled that the 
developer had acquired no vested rights entitling it to proceed with actual construction.  The rationale was that by 
requiring a building permit as a prerequisite to obtaining a vested right to actually build, the court was preserving to 
localities regulatory flexibility in the development process to meet changing circumstances and needs.  Otherwise, 
there would be a serious impairment of the government’s right to control land use policy.  This decision was the 
impetus for the enactment of the California development agreement statute, discussed later.  See also Hermosa 
Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach, 86 Cal. App. 4th 534, 551, 103 Cal. Rptr.2d 447, 460 
(2001)(upholding repeal of exemption for oil drilling effectively nullifying leases for exploration and development 
where all costs were “soft costs”, such as for engineering, consultants, lawyers).  See generally  4 EDWARD H. 
ZEIGLER, JR. RATHKOPF’S, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, Ch. 70. (2002).  Depending upon the 
particular circumstances of the case, a governmental action that essentially destroys the landowner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations could result in a taking, compensable under the Fifth Amendment.   For a 
discussion of regulatory takings, see Gregory M. Stein, Who Gets the Taking Claim? Changes in Land Use Law, 
Pre-Enactment Owners, an d Post Enactment Buyers, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 89 (2000); Steven J. Eagle, The Supreme 
Court’s Evolving Takings Jurisprudence: A First Look at Tahoe-Sierra, 16 Prob. & Prop. 5 (November/December 
2002); John J. Delaney & Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Protected Property in Fifth 
Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 27, 38 (1996).
5landowner, which is largely held to be illegal, or a related form of bargaining, not involving an 
exchange of promises in the context of a bilateral agreement, i.e., “conditional zoning”. I go on 
in Part II to discuss the emergence of the development agreement, which involves a contract with 
a municipality and the developer under which the developer is assured that new zoning 
ordinances adopted after the date of the agreement will not apply to the developer.  Part III 
discusses the reserved powers doctrine on the ability of governments to contract and the issue of 
transparency in making zoning decisions.  Part IV considers in depth the murky concepts of 
contract and conditional rezoning and why they are looked on with such suspicion by the courts.  
I analyze significant rulings from the courts in the jurisdictions that most often considered the 
question.  Part  V considers contract zoning compared to conditional zoning.  Part VI  shows 
how conditional zoning once maligned have gained acceptance by the courts.  Part VII discusses 
conditional use zoning device in North Carolina.  Part VIII discusses concomitant agreements 
whereby a municipality has the power to enter into an agreement with a developer as to zoning in 
exchange for the developer’s promise to develop in certain way.  Part IX considers  whether 
development agreements can be upheld against a challenge that they amount to contract or 
conditional zoning and explains why they can be and should be encouraged.   Part X offers some 
conclusions about the future of land use planning.
II.  The Development Agreement as an Important Bargaining Device, 
   Moving Away for Traditional Euclidian Zoning
In recent years, land use decisionmaking has shifted significantly from the planned 
toward the particularized, affording more ad hoc responses to individual development 
6proposals.15  In a fluid society, adherence to the rigid Euclidean model for zoning which consists 
of the division of land into zones, with identical uses within each zone, has been found to be 
inadequate for achieving a rational and effective land use plan, since it precludes the zoning 
authority from considering particular and perhaps beneficial uses for a parcel within the zone. 
Municipal land use bargaining is rapidly becoming “the universal language of land use 
planning,”16 as public and private parties to land use disputes adopt the bargaining model to 
obtain mutually agreeable solutions based on mutually beneficial exchange.17  Under the 
bargaining model, the emphasis is placed on flexibility and change through the use of 
variances,18 special use permits,19 rezoning, incentive and bonus zoning,20 conditional zoning21
and development agreements.  Zoning determinations are made of actual uses based upon 
concrete proposals that allow municipalities to  assess the potential impact of uses in a concrete 
situation.  The model also provides municipalities with significant leverage over potential 
development in order to obtain concessions from developers.22
As municipalities have sought more formal, more predictable forms of flexibility, such as 
15Ryan at 349; see also Terry Lewis, et. al., Spot Zoning, Contract Zoning, and Conditional Zoning, 2 
Florida Environmental and Law Use Law, chapter IV(E)(The Florida Bar FL-CLES 7-1, (1994)(noting the key to 
implementing efficient development proposals is “negotiation between government and the developer; Rose,  
Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal; Land Use Controls as  Problem of Local Legitimacy,71 Cal. L.Rev. 937,849 
(1983); Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning Development Agreements, and the 
Theoretical Foundations of Government Law Use Deals, 65 N.C. Law Rev. 957, 969 (1987).
16Ryan at 338,
17Ryan at 338.
18
 A variance is an authority to a property owner in a manner forbidden by the ordinance.  Daniel 
Mandelker, Land Use Law §6.39 (2003).
19
 A special use permit is an exception to the existing zoning in a particular district, allowing a different use 
that is expressly permitted by the ordinance.  Mandelker at § 6.39. 
20
 Incentive and bonus zoning allow for exceptions to the zoning regulations in a particular district, 
typically allowing greater density or relaxing height restrictions on buildings constructed in the district.
21
 This concept is discussed in detail, infra.
22Ryan at 349, citing Cordes at 167.
7in development agreements,23 a growing number of states have enacted legislation authorizing 
the making of land use through this device.24   “Development agreements” between developers 
and municipal governments respond to the  uncertainties inherent in the use of the minor 
adjustment mechanisms found in Euclidean zoning and in vested rights.  They are negotiated 
agreements between a developer and the local government under which the local government 
agrees to apply the land use rules, regulations and policies in effect on the date of the agreement, 
in exchange for the developer’s promise to develop in a certain way.25
A.  The Benefits to the Developer and the Municipality. Under the development 
agreement model of  land use, the developer gains: a)  certainty as to the governing regulations 
for the development project;  b)  the ability to bargain for support and the coordination of 
approvals; c) easier and less-costly financing because of the reduction of the risk of non-
approval; d)  ability to negotiate the right to freeze regulations as to changes in the project; e) 
predictability in scheduling the phases of the development;  f) change in the dynamics of the 
development process from confrontation to cooperation.   
The municipality gains a) the facilitation of comprehensive planning and long-range 
23
 In 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard Condominium Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 146 Wn.2d 194, 43 
P.3d 1233, 1237 (2002), the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that “a local government and a property owner 
may reach an arms-length, bargained-for agreement which may include waivers of liability for risks created by [a] 
proposed use of property because of the shape, composition, location or other characteristic unique to the property 
sought to be developed.”  In that case, the city had contended that innovative land use instruments, such as 
exculpatory covenants, should be encouraged because the Growth Management Act, (36.70A R.C.W.) was 
channeling development onto more and more marginal lots; that property owners of land marginal for development 
because of the composition, topography, location, or other characteristic of the property, should be free to propose 
creative solutions, and accept the risks of development.
24discussed, infra at ---.
25See generally, Knight and  Schoettle, supra note 15; Daniel J. Curtin and Scott A. Edelstein, Development 
Agreement Practice in California and Other States, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 761 (1993); Note, Development Agreements: 
Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 B.C. Envt’l Aff. L. Rev. 719 (Summer 2001); Michael H. Crew, Development 
Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 22 Urb. Law. 23, 29 (1990).
8planning goals;  b) commitments for public facilities and off-site infrastructure; c) public benefits 
otherwise not obtainable under regulatory takings doctrine; d) avoidance of administrative and 
litigation costs and expenditures.
 Development agreements thus offer both flexibility and certainty: flexibility to the local 
government by incorporating terms and conditions in the agreements that may be different from 
those expressed in the land use regulations, and certainty to the developer by setting the 
governing standards and rules for the duration of the development project.  Recently, a California 
court of appeals ruled that the development agreement statute applied equally to the planning 
stage of development and not just to projects that have been approved for actual construction.26
Such a construction of the statute, the court said, was entirely consistent with the overall 
purposes of the statute to “encour[age] the creation of rights and obligations early in a project in 
order to promote public and private participation during planning, especially when the scope of 
the project requires a lengthy process of obtaining regulatory approvals.27
26Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors, 84 Cal. 
App. 4th 221, 228, 100 Cal. Rptr. 740 (2000), review denied 2001 Cal. LEXIS 341 (Cal. Jan. 17, 2001).
27Id. at 228.  In that case, the development agreement pertained to the planning of the development 
project that met the requirements of the statute, though the county had not approved an actual development, but 
had established the scope of the project and precise parameters for future construction, as well as a procedure to 
process project approvals.  It also provided for a variety of improvements for public use which might not have 
been agreed to by the developer without corresponding commitments by the city as outlined in the agreement.” 
Id. at 229.  It was nonetheless necessary for the court to construe the agreement as an approval of the project 
because it committed the parties to a definite course of action aimed at assuring construction of the project, 
provided certain contingencies were met. Id. at 229.  “While further agreement and discretionary approvals were 
necessary, every approval or denial permitted by the Agreement was designed to advance the project in 
accordance with the standards for ... development adopted by the County in the ... Area Plan.” Id. at 229.  The 
court pointed out that though the statute was limited to actual projects, it did not require deferral of development 
agreements until construction was ready to begin or require any particular stage of project approval as a 
prerequisite.  “In fact, by permitting conditional development agreements when property is subject to future 
annexation, the statute expressly permitted local governments to freeze zoning and other land use regulation 
before a project was finalized.”  Id. at 230, citing National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. County of Riverside, 
42 Cal. App. 4th 1521-22 (1996).  In the court’s view, nothing limited the statute to development agreements 
which created “vested rights” to complete construction of a project according to completed plans.  Id. at 230.
9Though they are local in nature, development agreements usually are entered into 
pursuant to state enabling legislation.  California was the first state to enact such legislation in 
1980  and twelve states have followed.28  Development agreements are said to require enabling 
legislation because of their effect upon the powers of local governments, both conferring and 
limiting.   Nonetheless, because development agreements potentially empower local officials to 
control land use in more effective ways than under the zoning ordinance, their use has been 
sanctioned even in states with no statutory enabling law, as an exercise of their auxiliary and 
implied powers under the zoning laws.29
 A practical and legal limitation on development agreements  is that they only bind the 
contracting parties, i.e., the developer and the municipality signing the agreement.  Projects that 
require approval from other governmental entities (such as the local coastal commission or 
environmental protection agency) remain at risk.  But this can be addressed by a multi-party 
development agreement.
1.  Common Provisions in the Development Agreement Enabling Statutes.  
 Municipality’s Authority to Act .  The municipality may be required to first pass an 
28ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05 (West Supp. 2001-02); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65864 (West 
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3220 (West 2000); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 46-121 (1993); IDAHO Code  § 67-6511A (Michie 2001);  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.21 
(West 2002);  MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B § 13.01 (Lexis 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.504 (2001); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 278.0201; N.J. STAT. ANN § 40:55D-45 (West 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-10 (West 
Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1(Michie 1997).  See generally Janice C. Griffith, Local 
Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 277 (1990); Judith 
Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical 
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 U.N.C. L. Rev. 957, 995 (1987); Comment, Development 
Agreement Legislation in Hawaii, 7 U. Haw. L. Rev. 173 (1985).
29See Giger v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 676, 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989)(upholding development 
agreement against challenge that municipality bargained away its police powers.  This case is discussed in detail 
infra at text accompanying notes ------ to ------. See generally R. Alan Haywood & David Hartman, Legal Basics 
for Development Agreements, 32 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 955 (2001); Jennifer G. Brown, Concomitant Agreement 
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enabling ordinance or resolution establishing the details of development agreement procedures 
and the requirements that the executive branch of the governmental unit must follow.30
Goals.  Most statutes identify the purposes and goals of such agreements, e.g.,: 
a) to bring increased “certainty” and “assurance” to the development 
process, which in turn will strengthen the public planning process, encourage 
private participation in comprehensive planning and reduce the economic costs of 
development,31
b) to achieve “predictability,” and “public benefits,”32 including affordable 
housing, design standards, and off-site infrastructure,33
c) for the “vesting of development rights” as solutions to the problems 
caused by the “lack of certainty” in the  development process.”34
Minimum Provisions.  The statutes typically require that a development agreement 
specify certain substantive terms, including: 
a) a description of the land subject to the agreement; 
b) a statement of the permitted uses, including density, intensity, maximum height 
and size of the proposed buildings; 
c) provisions for reservations or dedications of land for public purposes;
Zoning: An Economic Analysis, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 89 (1985).
30ARIZ. REV. STAT. 9-500.05A; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65865(c); HAW. REV. STAT. §  46-124; 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163-3223.
31CAL. GOV’T CODE §  65864. 
32HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-121.
33S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-10 (B)(4).
34HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-121; S.C. CODE ANN.§ 6-31-10(B)(4);  LA. REV. STAT. § 33-4780.21(1) 
(“the lack of certainty in the approval of development can result in a waste of resources, escalate the cost of 
housing and other development to the consumer, and discourage investment in and commitment to 
comprehensive planning which would make maximum efficient utilization of resources at the least economic 
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d) conditions, terms, restrictions and requirements for public infrastructure;
e) the phasing or time of construction.35
Conformance with Comprehensive Plans.  As a condition of enforceability, most 
statutes require development agreements to comply with local comprehensive plans.36
Duration.  Some statutes limit the duration of a development agreement to a specific 
number of years, although extensions by mutual agreement following a public hearing may be 
obtained.37 Others provide that a development agreement may include commencement dates for 
construction38 or the duration of the agreement.39
Amendment, Cancelations, Exceptions .  As with any contract, amendments can be 
accomplished by mutual agreement.40  However, under all the statutes, despite the terms of the 
agreement, the municipality reserves the power to cancel it unilaterally when required to ensure 
public health, safety or welfare.41 The California statute requires a municipality to review 
cost to the public.”).
35CAL. GOV’T CODE §  65865.2; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3227; HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-126; 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B § 13.01(f); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.0201 (1);  N.J. STAT. ANN § 40:55D-
45.2(A); OR. REV. STAT § 94.504 (2); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 6-31-60.  The Arizona statute provides that the 
development agreement may also specify such things as density and intensity of use, maximum height and size 
of proposed buildings.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-500.05(G)(1)(c).  The Louisiana statute provides that the statute 
shall specify such things.  LA REV. STAT. § 33:4780.24.  See also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1(B); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 94-518.
36CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65867.5;  HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-129; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-500.05(B); 
NEV. REV. STAT. §  278.0203; REV. CODE WASH. § 36.70B.170(1); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 6-31-70; VA. 
CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1(B).
37FL. STAT. ANN. § 163.3229; MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B § 13.01(g).
38CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65865.2; FL. STAT. ANN. § 163.3229; HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-126; NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 278.0201. 
39LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.24.
40See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-500.05C; MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B § 13.01(h);  OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 94-522;  LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.30; S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-100.  But in Hawaii,  if the county 
determines that a proposed amendment would “substantially alter” the original agreement, a public hearing must 
be held. HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-130. 
41See e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65865.3; HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-127.  In Louisiana, this is so in 
the case of newly incorporated municipalities as to development agreements entered into prior to incorporation.  
LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.25.  In Hawaii, the current (and later enacted) laws may be applied if necessary to 
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annually compliance with the agreement and authorizes it to terminate or modify the agreement 
upon a finding of noncompliance.42  The Nevada statute requires review only once every two 
years.43
Approval and Adoption.  The mechanisms for obtaining approval vary.  In Hawaii, the 
mayor is the designated negotiator, but the final agreement must be approved by the city council, 
and then adopted by resolution.44  In California, a development agreement must be approved by 
resolution or ordinance.45  In several states, a public hearing must be held prior to adoption of the 
development agreement.46  Whether a development agreement is considered a legislative or an 
administrative act affects the mechanism and procedure for approval.  If it is a legislative act, a 
referendum may nullify the agreement.47 In California, a developer’s rights do not vest under a 
development agreement until the referendum period expires, and if other conforming enactments 
(e.g., a general plan amendment or re-zoning) are necessary under the agreement, vesting is 
deferred until the referendum period expires on those as well.48  In Hawaii, development 
rectify a condition ‘perilous’ to residents’ health and safety.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-127(b); see also VA. 
CODE ANN.  15.2-2303.1A; MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B § 13.01(i); LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.24.  The 
Louisiana statute also provides for modification or suspension of provisions of the development agreement 
where necessary to comply with subsequently enacted state and federal laws and regulations.   Id. at § 
33:4780.32. See also ARIZ REV. STAT. § 9-500.05G(1)(a); S.C. CODE ANN. § § 6-31-130). 
42CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65865.1.   
43NEV. REV. STAT. § 278-0205.  The Louisiana statute requires periodic review at least every twelve 
months, at which time the developer must demonstrate good faith compliance with the terms of the agreement or 
face termination or modification.  LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.23; S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-90. 
44HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-123- 46.124; S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-30. 
45CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65867.5; LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.28 (after a public hearing a development 
agreement must be approved by ordinance of the governing authority of the municipality).
46HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-128; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65867; LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.28; MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 66B § 13.01(d); OR. REV. STAT. § 94-508, 513; S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-50. 
47The Colorado statute provides that development agreements shall be adopted as legislative acts subject to 
referendum. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2). 
48Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1990).
13
agreements are administrative acts, precluding repeal by referendum.49
Effect of the Agreement.   The statutes variously provide that the effect of the agreement 
is that the rules, regulations and official policies governing permitted uses of the land are those in 
force at the time of execution of the agreement.50
Effect of Contracts Clause. The Contracts Clause of the Constitution may prevent a 
municipality from abrogating a development agreement once entered into with a developer.51
This means that if the municipality uses its legislative authority to impair an otherwise 
enforceable contract, it may incur liability to the developer.52  An impairment of contract 
addressable under the Constitution should be distinguished from a breach of contract under 
common law.  An impairment of contract occurs if a government acts in a way that makes 
performance of the contract illegal or impossible.53  That illegality or impossibility provides a 
defense to the developer in a breach of contract action for damages or for other relief brought by 
the municipality, the non-government party now unable to fulfill its contractual obligation.54   On 
the other hand, when the government merely refuses or omits to perform its contractual 
obligation, an adequate remedy in damages ordinarily exists, such that the government action is 
49HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-131.  The Colorado statute provides that development agreements shall be 
adopted as legislative acts, subject to referendum.   COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2).
50ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-500.05(B); CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65866; HAW. STAT. ANN. § 46-127 (b); 
LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4780.27 (except that subsequently enacted rules, regulations and policies that do not conflict 
with those in effect at the time of the signing of the agreement may apply); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B § 13.01(j); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 278-0201(2)(3); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.518; S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-80; VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15.2-2303.1(B).
51U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
52The Contracts Clause provides in part: “no state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”
53E. & E. Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist.,  613 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1980).
54Id. 
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characterized as a breach of contract that does not rise to the level of a contractual impairment.55
Even when there is an impairment of contract as just described, the Contracts Clause may 
yet offer no relief because the constitutional protections are not absolute.  Every contract made 
with a governmental entity is in some degree subject to the exercise of that government’s police 
powers.56  This means that a development agreement may be justifiedly impaired by the 
government and such impairment is not unconstitutional if it is “reasonable and necessary” to 
serve an important public  purpose.57  The legislative act allegedly impairing the agreement, 
though, is subject to strict judicial scrutiny and requires a balancing of the government’s interest 
in the exercise of its police power against the degree of impairment of the private party’s 
contractual expectations arising from the terms of the development agreement and including a 
consideration of changed circumstances and unforeseen events since the agreement was entered
into, and the alternatives available to the government.58
III. Contract and Conditional Zoning: Two Issues:
The Reserved Powers Doctrine and Transparency
Modern land use planning, fundamentally an exercise in bargaining, involving 
agreements between the landowner and the municipality and the imposition of conditions on the 
55Id.
56See e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
57United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spans, supra
note 89; see generally, Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping From the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 
75 Iowa L. Rev. 277 (1990).
58United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 28-32; Rue-Ell Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Berkeley,
147 Cal. App.3d 81, 87, 194 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1983)(setting out a three-step analysis  for determining whether a 
contract has been impaired:  1) whether the state law has substantially impaired the contractual relationship; 2) if 
substantially impaired, whether the impairment was justified by a significant public purpose behind the regulation, 
such as remedying a broad and general social or economic problem; and 3) if there is a legitimate public purpose, 
whether the adjustment of the rights and duties of the contracting parties was reasonable and appropriate to the 
public purpose justifying the law.  The California Supreme Court has also stated that any such modification must be 
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land in exchange of rezoning, may be challenged as unlawful under the reserved powers 
doctrine, that they amount to contract zoning, or  conditional zoning, both of which are said to 
involve a question of the bargaining away of the municipality’s police power. The two key 
problems with invalid contract zoning involve municipalities' relinquishment of its police powers 
and lack of transparency in the zoning scheme.  There is lack of transparency where the 
conditions essential to the zoning decision are not contained in the ordinance, but are 
implemented through a private negotiations and agreements.  
A.  The Reserved Powers Doctrine as a limitation on Bargaining
The reserved powers doctrine holds that the power of governing is a trust committed by 
the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away. 59   It is a limitation on the 
scope of the Contracts Clause, meaning that any rights created by government contract are 
subject to such rules and regulations as may from time to time be ordained and established for 
the preservation of health and morality.60   All rights granted from government are held subject to 
the police power of the State.”61   Thus, application of the reserved powers doctrine requires a 
determination of the state’s power to create irrevocable contract rights in the first place, rather 
than an inquiry into the purpose or reasonableness of the subsequent impairment.  While a 
municipality’s retention of the right to abrogate a contract implicates the Contract Clause, that 
reasonable and when resulting in disadvantage to a private-sector party must be accompanied by comparable new 
advantages.
59
 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879).   
60 Id. See also Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566; 772 A.2d 553 (2001); Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 
114 N.M. 699, 845 P. 2d 793, 796 (1992); see generally David L. Callies and Julie Tappendorf, Symposium: 
Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public 
Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 Case Wes. Res. 663 Summer 2001.
61 Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. at 190-91 (1983); Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 
(1877).
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clause does not require a state to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its 
sovereignty.62  In deciding whether a state’s contract was invalid ab initio under the reserved 
powers doctrine, earlier decisions relied on a distinction among various powers of the state.  
Thus, the police power and the power of eminent domain were among those that could not be 
“contracted away”, but the state could bind itself in the future exercise of the taxing and 
spending powers.63   Such formalistic distinctions perhaps cannot be dispositive, but they contain 
an important element of truth.”64
“Contract zoning”65 involves a deal that creates an impermissible reciprocity of obligation 
between a private interest and a government entity. It is defined as the required exercise of the 
zoning power pursuant to an express bilateral contract between the property owner and the 
zoning authority and an agreement to rezone that lacks a valid basis independent of the contract 
on which to justify the zoning amendment.66  Thus, the problem with a deal arising under 
contract zoning is that it would bind the government to specific terms of the contract that may 
ultimately prevent it from carrying out its public duties, while conferring on private parties the 
special rights different from other landowners within the same zone. This practice has long been 
disapproved in most jurisdictions where the issued has come up.67
62 United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 23.
63
 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. at 820.  
64United States Trust v. New Jersey,  431 U.S. at 23-34. (“If a state could reduce its financial obligations 
whenever it wanted to spend the money for what is regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause 
would provide no protection at all.”  Id. at 25-26.
65
 This concept is discussed in depth, infra at text accompanying notes ---- to -----.
66See e.g., Quigley v. City of Oswego, 71 A.D. 2d 795 (4th Dept. 1979), lv. denied 48 N.Y.2d 607 (1979); 
Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A.2d 553 (2001); Morin v. Foster, 45 N.Y.2d 287 (1978); Almor 
Assoc. v. Town of Skaneateles, 231 A.D.2d 863 4th Dept. 1996); see also Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 453 A.2d 
1385 (Pa. 1982).
67See e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1996).  Another form of zoning that is often challenged as illegal, although not under the reserved powers 
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In contrast, conditional zoning68 is defined as rezoning subject to conditions which are not 
applicable to other property in the same zone, where the municipality makes no promise to the 
landowner to rezone, but does rezone upon the imposition of conditions, covenants and 
restrictions on use of the rezoned land.   Under conditional zoning, the landowner covenants to 
perform certain conditions if the rezoning is granted. Conditional zoning allows municipalities 
and developers essentially to negotiate the terms of a development.  The developer obtains the 
certainty that the development project will proceed, thus making financing easier to obtain, and 
tenants more ready to sign leases.69  At the same time, the municipality is able to set definite 
conditions that govern the process of development, thus limiting the potential negative impacts 
doctrine, is spot zoning. Spot zoning involves the singling out of a small parcel of land for a use classification totally 
different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment to 
other owners.  In other words, spot zoning occurs when a single lot or area is granted privileges which are not 
granted or extended to other land in the vicinity in the same use district. Galuska v. Racine County, 145 Wis. 2d 895 
(Wis. 1988), citing Cushman v. City of Racine, 39 Wis.2d 303, 306-07, 159 N.W.2d 67, 69 (1968). It is usually 
understood to be zoning “by which a small area is situated in a larger zone and is purportedly devoted to a use 
inconsistent with the use to which the larger area is restricted.” State ex.rel. Zupanic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis.2d 22, --, 
citing Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 235 Wis. 91, 292 N. W. 320  (1940). The validity of spot zoning depends 
upon more than the issue of the size of the spot, and spot zoning as such is not necessarily invalid, but depends 
instead on the facts and circumstances appearing in each particular case.  Spot zoning is invalid where some or all of 
the following factors are present: 1) a small parcel of land is singled out for the special and privileged treatment; 2) 
the singling out is not in the public interest but only for the benefit of the landowner; 3) and the action is not in 
accord with a comprehensive plan. However, spot zoning is not regarded as illegal per se and courts do not consider 
the rezoning in this way to be illegal spot zoning where it is in the public interest and not solely for the benefit of the 
developer. State ex. rel. Zupanic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis.2d at 33, citing See Boerschinger v. Elkay Enterprises, Inc.
(1966), 32 Wis. 2d 168, 145 N. W. 2d 108; Cushman v. Racine (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 303, 159 N. W. 2d 67; Howard v. 
Elm Grove, 80 Wis. 2d 33 (Wis. 1977); Rodgers v. Menomonee Falls, 55 Wis.2d 563, 572, 201 N.W.2d 29 (1972); 
Cushman v. Racine, 39 Wis.2d 303, 306, 159 N.W.2d 67 (1968). It is illegal only when there is a change that is 
otherwise than part of well-considered and comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the 
community. Collard v. Flower Hill, 52 N.Y. 2d 594 (1981). Nonetheless, the attitudes of courts and commentators 
toward spot zoning have differed.  Spot zoning has been characterized both as a necessary device to provide 
flexibility to comprehensive zoning ordinances, 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 9.17 at 129 (1976), and as 
“the very antithesis of planned zoning.” 1 Williams, American Land Planning Law, § 27.01 at 561 (1974). In any 
case, it is a form of rezoning and “should only be indulged in where it is in the public interest and not solely for the 
benefit of the property owner who requests rezoning.” Howard v. Elm Grove, 80 Wis. 2d 33, 41-42  (Wis. 1977);  
Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis.2d 137, 150-51, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966) (Currie, C.J. Concurring); Cushman v. 
Racine, supra at 309.”
68
 This concept is discussed in depth, infra at text accompanying notes ---- to ------. 
69Rohan at § 5.01[2].
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from the development on neighboring land and the community.70  Nevertheless, some have 
argued that where the imposition of conditions on land development is desirable, it might better 
be done by uniform ordinances providing for special uses, special exceptions and overlaid 
districts.71 “Conditions imposed in such cases . . . have a sounder legal basis because guidelines 
for their imposition are spelled out in the ordinance.”72 But, the process of conditional zoning at 
times seems almost indistinguishable from the process of negotiating a contract, meaning 
“contract zoning” where there is an exchange of promises between developer and the 
municipality.73   The closeness of these devices in definition and application has led to murky 
and overlapping discussions in the cases.  Several theoretical questions therefore arise: 1) is 
lawful conditional zoning the same as illegal contract zoning? 2) does conditional zoning 
extinguish or nullify the concept of contract zoning? 3) is the result that conditional zoning is 
illegal if contract zoning is illegal? or the converse: if conditional zoning is legal, then so should 
contract zoning?
1.  When an Agreement Between a Municipality and 
a Developer is Subject to Challenge as Such 
As stated, “contract zoning is defined as a ‘process by which a local government enters 
into an agreement with a developer whereby the government extracts a performance or promise 
from a developer in exchange for the government’s agreement to rezone the property.’”74  “The 
process is suspect because of the concern that a municipality will contract away its police power 
70Id. at   .
71State ex.rel Zupanic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 33 (Wis. 1970),  citing Cutler, Zoning Law and Practice 
in Wisconsin, p. 27, sec. 8.
72Id. at 33.
73Rohan, at --  § 5.01[2].
74McLean Hospital Corporation v. Town of Belmont, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 545, 778 N.E. 2d 1016, 1020 
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to regulate on behalf of the public in return for contractual benefits offered by a landowner 
whose interest is principally served by the zoning action.”75  It is thus said to be an ultra vires act 
bargaining away the police power, since zoning must be governed by the public interest and not 
by benefit to a particular landowner.”76 However, by bargaining away the police powers, the 
courts cannot mean that the current legislature may not enter into binding contracts or other 
obligations whose terms extend beyond the terms of the current body. Such an interpretation 
would almost nullify the municipality’s power to contract and its power to be sued, if every time 
when things looked different, it could claim that the act was outside its power.77  What seems to 
(2002), citing 3 RATHKOPF, ZONING & PLANNING §44:11 (Zeigler rev. ed. 2001).
75McLean, at 545, citing Rando v. North Attleborough, 44 Mass.  App. Ct. 603, 607, 692 N.E.2d 544 
(1998).
76Pima Gro Sys. v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Va. Cir. 241 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), citing 83 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning 
and Planning, § 46.   In Derrenger v. Billings, 213 Mont. 469 ( Mont. 1984), landowner Derrenger purchased a 
parcel of land comprised of three tracts.  One tract was zoned for single-family residences. The remaining two tracts 
were zoned Agriculture Open Space. Thereafter, the City of Billings and the landowner entered into a written 
agreement entitled “Waiver of Right to Protest Annexation and Agreement on Non-conforming Use.” The two tracts 
were annexed and rezoned R-96.  Later, a subsequent owner of the tract, proposed to build a multi-family residential 
unit on his property, all portions of which were then zoned R-96.  His plans were objected to and he sued for 
construction on the meaning of the restriction on use in the annexation agreement.  The trial court found that the 
subject agreement was clear on its face and did not constitute contract zoning. The appellate court reversed, holding 
the issue reduced to simplest terms was whether “residential purposes” was so clear on its face as to preclude multi-
family residential purposes. The court thought not.” Id. at 473. “[T]here is a fact question about what was intended.  
The parties may have intended to assure additional future uses in return for agreeing to annexation.  They may not 
have fully understood the limitations on contract zoning.  Surely, they must have intended to receive some 
consideration for not protesting annexation. Id. at 474.  The dissenting opinion by Justice Gulbrandson would have 
found contract zoning, stating, “[t]he parcel of land located within the City of Billings and having been zoned for 
single-family residence long before the date of the agreement, but bearing a non-residential non-conforming use 
could not legally be the subject of an agreement whereby the City would agree to grant a residential multi-family use 
variance. Such an agreement, in my view, would constitute contract zoning.” Id. at 475-76.  The Justice went on to 
state, “[a] contract made by the zoning authorities to zone or rezone for the benefit of a private landowner is illegal 
and is denounced by the courts as ‘contract zoning’ and as an ultra vires bargaining away of the police power.” The 
parties may have intended to assure additional future uses in return for agreeing to annexation, but in his view, “such 
an additional future residential use would constitute illegal contract zoning.” Id.
77A New Jersey court in Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117 (N.J. 1965), enforced an 
agreement against the municipality finding such an obligation did not constitute a contracting away of the police 
power.  The landowners had an agreement with the borough that no building could be erected in the area exceeding 
35 feet in order to preserve the beauty of the area.  The borough subsequently amended the zoning ordinance to 
allow the developer to construct a tower in excess of 35 feet.   The developer contended  that the borough did not 
have the power to restrict the use of privately owned property pursuant to an agreement with landowners or to agree 
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be the meaning given to the phrase by the courts goes largely to the process of decisionmaking in 
the particular rezoning at issue.   Did the municipality, through its zoning authority, arrive at the 
decision based upon its own assessment of what best serves the public health, safety and 
welfare78 and provided the public an opportunity to participate in the zoning procedure before it 
acted to rezone? 79  Substantively, did the municipality purport to surrender all power to act in the 
to insure the integrity of the skyline of the Palisades through its power of zoning.  Such action, the developer argued, 
would be invalid as “contract zoning.”  The court agreed with the general proposition that a municipality may not 
contract away its legislative or governmental powers.  However, the court ruled a municipality possesses not only 
such rights as are granted to it in express terms by the Legislature, but as well such other powers as “arise by 
necessary or fair implication, or are incident to the powers expressly conferred, or are essential to the declared 
objects and purposes of the municipality.”   Accordingly, the general proposition is subject to the limitation that 
where a municipality has incurred an obligation which it has the power to incur it cannot escape that obligation by 
asserting that it is merely exercising the police power delegated to it. Such an exception is necessarily appended to 
every such municipal contract. Id at 133.  The court went on to hold that the “the municipality, by virtue of the 
statute, had the express statutory power to execute the earlier contract imposing the restrictive covenants. The 
purpose of that agreement was not to restrict the municipality from further zoning. The sole objective was the 
imposition of restrictive covenants on specifically described parcels of land.  From that contract flowed the same 
duty and obligation that would be incurred by individuals and private corporations under similar circumstances, i.e., 
the duty not to take any affirmative action which would destroy the fruits thereof.  N.J.S.A. 40:60-26;  N.J.S.A.
40:60-51.2.  Under such circumstances, barring the borough from taking affirmative governmental or legislative 
action which would constitute a breach of its agreement is not to be regarded as the proscribed contracting away of 
such powers.  The borough could not escape the obligations incurred by the earlier agreement under the guise of 
police power. The landowners and the Commission were therefore entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief 
against this “inequitable conduct” because “the borough violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in its agreement with the [landowners] when it amended the zoning ordinance.” Id. at 134-35. 
78 See Alderman v. Chatham County, 89 N.C. App. 610 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)(The rezoning here was 
accomplished as a direct consequence of the conditions regarding density of land use agreed to by the applicant 
rather than as a valid exercise of the county’s legislative discretion).
79Deland v. Town of Berkeley Heights, 2003 N.J.Super LEXIS 184; see also Warner Co. v. Sutton,   274 
N.J. Super. 464 (Super. N.J. App. 1994).  There, landowner owned approximately 3,000 acres of land adjoining the 
Manumuskin Watershed in Maurice River Township, which for many years was used for mining of sand as a legal 
nonconforming use.  Then the city rezoned the land to a classification in which mining was not permitted.  The 
landowner’s application for a renewal of its license to continue its mining activity was in part granted and in part 
tabled.  The landowner sued seeking to invalidate the ordinance, alleging spot zoning and a taking of property.  The 
parties reached a tentative settlement of the suit.   Under the proposed agreement, the Township recognized 
Landowner’s mining nonconforming use status, and that it applied essentially to Landowner’s entire tract. 
Landowner abandoned its challenge to the rezoning and its damage claim, and in turn was given a conditional right 
to construct a planned residential village on the tract.  The court found that the consent order caused the municipality 
to surrender its legislative function, and took away the public’s right to be heard.  The court held that the consent 
order amounted to contract zoning, and that it frustrated the public’s right to be heard on rezoning.  In other words, 
the municipality’s exercise of its police power to serve the common good and general welfare of all its citizens “may 
not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its exercise controlled by the considerations which enter into the law of 
contracts.”  See also State ex. rel. Zupanic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d at 33 (“contract zoning is illegal not because of 
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future to protect the public health, safety and welfare? Where the answer to the first question is 
in the affirmative and the second in the negative, an agreement between a municipality and a 
private landowner should be enforceable.
But, not all agreements between the municipality and a developer amount to contract 
zoning.  Instead, the courts have said that “contract zoning,” connotes a transaction wherein both 
the landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action and the zoning authority itself undertake 
reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral contract.”80   “In short, a ‘meeting of the 
minds’ must occur; [and] mutual assurances must be exchanged.”81  Thus, the central issue in 
many of these cases is whether or not there were bilateral negotiations between the landowner 
and the city resulting in an agreement, which consisted of mutual covenants; that is, mutual 
promises with consideration running to both parties from the other as opposed to the unilateral 
imposition of conditions by the municipality which conditions were for the benefit of the general 
public as opposed to the landowner as an individual.82
In accordance with this definition in evaluating a charge of contract zoning, courts have 
undertaken the seemingly impossible task of distinguishing those agreements involving bilateral 
exchanges from those involving unilateral promises from the landowner.  Courts look to see if 
there has been the use of governmental power as a bargaining chip and where rezoning occurs 
the result but because of the method.”). 
80Chrismon v. Guilford County, 332 N.C. 611 (1988); Graham v. Raleigh, 55 N.C. App. 107, 112-13 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1981)(Absence in the record of any representation by the developer as to their specific plans for 
development of the subject property, meant there was no unlawful contract zoning involved in the adoption of the 
challenged ordinance.)
81Hall v. City of Durham, 323 N.C. 298, 298-99 (1988).
82O’Dell v. Board of Comm’rs of Johnson City, 910 S.W.2d 436  (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)(The proof showed 
no evidence of a bilateral agreement, the landowner followed the customary procedure in an attempt to have its 
property rezoned, there is no evidence of negotiations between the parties, and no quid pro quo, only unilateral 
conditions requiring that necessary improvements be made).
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not based on the merits of the zoning change request, nor because it is in the public interest, but 
because a deal had been struck.83  On the other hand, where a developer makes promises 
regarding the use of the land, but the city council makes no reciprocating promises, the rezoning 
that follows is not be regarded as contract zoning. If all that is alleged is that “a reciprocal 
understanding resulted in a tacit agreement” based upon the landowner’s assurance to the zoning 
authorities that the property would be used only for a particular purpose and that any activity of 
the zoning authority, no contract zoning is found based upon the assumption that this was the use 
to which the property would be subjected to the rezoning.84 Courts have explained that “[t]he 
illegal aspect of contract zoning occurs when a zoning authority binds itself to enact a zoning 
amendment and agrees not to alter the zoning change for a specified period of time.85  When a 
zoning authority takes such a step and curtails its independent legislative power, it has acted 
ultra vires and the rezoning is therefore a nullity.86  Short of such act, however, the rezoning of 
83Id. at---.
84Dale v. Columbus, 101 N.C. App. 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). There, a small tract was rezoned Highway 
Commercial from an R-2 Residential district. The parcel faced a major highway to its south and across that road, the 
land was zoned Public Service.  At its southwest corner, the tract touched a Highway Commercial district and a city 
boundary.  Across that boundary was a county Highway Commercial district. The record was clear that the planning 
board discussed the negative effects of highway traffic on any residential property along the road.  The board 
reviewed the commercial nature of the remainder of the and the town’s comprehensive plan of commercial 
development along the highway.  It also discussed the possible benefits of increasing the town’s tax base and 
providing more jobs through the establishment of more commercial enterprises. The appellate court ruled that there 
was no showing of illegal contract zoning which “properly connotes a transaction wherein both the landowner who 
is seeking a certain zoning action and the zoning authority itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a 
bilateral contract.” Id. at 338, citing Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. at 635, 370 S.E.2d at 593; see Allred v. 
City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432, and Blades, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35. 
85 Id. at 338, citing Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. at 635, 370 S.E.2d at 593 (citing Shapiro, The 
Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 Temp. L.Q. 267, 269 (1968).
86Id..  The court found no evidence of any reciprocal agreement made between the board and the current 
owner, the applicant who filed for rezoning, or with anyone else concerning the property.  The transcript was 
unequivocal that the board understood that if the property was rezoned, the owner was not bound to operate an 
automobile dealership or any other specific establishment on the tract.  The record was also clear that the board was 
advised of all the possible uses that could be made in a Highway Commercial district and of the possible uses if the 
property remained R-2 Residential. After comparing the two alternatives, the board made the decision to rezone.” 
Dale v. Columbus, 101 N.C. App. at  339-40. The court then concluded, “[f]urthermore, all the proper rezoning 
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land raises no contract zoning issue.87
2.  Some Courts Rejecting Per Se Illegality of Agreements 
Most jurisdictions have declared agreements amounting to contract zoning invalid per 
se.
88
 The reasoning being that “the police power may not be exerted to serve private interests 
procedures were followed in this case. Initially, the proposed change was referred to the Town Planning and Zoning 
Board, which endorsed the change.  A public hearing was held, and at a separate public meeting, the board 
unanimously adopted the zoning change.  There was no indication that the Board’s decision was a foregone 
conclusion or that the decision-making procedures were a ploy to cover up a hidden agreement between the 
landowner and the zoning authority.  Plaintiffs’ argument that the board’s knowledge of the landowner’s intended 
use may have influenced their decision was not sufficient to support an allegation that contract zoning occurred. Id. , 
citing Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. at 636, 370 S.E.2d at 593.
87The Alabama courts have also looked for a “binding mutual agreement between the city and the developer 
before finding contract zoning.  In Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 So.2d 1303 (Ct.Civ.App. 1988).  The city gave 
a right of way to the property owner through park land for a road to facilitate the development of newly annexed 
adjoining land, which the city rezoned.  The court found no evidence of an agreement between the city and 
developer to rezone.  Rather, the agreement was that if the Zoning and Planning Commission did not rezone the 
property to the classification sought, and there appeared to be no assurance that it would then, the city would agree 
to de-annex the property. Id. at 1306. Moreover, the court found the city did not abdicate its legislative responsibility 
with regard to annexing and rezoning of the property.  On the contrary, the evidence indicated the city was 
extensively involved in the development of the subdivision.  There was much negotiation between the city the 
developer both as to the type of residential subdivision that would be built and type of road that would be laid 
through the park.  And, public hearings were held on the developer’s petition to rezone. Id. at 1306.
88 In Wilmington Sixth District Community Committee v. Pettinaro Enterprises, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142 
defendants sought to have rezoned a former hospital site to permit residential development and use.   Defendants 
negotiated for the possible purchase of the site, which required rezoning.  There was introduced an ordinance 
providing for the rezoning of the site for residential use.   Shortly thereafter, defendants met with representatives of 
the Committee to assuage the expressed concerns over the possibility of the renting of the units erected on the site, 
the lack of adequate parking and the increased congestion which would follow in the neighborhood if the rezoning 
occurred.  Defendants assured the Committee and represented at a public hearing that all housing units would be 
offered for sale with no rentals and that ample parking would be provided and that they would ask the seller to place 
restrictions in the deed of conveyance to that effect.  The application for rezoning received unanimous approval 
from the Planning Commission.  However, the deed did not contain any such restriction and defendants changed 
their plans deciding on 3 story townhouses, establishing a lease payment arrangement whereby a prospective 
purchaser could lease a unit for a time. Plaintiffs filed an action seeking specific performance of defendant’s 
representations to the Council. Defendants asserted two arguments that the representations made to the Council did 
not as a matter of law create an enforceable contract, the performance of which could be specifically enforced 
because it would amount to contract zoning.  The court stated: “even assuming arguendo that the necessary 
prerequisites for a contract arose by the defendant’s representations to Council, contracts between a municipality 
and a developer to rezone in accordance with mutual promises are apparently per se invalid in Delaware,” as the 
legislative function may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its exercise controlled by the consideration 
which enter into the law of contracts. The court noted that this rule is contrary to the holdings of some other courts 
which have upheld contract zoning if reasonable, non-discriminating and serving the public welfare. Id. at *8.  The 
court went on to distinguish contract zoning (involving a bilateral agreement) from conditional zoning (where the 
government does not agree to rezone but merely decides to impose conditions which would otherwise not be 
applicable to the land), but found the rezoning here was not conditional zoning because the council approved the 
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merely, nor may the principle be subverted to that end.”89  Further, the rezoning of a parcel of 
property by a municipality based in any way upon an offer or agreement by an owner of property 
is said to be illegal to the extent that it is inconsistent with, and disruptive of, a comprehensive 
plan.”90  One court stated: “[i]f local government could change its zoning laws by private 
agreements with individual landowners, a hodgepodge of regulations would develop, the 
legislative process would be usurped, and the public good would be compromised.”91   Still, as 
stated, it is not at all clear from a reading of the cases when contract zoning occurs and not all 
zoning actions taken in connection with an agreement with an affected landowner is unlawful, 
that is, the existence of an agreement per se does not invalidate related zoning actions.  Instead, 
in most jurisdictions, it is the nature of the agreement and the character of the zoning action that 
determines the outcome.92  Some courts have specifically upheld contract zoning or have 
declined to declare it illegal under all circumstances.93  In Alaska, contract zoning has been 
ordinance without written conditions, and there were no recorded covenants, agreements, which could show the 
existence of conditional zoning.  Id. at *9.
89Id., citing Powell on Real Property §871.4[2] 1988 and cases cited therein; see also Hartman v. Buckson, 
Del. Ch. 467 A.2d 694, 699-70 (1983); quoting V.F..Zahodiakin Eng. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, N.J. 
Super., 86 A.2d 127, 131 (1953). 
90Riverschase Homeowners Protective Assoc.,Inc. v. City of Hoover, 531 So.2d 645 (Ala. 1988); Willis v. 
Union County, 77 N.C. App. 407, 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (to avoid contract zoning, all the areas in each class 
must be subject to the same restrictions.  If the rezoning is done in consideration of an assurance that a particular 
tract or parcel will be developed in accordance with a restricted plan this is contract zoning and is illegal; evidence 
in this case showed that at meetings regarding the rezoning petition, defendants’ attorney referred to specific plans, 
including drawings and rental rates for a proposed apartment building to be constructed on the property; and also 
that the attorney made representations at the various hearings to the effect that there should be no concern about 
mobile homes on the property after rezoning because the defendants were willing to put restrictions in the deeds 
prohibiting mobile homes); See also Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E. 2d 432 (1971)(contract zoning 
illegal). 
91 Pima Gros System, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of King George County, 52 Va. Cir. at 244.  (county did 
not just agree to rezone, an act which of itself is generally illegal as “contract zoning”; rather, the county actually 
agreed to allow an activity that was prohibited to all others under the zoning ordinance, such act being beyond the 
county’s powers).  
92McLean, at 545, 1020.
93 See e.g., Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 143 (Ark.. March 20, 2003) where a 
company wanted to sell fireworks within the city.  Another company was permitted to sell fireworks only because it 
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soundly upheld.  City of Homer & City Council v. Campbell,94 finding contract zoning a property 
right, the deprivation of which is subject to due process.95  In State ex rel. Myhre v. City of 
Spokane,96 the court took the view that “a zoning ordinance and a concomitant agreement should 
be declared invalid only if it can be shown there was no valid reason for a change and that they 
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and have no substantial relation to public health, safety, 
morals and general welfare, or if the city is using the concomitant agreement for bargaining and 
sale to the highest bidder or solely for the benefit of private speculators.”97
The courts of Indiana have declined to rule on the question whether contract zoning is 
illegal.  In Prock v. Town of Danville,98 the court declared “Indiana courts have not yet addressed 
the issue whether a contract for zoning is illegal.  However, the court noted, several courts in its 
sister states have considered the issue and, in general, they hold that contract zoning is illegal.”99
was grandfathered into the city limits.  Company filed federal action against the city.   At public hearings, the 
company agreed to dismiss the suit if the city voted in favor of an ordinance allowing the sale of fireworks from a 
specific location.  The city passed several zoning ordinances to allow this.  The ordinances were challenged as 
contract zoning.  The trial court determined that the only reason the city relented to the company’s demands was to 
settle the suit.  But, such settlement could be upheld as long as the city went through a bona fide procedure in the 
zoning process.  The supreme court found that the trial court was correct in finding that the company and the city 
had not entered into any type of binding agreement to settle until the city council meeting, the agreement was only 
finalized after the city council passed the challenged ordinance, not before.  The court otherwise found none of the 
circumstances which traditionally give rise to a finding of contract zoning was present.  Therefore, the question of 
the legality of contract zoning in the State of Arkansas was not an issue to be addressed by this court in the instant 
appeal.  The legality of contract zoning was an issue of first impression in the State of Arkansas, the court noting 
that not all jurisdictions that have examined the issue have found contract zoning to be prohibited. 
94719 P.2d 683 (Alas. 1986).
95Id., citing Seward Chapel, Inc. v. Seward,  655 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Alas. 1982).
9670 Wash. 2d 207, 216, 422 Pac. 2d 790, 796 (1967)(The court found that the concomitant agreement was 
not ultra vires because: (1) the city's requirement that it be reimbursed for costs related to condemnation proceedings 
for property needed for right-of-ways was within the city's legislative authority; and (2) the agreement only granted 
the development company its statutory right to file a petition to vacate certain streets, but did not oblige the city to 
grant such a petition.
97Id.; see also Hudson Oil Co. of Missouri v. City of Wichita, 193 Kan. 623, 396 P. 2d 271 (1964). 
98655 N.E.2d 553 (Ind.Ct. App. 1995).
99Id. at 559, citing Ford Leasing Developmemnt Corp.v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 186 Colo418, 528 P.2d 
237, 240 (1974)(recognizing that the general rule in most states is that contract zoning is illegal as an ultra vires
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The court went on to discuss Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso,100 from the New Mexico Supreme 
Court.  That case defined contract zoning as “an agreement between a municipality and another 
party in which the municipality’s consideration consists of either a promise to zone the property 
in a requested manner or the actual act of zoning the property in that manner...”  However, the 
Dacy court refused to subscribe to a per se rule against contract zoning, but recognized that 
numerous courts had in fact declared contract zoning invalid per se, because it is an illegal 
bargaining away or abrogation of the police power”101  The Dacy court explained further that a 
contract in which a municipality promises to zone property in a specified manner is illegal 
because, in making such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to 
zone the property according to prescribed legislative procedures, including notice and a public 
hearing prior to passage and a right of citizens to be heard at the hearing.  By making a promise 
to rezone before a rezoning hearing occurs, a municipality denigrates the statutory process 
because it purports to commit itself to certain action before listening to the public’s comments on 
that action.102  However, in Dacy,103 the supreme court pointed out that analysis implies that one 
form of contract zoning is legal: a unilateral contract in which a party makes a promise in return 
for a municipality’s act of rezoning.  In this situation, the municipality makes no promise and 
there is no enforceable contract until the municipality acts to rezone the property.  Because the 
municipality does not commit itself to any specified action before the zoning hearing, it does not 
bargaining away of the police power); Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791, 795 
(1969)(zoning ordinances should not be subject to bargaining or contract).
100114 N.M. 699, 845 P.2d 793, 796 (1992).
101Id. citing Dacy at 797, in turn citing V.F. Zahodiakin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd of Adjiustment, 8 
N.J.386, 86 A.2d 127, 131(1952); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
102Id. at --.
103114 N.M. 699, 845 P.2d 793 (N.M. 1992).
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circumvent statutory procedures or compromise the rights of affected persons.104  The court 
pointed out that some have nonetheless condemned this form of contract zoning on the ground 
that the contracting party’s promise provides improper motivation for the municipality’s 
rezoning action.   The court did not find this reasoning persuasive, since private interests are 
inherently involved in any zoning matter.  Moreover, any potential misconduct that might occur 
through unilateral contract zoning may be corrected through judicial review if the action of the 
zoning authority is improper.105  The Dacy court implied that the agreement that results after the 
zoning hearing would be enforceable against the city; that it is the agreement before 
consideration of relevant factors that makes the agreement illegal.
In Prock, there was no contract zoning because there was no promise by the town that it 
would zone the property in any particular way.  Rather, the agreement provided: “In 
consideration of the payment of the [fee], the town agrees to actively support [the developer’s 
proposed] operation within the [annexed area] and [the developer’s] attempts to secure all 
permits and approvals for [expanding] the area.  Such support may include without limitation the 
submission of whatever reasonable documentation [was] required to establish the town’s need 
for the expansion of the [operation] upon receiving a request to do so from [the developer].”106
The court pointed out, by the agreement, the town was not contractually bound to zone the 
property in a particular way or promised that in the future it would rezone the property to expand 
the landfill.  Further, the town did not promise to support the developer’s efforts regardless of 
104at *12-13.
105at*13-14.
106Id. at *14. 
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whether those effects were in compliance with the town’s statutory zoning procedures.107
Because there was no contract zoning, the court declined to express any opinion as to whether 
such contracts are in fact illegal and may result in rendering a zoning ordinance void.  It seems 
though that in evaluating this bargained for agreement, the court drew a fine line between the 
agreement to support the developer’s application in exchange for the payment of a fee and a 
contract with mutual promises, the city agreeing to rezone in exchange for a fee.  
In a more recent Indiana opinion, the court again declined to take a position on the 
legality of contract zoning.  In Ogden v. Premier Properties, U.S.A., Inc.,108 the city council 
voted to adopt an ordinance which rezoned from residential to commercial certain property.  The 
developer filed a petition to rezone four years earlier to construct a retail shopping facility.  The 
Area Plan Commission recommended denial of the request to the City Council and the City 
Council denied the zoning petition. The developer filed another petition which was also denied, 
then another petition seeking to rezone the property.  The Area Plan Commission recommended 
denial.  Each rezoning petition included a use and development commitment, which placed 
restrictions and requirements on the proposed development.  The city council considered the 
petition at a hearing at which the developer introduced a document titled “covenant” that 
contained written commitments “in addition to the covenants set forth in the use and 
development commitment.”109   The commitments were conditioned on the city council 
approving the developer’s zoning request and were binding on the developer for twenty years.  
107Id. at *14.
108755 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
109The covenant was intended to accommodate the concerns of the adjoining landowners and the city 
council.  For instance, the developer promised to construct berms on two sides of the proposed facility, restrict hours 
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The city council voted in favor of the petition adopting the rezoning ordinance which 
incorporated the use and development commitment.  
The court rejected the contract zoning claim asserted by the neighbors.   The facts there 
were weaker than in Prock where the town was a party to the agreement with the developer and 
agreed to support the developer in obtaining permits and approvals for the project.  Yet, the court 
in Prock  failed to find contract zoning.  Here, the city council was not a party to the covenant, 
which did not bind the city council to zone the property in any particular way.  As in Prock, the 
rezoning was approved before the covenant became effective, that is, the agreement was signed 
after the ordinance was passed, hence the town council could not have contracted away its power 
to zone because the zoning was already completed before the agreement was executed.  Here, a 
provision in the covenant stated it would become effective five days after the passing of the 
ordinance.  Consequently, the court held,  the city council could not have bargained away its 
power to zone by virtue of the covenant.110 The holding in this case can be criticized on the basis 
that the order in which the act of rezoning and formal signing of an agreement to rezone occurs 
does not make a critical difference, if the inducement for the rezoning is the promise by the 
developer and the rezoning contemplates the entering into the agreement.
The Massachusetts courts have also rejected a per se treatment of all agreements between 
a municipality and a developer as illegal contract zoning.   Instead, what seems to matter is 
whether the rezoning serves the public interest and that the consideration offered by the 
developer was not extraneous to the property at issue.  In McLean Hospital v. Town of 
of garbage disposal, maintain landscaping, construct improvements to the roads abutting the facility, including 
adding traffic lanes and turn lanes, and install a traffic light.  Id.
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Belmont,111 prior to rezoning, a hospital was situated on a “single residence D” zoning district, as 
a non-conforming use.  It bordered on the northeast and northwest by residential zoning districts 
and in the southeast by local business districts.   The hospital presented a proposal which led to 
the hospital and town entering into a memorandum of understanding of the proposal which 
contemplated rezoning the entire site, together with commitments generally, but not exclusively 
of benefit to the town (including legal protection of significant historical features, acquisition by 
the town of an interest in the site, including title to a major portion for open space and a 
cemetery), tax exemption for that portion dedicated for hospital operations, traffic management, 
and commitments for recreational benefits.112
Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding, the town embarked on a process leading 
to comprehensive rezoning of the area; the proposed rezoning being substantially similar to the 
memorandum of understanding.113 The town planning board recommended approval of the 
amendment. After extended discussion, the amendment failed.114 But on reconsideration of a 
revised proposal that reflected concerns expressed earlier, the proposal passed.115  The hospital 
and the town then executed a memorandum of agreement incorporating the parties various 
commitments to each other.116  In considering a challenge to the rezoning, the court noted that 
the challengers employed the label “contract zoning” as an epithet that suggested that zoning 
110Id. at 669.
11156 Mass. App. 
112The commitments included reducing the maximum square footage of the research and development 
subdistrict; the payment of  $800,000 by the hospital to the town for traffic mitigation, payment by the town to the 
hospital of $1.5 million, and further amendments. Id.at 542, n.5.
113Id.at 542.
114Id.at 543.
115Id.at 544.
116Id.at 544.
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action taken in connection with any agreement with an affected landowner is unlawful. This was 
wrong as a general proposition.117  The court explained, the existence of an agreement per se
does not invalidate related zoning actions; it is the nature of the agreement and the character of 
the zoning action that determine the outcome.118  Attacks on zoning enactments as unlawful 
contract zoning had been considered previously by the appellate courts in Massachusetts.  Each 
case featured an agreement between the municipality and the developer; in neither case did the 
court invalidate the zoning action. In the first such case, Sylvania Elec. Prod. Inc. v. Newton,119
the landowner agreed that should the city rezone a potential parcel from a single residence 
district to a limited manufacturing district, it would restrict its uses of the parcel in various ways 
and convey to the city an option to purchase a portion of the property.  It was clear that the 
respective undertakings were contingent on each other or, as the court expressed it, “the option 
proposal was a significant inducement of the zoning amendment and the amendment induced the 
giving of the option.”120  The Sylvania court went on to state, “the mutual dependence of the 
parties’ commitments did not by itself render the zoning aspect invalid.”121 This was true, said the 
court, notwithstanding that local “officials let it be known that favorable rezoning depended in 
great likelihood on the adoption of the option restrictions.”122  Nor did it “infringe zoning 
principles that, in connection with a zoning amendment, land use [was] regulated otherwise than 
by the amendment.”123
117Id. at 545. 
118Id.
119
 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962).
12056 Mass. App. at 545, citing 344 Mass. 428, 433.
121 Id. at 546, citing 344 Mass. at 434.
122Id. at 545-46, citing 344 Mass. at 436.
123 Id. at 546, citing 344 Mass. at 436.
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The court explained, the “zoning regulations . . . exist[ed] unaffected by, and did not 
affect, deed restrictions.”124  In other words, the zoning action, if otherwise valid, stood by itself 
and its legitimacy was not lessened because it was accompanied, and even encouraged, by 
ancillary agreements not involving consideration extraneous to the property being rezoned.125 In 
Sylvania, the zoning decision that the locus, as restricted by the owner, should be a limited 
manufacturing district “was an appropriate and untainted exercise of the zoning power. What 
was done involved no action contrary to the best interest of the city and hence offensive to 
general public policy.”126
The other Massachusetts appellate case, Rando v. North Attleborough,127 was to the same 
effect.  There, a developer sought a rezoning of land from a residential district to a commercial 
district.128 As an inducement to the town, the developer offered various accommodations, 
including a “no build’ buffer zone, traffic improvements, mitigation payments, and a 
commitment not to seek tax abatements with respect to the rezoned land for five years.129 The 
plaintiffs argued that the town had bargained away its police powers in return for the promised 
benefits.130   Likening the objection to that in the Sylvania case, the Rando court held warranted 
the finding of the trial judge that the town meetings had not been “‘improperly influenced to act 
on behalf of the developer rather than in the best interests of the town.’”131  In addition, the 
Rando court agreed that the benefits promised by the developer did not constitute “‘extraneous 
124Id. at 546, citing 344 Mass. at 434.
125Id. at 546, citing 344 Mass. at 434.
126Id. at 546, citing 344 Mass. at 434.
12744 Mass. App. Ct. 603 692 N.E.2d 544 (1998).
128Id. at 546, citing 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 604.
129Id. at 546, citing 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 605.
130Id. at 546, citing 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 607.
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consideration,’” stating, “[w]e do not think a payment that is promised by the developer rather 
than required by the municipality and that is reasonably intended to meet public needs arising out 
of the proposed development can be viewed as an ‘extraneous influence’ upon a zoning 
decision.”132 Under this definition, the zoning authority was found not to have entered into a 
bilateral contract with a landowner because: 1) the landowner’s application for rezoning detailed 
various conditions to be placed on the proposed rezoned property, including undisturbed buffers, 
(these promises being unilateral and no promises were made by the zoning authority; 2) the 
zoning authority imposed a 100 foot buffer on a parcel and made no promise associated with this 
provision and the landowner made no promise in return.  “Viewing the ‘whole record,’ there was 
no evidence that a transaction occurred in which either side undertook to obligate itself in any 
way.  No meeting of the minds took place and no reciprocal assurances were made.133   The court 
continued, “[t]hus, challenges to zoning enactments on the basis that they are products of 
contract zoning provoke two questions: (1) was the action “contrary to the best interest of the 
city and hence offensive to general public policy;” and (2) did it involve extraneous 
consideration “which could impeach the enacting vote as a decision solely in respect of rezoning 
the locus?”134
Rando seems much more narrow and strict in its treatment of agreements between 
municipalities and landowners, than Sylania.  In Sylvania, the court upheld an arrangement 
involving mutual commitments, contingent upon each other, where the landowner’s proposal 
was the main inducement for the rezoning, essentially on the ground that the rezoning was 
131Id. at 546, citing 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 610-11.
132Id. at 546, citing 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 609.
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otherwise in the public interest, although not required.  In contrast, in Rando, the court took pains 
show only unilateral promises by the landowner, seemingly suggesting that contract zoning 
involving a bilateral agreement would be invalid in Massachusetts.  Yet the McLean  court relied 
on both Sylvania and Rando to uphold what could hardly be regarded as anything but a bilateral 
agreement.  The McLean court’s reliance upon both cases, therefore makes the resolution of the 
issue unclear.135 McLean simply found the challengers failed to demonstrate that the interests of 
the town were not served by the rezoning.  Indeed, while McLean’s interests were obviously 
enhanced, a factor that did not discredit the zoning action, the benefits that flowed to the town 
from the agreement were obvious.136 The town faced a situation in which McLean could develop 
the unused portion of its property into single family residences and had an immediate economic 
incentive to do so.137 McLean agreed to surrender this right, a concession of clear benefit to the 
town, on condition that the locus be rezoned; that McLean receive from the town a payment of $ 
1,500,000; and that the town cooperate in an effort to obtain for McLean tax relief that was 
ordinarily enjoyed by institutions of similar character.138 The town received not only the 
elimination of the potential for an undesired residential development of the locus, an 
accomplishment that by itself would appear to satisfy the requirement that the zoning be for a 
133Kerik v. Busick, 145 N.C. App. 222 (2001). [This court quoting the two above].
13444 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 692 N.E. 2d 544 (1998).
135The McLean court went on to state that, “[i]n determining whether the rezoning challenged here satisfied 
the criteria of Sylvania and Rando, we apply the standard that a party attacking a zoning amendment has a heavy 
burden, one requiring that he “‘prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the zoning regulation is arbitrary and 
unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Id. at 547 (citations 
omitted). Id. at 547 (citations omitted).The challenger must demonstrate that the validity of the enactment “‘is not 
even fairly debatable.’”If the validity of the zoning action is fairly debatable, local judgment on the subject should 
be sustained. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
136Id. at 547-48.
137Id. at 548.
138Id. at 548.
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public purpose, but also open space; a cemetery; protection for significant historical features; 
commitments with respect to affordable housing and recreational benefits; and a traffic 
management agreement.139 The town meeting could lawfully conclude that the rezoning, given 
these commitments by the landowner, was substantially related to the general welfare.140  It was 
not improperly influenced to act on behalf of the developer rather than in the best interests of the 
town.141  The consideration flowing to the town under the agreement was not “extraneous” in the 
sense used in Sylvania and Rando, (as, for example, a request to give land for a park elsewhere in 
the city or to the general fund), 142 which could impeach the enacting vote as a decision solely in 
respect of rezoning the locus.143 Rather, each element of such consideration was reasonably 
related to the locus being rezoned. The court explained “[w]e believe it too narrow to require 
that, in order not to be labeled extraneous, consideration must directly ‘mitigate’ some 
deleterious effect of the development authorized by the rezoning (although such consideration 
would obviously be permissible).  Rather, it is adequate that the consideration bear some 
identifiable relationship to the locus so that there can be assurance that the town’s legislative 
body did not act for reasons irrelevant to the zoning of the site at issue.”  This requirement was 
satisfied here.144   It seemed therefore that the crucial point was that the town benefit from the 
developer’s promises and that  those promises relate to the parcel at issue.
In the end of the opinion, the court did state that the “rezoning was not a product of a 
bilateral contract that bound the town to rezone solely in consideration of the promises of the 
139Id. at 548.
140 Id. at 548 citing Sylvania, 344 Mass. at 434.
141
 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 610-611.
142Id. at 548 citing Rando, 44 Mass. App.Ct. at 609.
143Id. at 548 citing Sylvania, 344 Mass. at 434.
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landowner,”145 at the same time recognizing that the rezoning was conditioned on the 
developer’s promises.   It pointed out that the rezoning was not a term of a contract, but was a 
condition that had to be fulfilled before a separate agreement became enforceable.146  The court 
attempted to distinguish this from a bilateral contract between the developer and the municipality 
by stating that in the case before it, “the municipality made no promise and there was no 
enforceable contract until the municipality acted to rezone the property.”147  This distinction 
seems disingenuous and belied by the terms of the agreement. There seems very much of an 
agreement between the parties as the developer’s promises clearly induced the rezoning, and 
these promises would only be fulfilled upon rezoning.  The court could have just upheld the 
rezoning based upon its concluding remarks that it saw nothing in the zoning act,148 or in other 
applicable legal principles that prohibited a municipality from negotiating with a private 
landholder to bring about the receipt of benefits for desirable public purposes once otherwise 
valid zoning has taken place, assuming that those benefits have some reasonable relationship to 
the site governed by the zoning.149  Indeed, as the court recognized such arrangements are 
consistent with good government in general and with effective land use planning in particular.150
The court’s suggestion that a bilateral contract that bound the town to rezone solely in 
consideration of the promises of the landowner would be illegal, but that the city can negotiate 
and extract promises from a landowner and based upon these promises decide to rezone, so long 
144Id. at 547-48.
145Id. at 548-49.
146Id. at 549.
147Id. at 549.  The court also ruled that “[t]he rezoning having been adopted for a valid public purpose in 
relation to an area that is discrete in its geography, contours, and size, it is not spot zoning.  Id. 
148G. L. c. 40A, §§ 1 et seq.
149Id. at 549.
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as the rezoning benefits the city,151 makes too fine a distinction. Yet it seems to reflect the 
approach taken by courts inclined to uphold rezoning where the developer has made significant 
concessions of benefit to the parcel at issue and surroundings.152  In this vein, courts have held 
that that the city stands to benefit from the rezoning, by itself, does not make an agreement 
contract zoning.153
What seems a departure from the qualified conclusion in McLean is Durand v. IDC 
Bellingham, LLC,154 where the court focused it analysis of the contract zoning challenge on the  
relationship the rezoning, finding what can only be regarded as a most  tenuous relationship 
150Id. at 549.
151In Paul v. City of Manhattan, a restrictive covenant did not amount to contract zoning because it was not 
a prerequisite to the zoning, nor a controlling factor in the court’s decision.  They were merely considered as they 
might bear on population density--a key issue raised by plaintiffs. Further, rezoning would conform to the master 
land use plan even if the covenants were ignored.  In Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, Kansas,197 Kan. 731, 421 P.2d 
213 (1966), in connection with an application by the developer for a rezoning, the developer expressed willingness 
to convey to the city an easement for parking purposes consisting of a ten foot strip of land.  Rezoning was 
approved.  The plaintiffs alleged contract zoning. The court held that it had held contrary to the case cited by 
plaintiff, Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita, 193 Kan. 623 , 396 P.2d 271 (1964) stating “obviously the effect of any 
agreement respecting the right of way would be to alleviate the traffic condition.  If it were in fact made by the 
governing body as a prerequisite to rezoning, which does not affirmatively appear, that would be a reasonable 
requirement. Id. at 736, 421 P.2d 218.  See also Bucholz v. Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 
(1963)(upholding zoning ordinance where enacted with protective covenants including a buffer zone between the 
proposed shopping center abutting the residential area where there was no evidence of a bargain or agreement 
between the developer and the city, only representations made by the developer to the city in their rezoning 
application; the effect of the protective covenant was to give some further assurance to the city that the adjoining 
landowners that the representations of the applicant were made in good faith, giving the city greater control over 
development of the property rezoned).  
152See Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, Whitpain Township, 52 Pa. Commw. 145 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1980)(Where the “contract” would consist of special limitations affecting the zoning amendment in respects which 
the landowner accepts in order to have the amendment enacted, have held such “contract zoning” found to be a valid 
exercise of the police power). 
153City of Springfield ex rel. Burton v. City of Springfield, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2721, *8. (Ohio Ct. App. 
2000)(The city agreed to bear the cost of construction with the understanding that, if the zoning was changed to 
allow for residential or commercial development of the abutting property, the developer would contribute to the cost 
of the road in proportion to the manner and extent to which the property was developed.  Neither the original 
agreement nor side agreement, which supplemented it, required the city to zone the property in any particular way; 
the fact that a city stood to benefit from a zoning decision did not disqualify the city from enacting zoning 
regulations and “could not be considered as illegally controlling the course of legislative decision making”).
154
 440 Mass. 45 (2003).
38
between the consideration received and the parcel at issue sufficient to avoid the contracting 
away of governmental powers challenge.  There, the Massachusetts high court upheld a rezoning 
where the developer offered to make an $8 million gift for the construction of a new high school 
if its rezoning was permitted and a power plant built and operated on the site.155 The town held an 
open town meeting at which the proposed rezoning was introduced.  IDC made a presentation at 
the meeting and reiterated its offer of an $8 million gift.  The planning board and finance 
committee both recommended passage of the zoning article.  There was some discussion of the 
zoning aspects of the proposal, as well as discussion regarding the offered gift.  The ordinance 
passed by more than the two-thirds vote required. Thereafter, IDC submitted an application for 
five special permits, which were granted.  Landowners located near the site filed suit against 
IDC, the town and the town zoning board of appeals, arguing inter alia that the rezoning 
constituted illegal “contract zoning” or “spot zoning”.  The trial court viewed the $8 million gift 
as extraneous consideration since no attempt was made to show it was offered to mitigate the 
impact of the project.  As such, it was offensive to public policy.  The trial court ruled that the 
offer made was sufficient to nullify the rezoning vote, even without the necessity of finding that 
155 Id. at 47. Previously, the town had begun to examine ways to increase it property tax base and an 
economic development task force was appointed to study the issue.  The task force prepared a report, identifying a 
parcel of land which abutted land already zoned for industrial use, as a candidate for rezoning from agriculture and 
suburban to industrial use.  Subsequently, at the town meeting, a zoning article proposing the rezoning fell eight 
votes short of the required two-thirds majority. Thereafter, IDC, which owned a power plant in the town, began 
discussions with town officials about the possibility of rezoning the site so that a second plant might ultimately be 
built on it.  These discussions included the subject of what public benefits and financial inducements IDC might 
offer the town with regard to the proposed power plant.  The town administrator told IDC that the town was facing 
an $8 million shortfall in its plans to construct a much needed new high school.  Shortly thereafter, the president of 
IDC publicly announced that IDC would make an $8 million gift to the town if IDC decided to build the plant; 
obtained the financing and permits necessary to build the plant and operated the plant successfully for one year.  The 
offer was made to generate support for the plant and became public knowledge in the town. Id. at 47.
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voting town meeting members were influenced by it.156  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts reversed.157  “The enactment of a zoning bylaw by the voters at town meeting is 
not only the exercise of an independent police power; it is also a legislative act, …carrying a 
strong presumption of validity.”158 It will not normally be undone unless the plaintiff can 
demonstrate “‘by a preponderance of the evidence that the zoning regulation is arbitrary and 
unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public health, safety, … or general welfare.’”159
The court explained, this analysis is not affected by consideration of the various possible motives 
that may have inspired the legislative action.160 The court explained, contract zoning involves a 
promise by the municipality to rezone a property either before the vote to rezone has been taken 
or before the required statutory process has been undertaken.  The court ruled that the trial court 
found no such advance agreement occurred here, since despite IDC’s offer of $8 million, the 
voters of the town meeting were not bound to approve the zoning change.  Because the town 
followed the statutory procedures, the rezoning was not illegal under state law on that basis.  
The court noted that the trial judge found the $8 million offer substantively valid, 
meaning not arbitrary nor unreasonable, and was substantially related to the public health, safety, 
or general welfare of the town.  In other words, its adoption served a public purpose.  Here, the 
site abutted land zoned for industrial use; a town-appointed task force had recommended its 
rezoning after studying the town’s tax base and the need for economic development and a 
156 Id. at 49-50.
157 The court began with a discussion of the source of the municipality power to enact local ordinances, i.e, 
the Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution.  The zoning power enabled municipalities to enact zoning 
ordinances or bylaws as an exercise of their “independent police powers.”Id. at 51.
158 Id. at 51.
159 Id. at 51.  [citations omitted].
160 Id. at 51. [citations omitted].
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previous rezoning attempt barely failed the two-thirds vote required.  Therefore, the enactment of 
the rezoning was not violative of state law or constitutional provisions as the $8 million was not 
extraneous consideration. Instead, the court concluded that a voluntary offer of public benefits is 
not, standing alone an adequate ground on which to set aside an otherwise valid legislative act.161
In general, the court found no reason to invalidate a legislative act on the basis of an “extraneous 
consideration” because courts defer to legislative findings and choices without regard to motive.  
And, the court saw no reason to make an exception for legislative acts that are in the nature of 
zoning enactments, and found no persuasive authority for the proposition that an otherwise valid 
zoning enactment is invalid if it is any way prompted or encouraged by a public benefit 
voluntarily offered.162   The offer of a benefit in exchange for the exercise of the municipality’s 
zoning power seems to fall at the heart of the contract zoning prohibition, if the prohibition exists 
for that sake alone. But if it exists to impose a showing that the rezoning act is otherwise in the 
public interest, then the fact that a municipality achieves a benefit while otherwise faithfully 
carrying out its responsibilities then what was upheld should not be of great concern, particularly 
161
 The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the trial court’s reliance on Sylvania to this effect was misplaced.  
That opinion cited no supporting authority for the proposition that the presence of an “extraneous consideration” at 
the time of the vote on a zoning amendment would invalidate the vote, but the language has since been given added 
life in two cases decided by the Appeals Court, McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Belmont, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 546-547 
(2002), discussed supra, where the court held that the promise of the landowner to surrender its right to develop an 
unused part of the property and provided open space; a cemetery; protection for significant historical features; 
commitments with respect to affordable housing and recreational benefits; and a traffic management agreement were 
not extraneous consideration, but as reasonably related to the locus being rezoned); Rando v. North Attleborough, 44 
Mass. App. Ct. 603, 608-09 (1998)(payment that is promised by the developer rather than required by the 
municipality and that is reasonably intended to meet public needs arising out of the proposed development can not 
be viewed as an ‘extraneous influence’ upon a zoning decision.”).
162 Id. at 57.  The dissent found that the town meeting improperly agreed to exercise its power to rezone 
land in exchange for a promise to pay money; the exercise of that power to approve the requested zoning change 
was a condition precedent to the promise of IDC to pay money under its agreement with the town; that this was not a 
decision solely in respect of rezoning the site; the parties struck a bargain: the payment of money in return for a 
zoning change.   This was a sale of the police power because nothing in the record legitimized the $8 million offer as 
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if the municipality could have rezoned without the benefit offered.  Although, there is the 
concern that the public interest considerations may be given short shrift with the lure of $8 
million dollars, but that can be tested by judicial review.163
B.  Lack of Transparency Where Zoning Bypasses the Statutory Procedures 
Contract zoning has been held to be objectionable where it bypasses the notice and public 
hearing procedures required for enacting a zoning ordinance.164 The lack of transparency occurs 
even if the municipality informs the public at the time of the rezoning that the land at issue will 
be governed by separate rules, because others who come later to examine the ordinance to try to 
understand the general plan for the community will not understand  fully how the plan is 
intended to mitigate the impact of the development upon the town, or as reasonably intended to meet public needs 
arising out of the proposed development. 
163But see Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. Mo. E.D. 1980).  There, the court, in its in-
depth discussion of contract zoning stated, declared invalid as an instance of contract zoning, an ordinance where the 
consideration was extraneous to the land at issue. There, “[t]he ‘contract zoning’ charge arose from the requirement 
of the ordinance that the developer improve the road next to the property and widen a one-lane bridge on the road 
near, but not adjacent to, the property.” Id. at 716. The court explained that where the offer made or the exaction 
demanded for the rezoning bears no reasonable relationship to the activities of the developer the action of the county 
or municipality in rezoning the property in exchange for such offer or exaction, amounts to a contracting away of the 
police power, which is forbidden. Id. at 715.  The court addressed the case of State ex rel Noland v. St. Louis 
County, which dealt with this problem in the context of subdivision legislation. “The test to be applied there was: 
that there must be some ‘reasonable relationship’ between the proposed activity of the landowner and the exaction of 
government. Id. at 716-17, citing Art. XI, Sec. 3, Mo. Const.; see also Kansas City Power and Light Co. v. Midland 
Realty Co., 338 Mo. 1141, 93 S.W.2d 954 (1936), aff’d, Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 
300 U.S. 109, reh. den. 300 U.S. 687, (1937).   Whether or not the conditions imposed are within or outside the area 
of the subdivision would be immaterial so long as they met such a standard.  Id.  The court stated that it is not clear 
what distinction the State ex. rel. Noland court was drawing between zoning and subdivision cases and doubted that 
the court meant that in zoning the relationship could be unreasonable. Because there were no cases in Missouri 
involving zoning conditioned upon a particular performance, the court may have been distinguishing zoning and 
subdivision control for that reason.”  Id. The court went on to discuss City of Bellefontaine Neighbors v. J. J. Kelley 
R & B Co., 460 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. App. 1970), in which that court upheld the validity of a road improvement 
promise by the subdivision developer as a condition to development of the subdivision. There the court “recognized 
that such power could arise from a zoning or street development plan, and in that case the city had acted under a 
provision of its zoning ordinance.” The test applied in State ex rel Noland v. St. Louis County, has been applied in 
other jurisdictions, including State ex rel Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash.2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967); City of 
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designed  because the plan itself will not reflect all of the considerations which went into the 
rezoning decision.  Similarly, if the planning board has already contracted to support the 
landowners’ requrest for rezoning before public hearing, it had invalidly contracted away its 
discretionary legislative power as the final decisionmaking authority.  Hearings regarding the 
issue of rezoning would then be a pro forma exercise since the County has already obligated 
itself to a decision.165  The court concluded that the county’s agreement to “support and 
expeditiously process” landowner rezoning application can be viewed as a form of contract 
zoning.166
Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953). Id. at 717, citing Home Builders Association of 
Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. banc 1977).”
164Morgran Company, Inc. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2002).
165Id. at 644.  The city had not expressly or irrevocably committed itself to rezone the area.  Nonetheless, 
the court concluded that since the decision to rezone was contingent on the filing of restrictive covenants by the 
developer a bargaining away of police power had occurred.  at 89.
166 Id. The question of bypassing the notice and public hearing procedures has also arisen in the context of 
settlement of litigation brought by a developer challenging the municipality’s denial of an application for a proposed 
land use. Chung v. Sarasoata County, 686 S.2d 1358 (Fla. 2d Dist.Ct. App.(1996). There, the landowner filed a 
petition with the county to rezone eleven acres.  After rezoning petition was denied by the county commissioner, 
landowner took legal action.  Then the landowner and the county entered into a settlement agreement which 
obligated the county to rezone the landowner’s property, subject to numerous stipulations and conditions.  Based 
upon the settlement, the trial court entered a stipulated final judgment and retained jurisdiction over its enforcement.  
An adjacent landowner intervened and the trial court vacated the stipulated final judgment.  On appeal, the adjacent 
landowner argued the settlement amounted to contract zoning.  In agreeing with the adjacent landowner, the court 
explained that “contract zoning refers to an agreement between a property owner and a local government where the 
owner agrees to certain conditions in return for the government’s rezoning or an enforceable promise to rezone.” 
The court explained that “one of the reasons contract zoning is generally rejected is because ‘the legislative power to 
enact and amend zoning regulations requires due process, notice, and hearings.’” “Assuming that the developer and 
municipality bargain for a rezoning ordinance that is fairly debatable and non-discriminatory, contract zoning is 
nevertheless illegal when they enter into a bilateral agreement involving reciprocal obligations.  By binding itself to 
enact the requested ordinance (or not to amend the existing ordinance), the municipality bypasses the hearing phase 
of the legislative process.” Here, under the settlement agreement, the county bound itself before satisfying the public 
notice and hearing requirements.   This could not be allowed for the carefully structured provisions for public notice, 
public hearings, and in many cases, required consideration of staff or planning commission recommendations, would 
be stripped of all meaning and purpose if the decisionmaking body had previously bound itself to reach a specified 
result. Id. citing D. Lawlor, Annotation, Validity, Construction, & Effect of Agreement to Rezone or Amendment to 
Zoning Ordinance, Creating Special Restrictions or Conditions not Applicable to Other Property Similarly Zoned,
70 A.L.R.3d 125, 131 (1976); P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo, 549 So.2d 738 (Fla 2d D.C.A. 1989);  see also 
Terry Lewis, et. al., Spot Zoning, Contract Zoning, & Conditional Zoning, in 2 Florida Environmental & Land Use 
Law 9-1, 9-13 (James J. Brown, ed.2d 1994); Roy P. Cookston & Burt Bruton, Zoning Law, 35 U.Miami L. Rev. 
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The Maryland courts have taken a similar position on rezoning arising out of settlement 
agreements, specifically and against agreements whereby the city agrees to rezone upon the 
landowner’s agreement to conditions to be imposed on the land.167
581, 589, n. 34 (1981); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956). The Second and Fourth Districts of Florida have 
come to mixed decisions when confronted with the issue of contract zoning in the context of settlement agreements.
PCB Partnership City of Largo, 549 So. 738 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. (1989), ruled that contract zoning was 
unenforceable because it restricts the city decisionmaking responsibility and eliminates the city’s ability to exercise 
its police power.. Conversely, the Fourth District in Moling v. Tradewinds Development Corp, 526 S.2d 695 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) upheld a rezoning settlement agreement and ordered the city to comply with the agreed 
terms. In Chung, it can be argued that the court did not prohibit settlement agreements per se, but implied that the 
agreements may be upheld if the local government conforms to the due process, notice and hearing requirements.  
But see Warren v. Sutton, 274 N.J. Super. 464 (Super. N.J.App. 1994)(invalidating ordinance resulting  from consent 
order as surrendering of legislative function); Toll Bros. v. Township of W. Windsor, 334 N.J. Super. 77 (Super. Ct. 
N.J. App. Div. 2000)(holding that consent orders and judgments are not necessarily a form of contract zoning 
provided certain procedures are followed to ensure that the interests of low and moderate income households are 
adequately protected); Livingston Builders v. Township of Livingston, 209 N.J. Super. 370 (Super. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 
1998)(approving settlement against charge of illegal contract zoning where order made expressly conditioned on 
city adopting an ordinance through established procedures); Warner v. Sutton, 274 N.J. Super. 464, 644 A.2d 656 
(1994(finding municipality had no power to amend zoning ordinance by consent decree, which would amount to 
contract zoning and remanding for public hearing by local governing body in accordance with procedures for 
amending zoning ordinance, with the trial court retaining jurisdiction). 
167
 In Attman/Glazer P.B. Company v. Mayor & Alderman of Annapolis, Id. at 680, 552 A.2d at 1280, a 
developer sought rezoning of two parcels that had been acquired and assembled by the city for an urban renewal 
project.  Originally, one parcel was zoned neighborhood commercial and business use and the other for residential 
use. The developer proposed the construction of a commercial office building.  The developer’s initial request was 
granted and the aldermen amended the urban renewal plan to change the designation of the two parcels to 
commercial use.  The resolution also permitted the erection of a professional office building, on the condition that 
the owner of the building provide 252 parking spaces, which could be located on-site or on other property within 
500 feet of the building.  By resolution, a conditional use for the proposed building was approved. Disagreements 
later developed as to the number of parking spaces to the point that the city denied the developer a use permit for the 
building.  The developer sued and the parties reached a settlement agreement, although there was serious 
disagreement between the parties as to the terms of their settlement.  The court of appeals ruled that if, as the 
developer contended, the agreement was intended to require the city council to grant an amended conditional use on 
the conditions specified, the agreement was invalid. Id. at 684, 552 A.2d at 1282. The court stated that these closely 
related functions often grouped generically under the broad topic of zoning, involve the exercise of the power of 
land use regulation that was delegated to the city by the Maryland Code.  Just as zoning authority is required to 
follow procedures mandated by statute, and to exercise its unconstrained independent judgment in deciding matters 
of reclassification, so too must the appropriate authority whether the zoning authority or a duly authorized board of 
44
C. Other Substantive Objections to Contract Zoning: Agreements 
that Destroy the Uniformity That is Required in Each District 
Agreements which would result in the destruction of the uniformity that is required by 
Euclidean zoning have been struck down as a form of contract zoning.168  That was the position 
taken by the Florida Supreme Court in Hartnett v. Austin.169 There, the landowner wanted to buy 
land and build a shopping center, it asked the city to rezone the land for commercial use.  The 
city refused to make the change unless the landowner agreed to certain conditions, including 
building a wall, maintaining a 4’; setback, landscaped the setback; protected neighbors against 
glare and disturbance; and paid for additional police protection.  The action was held invalid, the 
court stating, “if each parcel or property were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter 
into private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of community planning and zoning 
would collapse.”170
In Illinois, early on, contracts between a city and a developer regarding zoning were 
similarly condemned on this basis among others.  In Cederberg v. City of Rockford,171 the city 
rezoned two lots from residential to local business.  In rezoning, the landowner was required to 
execute a restrictive covenant, which was recorded, as a condition to the passage of the zoning 
committee’s report recommending rezoning. The covenant provided that notwithstanding the 
rezoning and business classification (which by the City’s ordinance, permitted forty-four types of 
local businesses) twenty-six enumerated uses, would not be allowed on the lots in question.  
appeals, follow required procedures and exercise independent judgment in deciding requests for special exceptions, 
conditional uses or variances.  Id. at 696.
168 Attman/Glazer P.B. Company v. Mayor & Alderman of Annapolis, Id. at 685, 552 A.2d at 1282.
169
 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
170Id.
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Both parties agreed that the covenant was a type of contract zoning, and as such void.  The 
question left for review was what effect, if any, the restrictive covenant bore on the validity of 
the ordinance rezoning the property from residential to local business district.  The court agreed 
with the trial judge and the parties that the restrictive covenant was an invalid attempt by the city 
to control the use of the land.  The parties’ briefs cited three cases as authority for this 
conclusion.  Each case condemned the practice of regulating zoning through agreements or 
contracts between zoning authorities and property owners.172 While no single basis for the rule 
against such zoning practices emerged from the cases cited, among the courts, the reasons were 
that by entering into agreement with the property owner, the zoning authority might use the 
zoning power to further private interests in violation of public policy; that such rezoning is a 
deviation from a basic zoning plan resulting in non-uniform application of the zoning law and 
inconsistencies within a zoning classification; that when the actual zoning requirements in force 
are determined by reference to evidence extrinsic to the zoning ordinance, that zoning law is 
rendered vague.173
Where the evidence shows that the city enters into an agreement with a landowner and is 
1718 Ill.App. 3d 984, 291 N.E.2d 249 (1972); But see Goffinet v. County of Christian, 32 Ill. App. 3d 108, 
discussed infra at text accompanying notes -----, expressing acceptance of conditional zoning.
172Id. 986, 291 N.E.2d at 251, citing Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prod. C. Ass’n.9 N.J. 122, 87 
A.2d 319(1952); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
1738 Ill.App.3d at 986, 291 N.E. 2d at 251.  Noting that the exact problem presented by the case had never 
been decided in Illinois, the court discussed a similar case, Hedrich v. Village of Niles,112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 77 
(1969), which established the rule that zoning ordinances should not be subject to bargaining or contract, that when 
zoning is conditioned upon collateral agreements or other incentives supplied by a property owner, zoning officials 
are placed “in questionable position of bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing on 
the requested amendments.” The zoning ordinance also failed in the absence of evidence that is was necessary or 
that it was granted only after a consideration of the appropriate use of the land within the total zoning scheme of the 
community or that the city gave any consideration to the statutory standards of public health, safety, comfort, morals 
or welfare, and the effect of the enactment taken together with the covenant, was to create a classification not set 
forth in the general zoning ordinance. Id. at 986.
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involved in the development process and has not simply acted to rezone at the request of the 
developer, a finding of contract zoning is not required.174
D.  Where the Municipality is Not a Party to the Agreement 
     Contract Zoning has not been Found
Where the zoning authority is not a party to an agreement between the town and the 
developer, and the zoning authority acts to rezone in accordance with the public hearing 
requirements, contract zoning has not been found, even where it appears that the zoning authority 
was motivated to rezone by the agreement.175   Thus, under one court’s conception, when a city 
itself makes an agreement with a landowner to rezone the contract is invalid; this is contract 
174
 In City of Orange Beach v. Peridio Pass Development Inc, 631 So. 2d 850 (Ala. 1993)(the developer 
proposed development of an island which at the time it was purchased by the developer was outside the boundaries 
of any municipality.  Developer met with the Mayor of the City of Orange Beach and discussed an annexation of the 
island to the city.  The Developer wrote a letter to the city attorney requesting Planned Unit Development Zoning, 
which would allow various types of development and mixed use within the area.  The City Attorney amended the 
letter by adding a request for the least restrictive zoning and a statement that zoning would occur at the time of 
annexation.  The Mayor and the developer also discussed the idea that the annexation was conditional upon 
receiving the zoning.   The Developer then submitted an annexation-zoning letter to the City of Orange Beach, 
which agreed to support the project.  The Developer wrote the Town Council stating that the development would 
occur in several phases and reduced number of lots.  The Town Council then reconfirmed its approval of the project.  
The City annexed the island.  The Developer sold the island to Peridio Pass Development, Inc. which began to plan 
its development in reliance upon receiving proper development zoning.  At a town council meeting, several 
members of the community began to express concerns for the impact on the coastal development.  The council voted 
to deny the Developer's request for PUD zoning.  The Developer brought a breach of contract action against the 
Town.  In defense, among other things, the Town Council claimed that the implementation of the agreement would 
amount to unlawful contract zoning by a municipality that is legislative in nature.  However, the court rejected that 
argument, stating that an annexation and zoning agreement is permissible if the city does not abdicate its legislative 
responsibility and the city is extensively involved in the development of the property, as the evidence showed the 
city was here.
175
 In Funger v. Mayor and Council of the Town of Somerset, 249 Md. 311, 328, 239 A.2d 748, 758 
(1968)(an agreement between developer and the town whereby the town would recommend to the county council 
rezoning and the developer to subject two acres to a scenic and conservation easement, limit the development of 16 
acres for a period of twenty years to the use currently permitted in the rezoned classification and to the density 
currently permitted for 18 acres and to give the town 12 acres of the tract for park land.  The area was rezoned by the 
county council following the hearing. The ordinance was held valid and not contract zoning).  See also State ex.rel. 
Zupanic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970)(agreement between neighboring landowners and 
developer made enforceable by the city by injunction, held valid where the agreement did not directly involve the 
city, but noting that a contract between the city and landowner to zone or rezone would be illegal, and the ordinance 
void); But see Pressman v. Baltimore, 222 Md.330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960)(invalidating an ordinance adopted by the 
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zoning.  However, when the agreement is made by others than the city to conform the property in 
a way or manner which makes it acceptable for the requested rezoning and the city is not 
committed to rezone, it is not contract zoning in the true sense and does not vitiate the zoning if 
it is otherwise valid.176
E.  Special Types of Zoning Resist Challenge as Contract Zoning
Special types of zoning may require pre-zoning contact, negotiations and bargains 
between the developer and the city toward the adoption of a development plan, and such contacts 
and bargains may not be regarded as contract zoning.  In Rutland Environmental Protection 
Ass’n v. Kane County,177 the county rezoned the property from farming to a community unit 
district, (“CUD”) allowing the developer to build an amusement park.178
The court found that CUD is a method of land use control designed to supplement 
existing master plans and zoning ordinances.  It permits combining different land uses on the 
same tract, is intended to apply to specific property and is meant to facilitate the development of 
an environmentally sound and functional unit.  Flexibility is the advantage which CUD zoning 
enjoys over traditional Euclidean zoning which divides a community into districts and rezones 
segregated uses.  Since the overall aims of CUD zoning cannot be accomplished without 
zoning board on conditions extracted by city planning commission, the court finding no authority in the state 
enabling act authorizing the planning commission to condition approval as such).
176 State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 28 (Wis. 1970). 
17731 Ill.App. 3d 82, 334 N.E. 2d 215 (1975).
178Id. at 86, 334 N.E.2d at 220. Under, an applicant for zoning must, at in informal conference, submit to 
the plat officer a sketch plan describing existing conditions of the site and of the proposed development.  After the 
pre-application conference, the plat committee reviews the proposal.  Recommendations made by the plat officer or 
committee during the initial review may be incorporated into the development plan.  After approval in the initial 
proposal by the plat committee, a detailed development plan is prepared which must include certain specified 
information, and this plan is then reviewed by the plat officer’s and committee with approval contingent upon the 
plan meeting specified criteria.  Regulations require that a developer’s final plan contain approved provisions for 
such items as streets, utility easements, water distribution, lighting and landscaping.  It is only after the plat 
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negotiations and because conferences are indeed mandated by the regulatory ordinance, the 
conduct of the defendants in meeting beforehand with the developer could not be read as 
constituting contract zoning.179
Similarly, agreements in connection with floating zones and planned unit developments 
(“PUD”),180 two innovative devices that have also withstood the contract zoning charge.  Their 
effect is similar, in that the local government may require performance of certain conditions and 
impose restrictions before approving the developer’s plan. 181 A floating zone is by definition 
committee has approved the development plan that the applicant may first petition for CUD zoning.
179Id.
180The floating zone involves a predetermined set of criteria established in the zoning code, but not yet 
affixed to any specific property.  Before the zoning authority “settles” the floating zone on a particular tract, the 
developer must comply with the conditions, density, setback, height, and other specified requirements.  A minimum 
size for the proposed zone may be required and the ordinance usually imposes conditions of the traditional 
Euclidean zoning type.  A planned unit development resembles a floating zone.   It is a district in which a planned 
mix of residential, commercial, and even industrial uses is sanctioned subject to restrictions calculated to achieve 
compatible and efficient use of land.  The ordinance authorizing the PUD will usually define the rights and 
objectives only in general terms, leaving the specifics to the development by the developer.   Roy P.Cookson and 
Burt Bruton, Zoning Law, 35 U.Miami L. Rev. 581, 593-94 (1981); DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 
§§ 6.60; 6.61; 9.01, 9.24.
181 In Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Mayor and City Council of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, 
749 So.2d 54 (Miss. 1999) a developer filed a zoning application requesting the city to rezone approximately 21 
acres out of a 150 acre parcel of land known as the Avery property from a single-family residential and general 
commercial classification to a restricted commercial and limited commercial classification.  Plaintiffs opposed this 
rezoning application and the developer withdrew the application, then refiled seeking to develop the same area as a 
PUD.  The planning board approved the proposed PUD and recommended that the application be approved by the 
Jackson City Council, contingent upon the addition of a housing component.  Following the required notifications, 
the planning board considered the developer’s application, but failed to reach consensus.  The developer then filed 
an amendment increasing the size of the proposed PUD from 21 to 50 acres.  The city’s site plan review committee 
approved the site plan for the PUD contingent upon the completion of 23 requirements.  After a hearing, the city 
council unanimously approved the application, contingent upon the 23 requirements, Id. at 56, which included a 
pedestrian circulation plan, that the revised site plan comply with all requirements of a PUD district of the zoning 
ordinance; that the functional aspects of the project not negatively impact surrounding land uses of the area’s 
infrastructure capacity; that the covenants previously submitted by the developer be incorporated as much as 
possible into the final covenants and that the final covenants be approved by the city council. Id. at 56-57. Plaintiffs 
challenged the rezoning on the ground inter alia that it amounted to contract zoning which is illegal. The court 
pointed out that “[a]mple statutory authority exists in the form of traditional zoning legislation that may be construed 
to support this novel regulatory device. The key question is whether such authority should be narrowly or broadly 
construed.  Many states have traditionally opted for narrow construction of enabling legislation to ensure against 
unwarranted action by local governments, but the present trend is toward a more expansive view of local 
government powers and a more generous interpretive view. Id.  see also Judith Welch Wagner, Moving Toward the 
Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government 
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conditional.182 Rezoning to a floating zone, cannot, by its vary nature, be bound upon precise and 
inflexible standards for each plot of ground is different and the environment in which it lies is 
different. 183  So long as the legislative decision is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, 
landowners like plaintiffs have no cause to object because the determination made under the 
general standard of the ordinance produces different results on different tracts of land.184 In 
Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 957, 983-985 (1987). The court chose to rely on the decision from the New 
Mexico, Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 114 N.M. 699, 845 P.2d 793, 796 (N.M. 1992), for proposition that “contract 
zoning was only illegal in cases in which a municipality committed itself to rezone property in such a manner as to 
circumvent the notice and hearing process or to compromise the rights of affected persons.” Id. The court noted that 
Dacy raised serious doubt as to whether the agreement in the present case constituted contract zoning at all, that 
court noting that : “[c]onditional zoning is not contract zoning at all, because it does not involve a promise by either 
party. Rather, conditional zoning describes the situation in which a municipality rezones on condition that a 
landowner perform a certain act prior to, simultaneously with, or after the rezoning. ... The absence of an 
enforceable promise by either party distinguishes conditional zoning from contract zoning,”  Id., citing 845 P.2d at 
796, since the conditions set forth by the site plan committee and adopted by the city council were the sort of 
conditions inherent to any PUD, fully consistent with the goals and purposes of the PUD land planning device. Id. at 
59.  A planned unit development is a district in which a planned mix of residential, commercial , and even industrial 
uses is sanctioned subject to restrictions calculated to achieve compatible and efficient use of land. In sum, far from 
constituting a “contracting away” of the city’s police power, the contingent zoning/PUD constituted an effective tool 
for the development of the property in a manner which satisfied the concerns of the residents living closest to the 
property. Id. at 63.
182In Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. Mo. E.D. 1980), the court rejected the claim that 
a floating zone was an instance of contract zoning, finding that municipalities need a certain degree of flexibility in 
determining whether particular types of uses should be allowed within the environs of an area zoned for some other 
use where the newly allowed use can be made compatible with the existing uses. The commercial district here 
satisfied these requirements. Id. at 712.
183There are certain mandatory requirements for uses within the new zone which the Council was not free 
to expand.  The regulations limited the uses, established minimum performance standards and sign regulation.  The 
council could impose greater restrictions and was required to prescribe height restrictions, lot area and yard 
requirement and off-street parking and loading requirements.  Plaintiffs had no right to complain that the Council 
might exercise its legislative judgment to impose more stringent requirements on commercial district than it does in 
another.  The court further found no objection to the fact that the ordinance did not spell out in detail the standards 
upon which a determination to rezone to commercial is to be made.  The section did provide for general standards 
which were to be considered by the legislative body.   Id. at 712.  
184Id. at 712.  Though the ordinance did authorize spot zoning, it was not invalid on that ground, the court 
pointing out that any zoning ordinance which allows for amendment allows spot zoning.  Spot zoning may be 
invalid or valid.  If it is an arbitrary and unreasonable devotion to the small area to a use inconsistent with the uses to 
which the rest of the district is restricted and made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the owner, it is 
invalid.  On the other had,, if zoning a small parcel is in accord and in harmony with the comprehensive plan and is 
done for the public good – is to serve one or more of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, it is valid.  
Nor was the zoning otherwise unconstitutional because there was ample evidence of reasonableness, it served the 
general welfare and did not adversely affect the public roads and the value of nearby property, or deviate from the 
comprehensive plan. Id. at 713-715,
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Campion v. Bd. of Alderman of City of New Haven,185 conditions imposed on approval of 
Planned Development District, were upheld because they created a new zone, such that 
uniformity of regulations was not at issue.  Some courts have also ruled that conditions placed on 
the granting of a special exception are different than agreements made in connection with a 
rezoning.  The court so held in Brandywine Enterprises Inc. v. County Council for Prince 
George’s County, Md, 186 where the court pointed out the case did not involve an agreement to 
rezone, but merely the placement of conditions upon a special exception use.  The granting of a 
special exception use subject to certain conditions is an appropriate exercise of, rather than, an 
abdication of, a local government’s police powers.187
IV.  Contract Zoning Compared to Conditional Zoning
In contrast to contract zoning which usually requires the showing of a bilateral contract, 
conditional zoning is analogous to a unilateral contract, the local government does not promise to 
rezone, but either voluntarily or through negotiation, the developer agrees to conditions that are 
otherwise not required in the proposed zone.188 This type of zoning does not represent the same 
relinquishment of police power authority as contract zoning, because the agreement occurs as 
part of a regulation that flows from comments made during the hearing process.  Here, the deal is 
not complete until after the municipality has heard concerns of both landowners seeking to 
rezone and the neighbors and has tried to arrive at a workable compromise.  In addition , the deal 
is transparent in that the conditions that form the agreement are explicitly set forth in the zoning 
amendment so that every one who subsequently reviews the zoning amendment in the 
1852003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 874.
186117 Md. App. 525, 700 A. 2d 1216 (1997).
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community will have a clear and accurate understanding of the uses to which the land can be put 
and the reasons the municipality decided to allow those uses.  The conditions can be made a part 
of the zoning text or be evidenced by the recording of an enforceable covenant binding the 
developer and his assignees to the negotiated condition.189  The unilateral/bilateral distinction has 
often been overlooked by the courts and much of the confusion in the cases can attributed to the 
failure of courts to properly define the two concepts.190  Conditional zoning properly understood 
involves only an adopted zoning ordinance which provides either: (1) the rezoning becomes 
effective immediately with an automatic repealer if specified conditions are not met within a set 
time limit, or (2) the zoning becomes effective only upon the conditions being met within the 
187Id. at 536, 700 A.2d at 1221.
188Id. at ---.
189Id at -----; see also Wilmington Sixth District Community Committee v. Pettinaro Enterprises
,1988 Del Ch. Lexis 142 (May 25, 1988), where the court noted that some courts had found contract zoning 
unenforceable per se, while others have enforced contract zoning if reasonable, non-discriminatory and serving the 
public welfare.  Still other courts, while prohibiting contract zoning, have recognized a subtle difference between 
contract zoning and conditional zoning, upholding the latter.  Id. at 8-9, citing 6 Powell on Real Property §871.4 
(1988); State ex rel. Zupanic v. Schimenz, Wis Supr. 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970); Church v. Town of Islip, N.Y. App., 
168 N.E.2d 680 (1960); 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning 3d § 9.20 (1986).   “Contract zoning is usually 
distinguished from conditional zoning by a finding that in contract zoning, there is a bilateral agreement committing 
the zoning authority to a legally binding promise while in conditional zoning the zoning authority does not legally 
bind itself to rezone.  For example, in contract zoning, the zoning authority agrees to rezone and the developer 
agrees to conditions which would otherwise not be applicable to his land.  Id. at ---, citing Kramer, “Contract 
Zoning-Old Myths and New Realities,” 34 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest 4.  In conditional zoning, however, the 
local government does not agree to rezone but merely decides to impose conditions that would not have been 
adopted if there had not been an application for rezoning. In conditional zoning, therefore, there is no binding 
obligations on the zoning authority to rezone the land even if the developer consents to the conditions proposed.  Id.
at at *9-10; see also Haas v. City of Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1972), where an ordinance rezoning 
an area provided that “no lot or parcel of land hereinabove described shall be used for any use allowed in [the 
rezoned district] until all the conditions set forth below have been complied with: subject to a reservation of the right 
of way for [a parkway] and the a second means of ingress and egress to the proposed [parkway] be provided.  A 
challenge to the rezoning was made on the basis that such a collateral agreement or deed to be executed between the 
city and the property owner constituted contract zoning.  The challenge was rejected, the court pointing out that 
zoning based upon and offer or agreement would be invalid, but it is well-established that a zoning ordinance may 
place upon a property owner reasonable restrictions and requirements in the use of the zoned property and this court 
had expressly approved such restrictions and requirements.
190See City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn., 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953)(treating unilateral promise by 
developer without reciprocal promise of the city as if there were a clear unequivocal bilateral contract controlling the 
discretion of the local government, making rezoning  invalid per se).
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time limit.191
The early attitude of the courts was to ignore the distinction and declare both contract and 
conditional zoning to be invalid per se.192   The reasons conditional rezoning did not fare well are 
myriad, including that despite the apparent unilateral structure, they introduced an element of 
contract, i.e, the imposition of conditions on the land the subject of rezoning being a quid pro 
quo for rezoning, although no express contract with the zoning authorities could be proved, given 
the close connection between the recording of restrictions at or soon after the rezoning and 
because they constituted an abrupt departure from the comprehensive plan contemplated in 
zoning.193  Other faults assigned by courts in their disapproval of conditional rezoning were that 
the zoning authority might use the zoning power to further private interests in violation of public 
policy, that the zoning authority might improperly try to control the use of the land, that the 
zoning authority might surrender its governmental powers and function or inhibit the exercise of 
its police or legislative powers and that it furnishes an avenue for corruption of officials.194 Other 
courts view the rezoning of a particular parcel of land upon conditions not imposed by the zoning 
ordinance generally in the particular district into which the land has been rezoned as “prima facie 
evidence of ‘spot zoning’ in its most maleficent aspect, as not in accordance with a 
191State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 31 (Wis. 1970), citing See Schaffer, Vol. 11, The 
Practical Lawyer, No. 5, p. 43, Contract and Conditional Rezoning; 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, p. 127, 
sec. 15.41. But see 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (1968), pp. 610-620, secs. 8.20, 8.21.” Id. at 30-31.
192See Hedrich v. Niles, 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969); Cederberg v. Rockford, 8 Ill. App.3d 
984, 291 N.E.2d 249 (1972); but see Goffinet v. County of Christian, 333 N.E. 2d at 736 (conditional zoning not 
invalid in every instance. There, the proposed use was a plant to manufacture synthetic natural gas and would serve 
an area where a fuel shortage existed; such use would fill a genuine public need and would unquestionably serve the 
public health, safety and welfare). 
193Treadway v. City of Rockford,  28 Ill. 2d 370, 371, 192 N.E.2d 351.
194Id. at 1095, 333 N.E.2d at 736.
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comprehensive plan and as beyond the power of the municipality.”195  This view is premised on
the notion that legislative bodies must rezone in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and 
Euclidean zoning requires that in amending the ordinance so as to confer upon a particular parcel 
a particular district designation, it may not curtail or limit the uses and structures placed or to be 
placed upon the lands so rezoned differently from those permitted upon other lands in the same 
district.  Consequently, “where there has been a concatinated rezoning and filing of a declaration 
of restrictions, the early view (where the question has been litigated) was that both the zoning 
amendment and the restrictive covenant were invalid.”196
The early Maryland court decisions showed a disfavor with conditional zoning, equal to 
that with contract zoning, although not clearly distinguishing the two.197  In Rodriguez v. Prince 
George’s County, Maryland,198 the court pointed that the “early view of most courts was that 
195Rathkopf , The Law of Zoning and Planning (3d ed.), Ch. 74-9, Deed Covenants and Restrictions --
Effect of Zoning Ordinance.
196 Id. at 31, citing  3 Rathkopf,; see also Templeton v. County Council of Prince George's County, 21 Md. 
App. 636 (Ct. of Special Appeals of Md. 1974)(The court addressed the contention that conditional zoning might 
have been utilized in this case - in the sense that the District Council might have considered a grant of the requested 
reclassification, subject to a reversion to residential use on the discontinuation of the roofing business by the 
appellant.   The court held that even if it were, it was quite apparent that appellant proceeded upon a distorted 
construction of conditional zoning generally and as contained in Chapter 471, Laws of 1968.  The latter provides 
that the District Council for Prince George’s County in approving any local map amendment, may give 
consideration to and “adopt such reasonable requirements, safeguards and conditions, as may in its opinion be 
necessary either to protect surrounding properties . . . or which would further enhance the coordinated harmonious 
and systematic development of the Regional District.” Id. The novel suggestion that a zoning reclassification to 
commercial might be made by the District Council subject to a reversion to residential obviously is not supported by 
this statutory authority for conditional zoning, nor by general law. Id. Conditional zoning is a device employed to 
bring some flexibility to an otherwise rigid system of control. Id. at 645-46, citing Anderson,  American Law of 
Zoning, § 8.20. The conditions generally imposed are those designed to protect adjacent land from the loss of use 
value which might occur if the newly authorized use were permitted without restraint of any kind.  Reversion of the 
reclassification to residential use when, and if, appellant should discontinue her roofing business is patently no such 
restraint. Id. at 646.
197Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, 372 Md.514 (2002)(striking down ordinance as 
conditional zoning although the dissent found such zoning to be valid).
19879 Md.App. 537, 558 A.2d 742 (1988).
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conditional zoning (or as it is sometimes called ‘contract’) zoning was unlawful per se,199 for 
three reasons: “that rezoning based on offers or agreements with the owners disrupts the basic 
plan, and this is subversive of public policy reflected in the overall legislation; that the resulting 
‘contract’ is nugatory because a municipality is not able to make agreements which inhibit its 
police powers; and that restrictions in a particular zone should not be left to extrinsic 
evidence.”200
Courts have also objected to conditional zoning as applied, i.e., that it constituted spot 
zoning by singling out one parcel for non-uniform and non-comprehensive treatment or that the 
conditions were not reasonably or causally related to the requested zoning or rezoning petition,201
some courts have considered arguments that conditional zoning was ultra vires, that no such 
authority could be found under the state zoning enabling act, where all zoning authority is 
found.202    In rejecting the ultra vires argument courts have found implied authority to rezone 
199Id. at 552, 558 A.2d at 749, citing Baylis v.City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 170, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
200Id. at 552, 558 A.2d at 749. Covenants coupled with the site plan attached, if adopted as a basis for the 
requested reclassification, would produce a form of conditional zoning.  So too, an amendment to the basic plan, 
where the applicant “was offering a deal to the district council in order to induce the council to approve its 
application for reclassification, the applicant agreeing in advance to exclude from the scope of the approval certain 
uses expressly permitted in the approved zone” is a form of conditional zoning and invalid. Id. at 553, 558 A.2d at 
750; see also Carole Highlands Citizens Ass’n v. Board of County Comrs., 222 Md. 44, 158 A.2d 663(1960)(finding 
invalid rezoning land from single family residential purposes to commercial, subject to an agreement by the 
landowner limiting the use of the land, whether or not a binding contract was involved, where the rezoning created a 
novel classification not authorized by the general plan); Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corp., 267 
Md. 364, 297A.2d 675 (1972)(finding invalid rezoning conditioned upon landowner’s offer to subject land to 
restrictions on use, as impermissible conditional zoning).
201Rohan  at ---; Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1974); See Allred v. City of 
Raliegh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971); see also Appeal of Cleaver, 24 Pa. D & C 2d, 11 Chester Co. 236 
(1961)(rezoning upon limitations on the use of the rezoned land invalid because it resulted in the devotion of a 
comparatively small area to a use inconsistent with the uses to which surrounding property was used, and made for 
the sole benefit of the private interests of the landowner); Ouryv. Grany, 107 R.I. 427, 267 A.2d 700(1970)(finding 
invalid rezoning upon condition that rezoned property be used exclusively for a particular business use, as not 
consistent with the comprehensive plan, but an accommodation to the landowner, made without regard for the public 
health, safety, and welfare). 
202Cederberg v. Rockford, 8 Ill. App. 3d 984 (1972)(confusing the bargaining away argument with the ultra 
vires argument, concluding that since the bargain is primarily for private benefit, it is not an act on behalf of the 
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with conditions on the basis that the procedure was within the spirit of the enabling act203and that 
silence of an enabling act on the question of conditional zoning does not necessarily imply a 
legislative decision to prohibit it.204
A.  Agreement v. Motivation
The modern trend is in favor of upholding conditional zoning.205  Generally, such 
conditions will be upheld when they are imposed pursuant to the police power for the protection 
or benefit of neighbors to ameliorate the effects of the zoning change.   Yet, the confusion in the 
cases continue.  Many cases presenting the issue of conditional zoning have been characterized 
by their challengers as involving contract zoning and struck down on that basis.206 Other courts 
general welfare and therefore ultra vires) see also Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694 (Del 1983)(city bargaining 
away part of its zoning power by new ordinance to a private citizen even though in furtherance of compromise to 
avoid threat of suit). 
203Church of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254 (1960)(rejecting ultra vires argument, finding implied authority to rezone 
with conditions as within the spirit of the enabling act).
204Scrutton.v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App.2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr.872 (1969);
Sylvania Elec. Products,Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass 428, 183 N.E. 118, 123 (1962); see also Palisades 
Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117 (N.J. 1965).
205See Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Mayor and City Council of the City of Jackson, Mississippi,
749 So.2d 54 (Miss. 1999); Chrismon v.Guilford Co. 322 N.C. 611 (N.C. 1988) (approving the practice as long as 
the local zoning authority acted reasonably and in the public interest); Old Canton Hills Homeowners Assoc.v. 
Mayor & Council of Jackson, 749 So. 2d 54, 59-60 (1999)(“contingency zoning an effective tool for the 
development of the ...property in a manner which satisfied the concerns of the residents living closest to the 
property); Stephen C. Keadey, Recent Developments: Into the Danger Zone: Massey v. City of Charlotte and the 
Fate of Conditional Zoning in North Carolina, 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1155 (2001); see also Konkel v. Common Council, 
Delafield, 68 Wis. 2d 574 (Wis. 1975)(upholding rezoning ordinance designed to take effect upon the fulfillment of 
certain conditions and for the reversion of the prior zoning status if the conditions were not satisfied).
206See e.g., Baker v. Chartiers Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 677 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)(contract 
zoning “is a form of unlawful spot zoning where rezoning is permitted based on regulations and conditions devised 
by agreement between the municipality and the landowner”); Knight v. Lynn Township Zoning Hearing Board, 130 
Pa. Commw. 617, 568 A.2d 1372 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)(same); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A. 2d 
429 (Md. Ct.App. 1959)(rezoning made conditional on the execution of an agreement between landowner and city, 
set out in the ordinance in the form for recording as a covenant running with the land; providing that in 
consideration for rezoning, the owner would use property only as funeral home; provide adequate facilities for 
ingress and egress, and off-street parking and not object to or oppose the reversion of the property to the former 
zoning if its use as funeral home ceased, held invalid as inhibiting municipality’s exercise of police power); 
Rodriguez v. Prince George’s County, 79 Md. App. 537, 558 A.2d 742(1989)(where developer agreed not to use the 
property in certain ways that would otherwise have been permitted in zone, court found no practical difference 
between proposed agreement to omit certain uses in exchange for approval and any other conditional zoning, finding 
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make an effort to distinguish the two, upholding rezonings involving only the imposition of 
conditions.207
Decisions from the Connecticut courts have responded by reference to contract zoning 
when only conditions are involved and have characterized as illegal contract zoning and 
otherwise finding a zoning ordinance made with conditions on the landowner to be invalid.  In 
Bartsch v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n,208 an attempt by planning and zoning commission to 
attach conditions running with the land, restricting the use of a particular parcel to a medical 
office building was held to be an attempt at contract zoning and violative of the uniformity 
provision of the statute because the restriction did not apply to other properties within the zoning 
zoning invalid, citing disruptions of uniformity and the weakening of police powers). Cram v. Town of Geneva, 190 
A.D.2d 1028 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 1993) is an example of a case confusing contract zoning with conditional 
zoning, although upholding the rezoning.  There, the town enacted an ordinance to rezone a certain property from 
residential to business.  In enacting the ordinance, the Town Board imposed certain conditions limiting the use of the 
property.  The residents argued that the ordinance was invalid contract zoning and that the town failed to take a hard 
look at the environmental impact of the proposed change as required by the state environmental law. The trial court 
dismissed the action and the residents appealed.    The court held that, “[i]n appropriate circumstances, a change in 
zoning may be subject to reasonable conditions and restrictions related to and incidental to the use of the property 
and designed to minimize any adverse impact in the surrounding area, Id. at 652, citing Matter of St. Onge v 
Donovan, 71 NY2d 507, 515-516; Matter of Dexter v Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 NY2d 102, 105), the 
conditions and restrictions imposed by the ordinance were related to the use of the property, were reasonably 
calculated to minimize any adverse impact on the surrounding residential area and provide no basis to annul the 
determination of the Town Board. Accordingly, the court rejected petitioners’ contentions that the enactment of the 
ordinance was unlawful contract zoning and was contrary to the town law. Id. at 652, citing Town Law §§ 262, 263 
and 268. 
207See e.g., In People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Beachwood Ltd Partnership 107 Md. App. 627, 
670 A.2d 484 (1995)(reclassification of property); Gillespie v. Stow, 65 Ohio App. 3d 601 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)(that 
contract zoning is not proper.; a municipality may impose conditions but may not bargain away its legislative 
power); Cross v. Hall County 238 Ga. 709 (Ga. 1977) (the court distinguished conditional zoning from contract 
zoning.  Here, rezoning conditioned on road improvements is conditional zoning rather than contract zoning.   At the 
hearing before the commissioners on the rezoning application, several neighboring landowners who opposed the 
rezoning mentioned that the road leading to the quarry needed paving.  The president of the zoning applicant offered 
to resurface the road.  The rezoning application was approved provided that the zoning applicant would agree to 
resurface the road. The paving condition was an attempt by the board to ameliorate the effects of the zoning change) 
Id. at 383. In King’s Mill Homeowners Assn. v. City of Westminster, 192 Colo.305, 557 P.2d 1186 (1976), the court 
responded to a challenge of contract zoning, largely with a discussion of conditional zoning, finding no contract 
zoning in the case; rezoning contingent upon the landowner’s fulfillment of certain conditions does not amount to 
contract zoning.
2086 Conn. App. at 690.
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district.  
In Kaufman v. City of Danbury Zoning Comm’n209 the court addressed both contract 
zoning or conditional zoning, holding that Connecticut did not recognize either. The court 
explained that there was no statutory provision that allows zoning commissions to condition a 
zoning change either in its formal resolution of approval or on the form of amendments to the 
zoning regulation.  According to the court, neither may the zoning authority enter into a binding 
contract with a developer to assure the completion of the conditions of approval.210  This is based 
on the statutory requirement that all such regulations be uniform for each class or kind of 
building, structure, or use of land throughout each district.  The cases conclude that to permit a 
zoning authority to enact or contract for special conditions to assure fulfillment of its goals with 
respect to a particular piece of property would promote the very type of mischief which the 
statute was enacted to prevent, namely that there would be no improper discrimination employed 
by the commission but rather that all owners of the same class and in the same district be treated 
alike.211   The court concluded “...[A] zoning commission cannot be allowed to create binding 
agreements on the use of land thereby limiting its successors ability to make changes in the 
future.”212
Connecticut courts, though have treated conditions on use placed in connection with an 
application for a variance, differently than those sought to be placed in connection with a 
rezoning request.  In Stryker v. Zoning Board of Appeals, the court upheld the imposition of 
2091993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2039.
210Id. at ---, citing Bartsch at 6 Conn. App. 686.
211Id. at ---, citing Bartsch at 689.
212Id. at -----. The same rationale applies for spot zoning. Both are condemned because the actual purpose 
of the zoning action is to benefit a single property owner rather than the community at large.  Id. 
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conditions on an application for a variance, distinguishing Bartsch.  The court pointed out that a 
variance was not rezoning and did not present a use inconsistent with the zone.  But, this does 
not follow, since by definition a variance involves a use different from that for which the land is 
zoned.  The court’s response to this point is that the rationale for permitting conditions to be 
attached to variances is to make variances more in harmony with the purpose of the zoning 
regulations.213 Still, a variance necessarily means lack of uniformity and different treatment for 
different owners.
In Hartnett v. Austin,214 the municipality agreed to rezone land to permit the development 
of a shopping center upon certain conditions.  In finding the ordinance invalid, the court ruled 
that the city had no authority to enter into a private contract with the landowner.215  In Cederberg 
v. Rockford,216the court held invalid the rezoning of certain lots from residential to local business 
coincidentally and conditioned upon the execution of a restrictive covenant on the use of the 
property to offices, finding such agreement to be a form of contract zoning, making the 
agreement void.217  Similarly in Andres v. Flossmor,218 the court struck down an ordinance 
rezoning land upon landowner’s fulfillment of certain conditions, finding the ordinance to have 
resulted from a deal, which introduced an element of contract.219
These cases, if the definition of contract zoning was faithfully applied would not be 
2131991 Conn. Super. at *22-23.
21493 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
215Id. at ____.
2168 Ill. App. 3d 984(1972).
217Id. at ----.
21815 Ill. App. 3d 655 (1973).
219Id. at ----; see also Shibata v. Naperville, 1 Ill.App. 3d 402 (1971)(invalidating as contract zoning 
ordinance made on condition that landowner execute and file a declaration of restrictions as to the use of the 
property).
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struck down on that basis since they do not involve bilateral agreements.  This may point out that 
the attempted distinction between contract zoning and conditional zoning based on the existence 
of a bilateral as opposed to a unilateral agreement may too simplistic and yield unpredictable 
results from the courts.  Instead, courts would do well to eliminate the false distinction and 
consider the particular acts of the municipality in wielding its police power.  
Later Illinois courts have taken differing positions on the legality of conditional zoning, 
than that in  Andres v. Village of Flossmor.220 Andres relied on a previous decision from the 
Illinois Supreme Court, Treadway v. City of Rockford, 221 for the reasons why absent general 
statutory authorization and standards, the making of individualized zoning deals by local 
municipalities apart from the provisions they are willing to adopt as general zoning regulations is 
an invalid abuse of the zoning power.222  That is, even where a zoning ordinance is reasonable 
and not arbitrary and bears a reasonable relationship to the public health, safety and welfare, they 
are yet invalid if subject to bargaining or contract.  In Andres, the court explained that “in 
accepting … donations and entering into or approving the[] agreements the trustees of the village 
undoubtedly did what they believed was best for the whole community, but it placed them in the 
questionable position of bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing 
on the merits of the requested amendment.”223
The court also expressed the concerns articulated in a Florida Supreme Court decision, 
22015 Ill. App.3d 655, 304 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
22128 Ill. 2d 370, 371, 192 N.E.2d 351.
222Id., citing Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545-46 (197-), 178 S.E.2d 432, 440-41, Oury V. 
Greany, 107 R.I. 427, 431, 267 A.2d 700, 702 (1970); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 168, 148 A.2d 429, 
433 (1959); City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528, 531 (1953); Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 
So.2d 384, 388 (1966).
223Id. at 659, 704.
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Hartnett v. Austin,224 that if each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables that 
could enter into private contracts, then the whole scheme and objective of community planning 
and zoning would collapse. The zoning classification of each parcel would then be bottomed on 
individual agreements and private arrangements that would totally destroy uniformity. If the city 
could legislate by contract, each citizen would be governed by an individual rule based upon the 
best deal he could make with the governing body.225  The court also relied on Baylis v. City of 
Baltimore,226 which held that special conditions imposed on rezoning amendments are invalid for 
the chief reasons that rezoning based on offers of agreements with owners disrupts the basic plan 
and thus is subversive of the public policy reflected in the overall legislation, that the resulting 
contract is nugatory because a municipality is not able to make agreements which inhibit its 
police powers and restrictions in a particular zone should not be left to extrinsic evidence.227  In 
Andres, the court ruled that the rezoning ordinance there which conditioned its effectiveness on 
subsequent execution by the village and the owner of a contract containing all the ad hoc
limitations and requirements of the ordinance, also exhibited an inherent defect which 
invalidated the ordinance, without more.228  In sum, the ordinance was the very model of 
invalid conditional zoning, falling squarely within the general policy considerations which 
22493 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
22515 Ill. App.3d at 658, quoting 93 So.2d at 89.
226219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429, 432 (1959).
22715 Ill. App.3d at 658, quoting 219 Md. at ---, 148 A.2d at ---.
228The court agreed with the trial court that the restrictive covenant was an invalid attempt by the city to 
control the use of the land. The ad hoc restrictions were not and could not purport to be based on any conceivable 
lawful zoning powers of the village in enacting requirements for all similarly zoned property.  The requirement that 
landscaping be subject to future approval by the village authorities without any standard as to what that approval 
must be based on was an unlawfully vague provision.  To require the payment of a lump sum of money without any 
basis set forth or discernable for arriving at that sum was unlawful.  The reverter provision was a  patently unlawful 
use of the zoning power which ordained that a change in zoning without any of the procedural steps or substantive 
considerations necessary thereto.  Id. at 658.
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strongly support the rule invalidating such ad hoc conditions in zoning amendments.229
The Maryland Court of Appeals, People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Beachwood 
Ltd Partnership,230 distinguished contract from conditional zoning, upholding the ordinance 
challenged. The board of appeals voted to grant the developer’s petition to reclassify the 
property, but with the condition that it finance an off-site improvement.231   Opposed to the 
condition, the developer argued that the reclassification was the result of contract zoning, that the 
office of planning and zoning sought to use the comprehensive zoning as a means to pressure it 
into financing an off-site traffic improvement.  Though the court failed to find evidentiary 
support for this allegation, it did discuss the concept of contract zoning.  The court pointed out 
that “one reason the allusions to contract zoning in the case had such a ‘phantom-like’ quality is 
that neither the case law, here or abroad, nor the academic community seemed to have a firm 
grip on exactly what was meant by the term ‘contract zoning’” or by its doctrinal doppelganger, 
229Id. at 658. See also Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App.2d 412, 418, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 , 877
(1969)( holding that the county had the power to impose conditions even though the statute was silent and that the 
power to impose conditions on rezoning furthered the well-being of landowners generally, promoted community 
development and served the general welfare.229  Like other changes in land use, the rezoning of an individual parcel 
may benefit the landowner but generate augmented demands for public services or create deleterious effects in the 
neighborhood.   Reasonably conceived conditions harmonize the landowner’s need with the public’s interest and 
rejecting the contract zoning charge); J-Marion Company, Inc. v. County of Sacramento, 76 Cal.App.3d 517,521, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1977).  There the court upheld rezoning upon conditions, finding the practice of imposing 
conditions justified as an appropriate exercise of local police power, pointing out the adherence to “[t]he so-called 
‘Euclidean’ zoning [that] divides the community into homogenous land use zones” that prevents the imposition of 
conditions on particular uses of property; but individual parcels may often be allowed as a justified escape from this 
rigid grouping without detriment to zoning objectives.  The court pointed out that California elucidations of the local 
police power recognize that other kinds of application for change in regulated land use may be granted subject to the 
landowner’s compliance with reasonable conditions; the power to impose conditions on rezoning furthers the well-
being of landowners generally, promotes community development and serves the general welfare.  The same police 
power which supports the imposition of reasonable conditions upon other kinds of changes in land use sustains the 
power of California counties to engage in ‘conditional rezoning. 76 Cal.App.3d at 522, 142 Cal.Rptr. at 725.
230107 Md. App. 627, 670 A.2d 484 (1995).
231Id.at 636, 670 A.2d at 489.
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‘conditional zoning.’”232  In the broadest of senses, both involve some sort of understanding 
between the governmental unit and the developer, whereby the doing of certain acts by the 
developer will result in favorable rezoning treatment by the governmental unit. Beyond that, the 
definitions begin to blur.233  Some academic authorities treat “contract zoning” as the more 
generic phenomenon, with “conditional zoning” as a special instance thereof and others do just 
the opposite.  Yet, others treat the two as closely-related but distinct phenomena, with “contract 
zoning” being illegal and conditional zoning slowly emerging into general acceptance.  The 
Maryland cases have treated “contract zoning” narrowly as a situation whereon the developer 
enters into an express and legally binding contract with the ultimate zoning authority.234  Part of 
the reason for the illegality is that the governmental unit may not bargain away its future use of 
the police power.  The court distinguished those cases where a developer makes agreements with 
a governmental unit which lacks ultimate decisionmaking authority on the rezoning.235  Thus, 
where the city council was not bound by the recommendations of the planning commission, in 
which the commission sought to impose conditions that it was not authorized to exact and that 
were therefore invalid, and in which the council did not undertake or attempt to incorporate the 
invalid conditions in its rezoning ordinance and did not even refer to them, no issue of contract 
232Id.at 668, 670 A.2d at 504.
233Id.at 668, 670 A.2d at 504.
234Id.at 669, 670 A.2d at 505; discussing Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959), 
where the city granted a rezoning conditioned on a binding agreement by the property owner to use the benefit of the 
reclassification only for the purpose of building a funeral home; the final form of the ordinance made the 
reclassification conditional upon the execution of an agreement, set out in the ordinance, between the owners and the 
city, and the recording of such agreement upon the property owners, their successors, heirs and assigns, held to be 
invalid.  But see Pressman v. City of Baltimore,222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960), where in contrast to Baylis, the 
owner entered into a formal and undisputed agreement with the city planning commission, which recommended that 
the rezoning be approved.  The court there declined to hold the agreement constituted illegal contract zoning, 
restricting the application of the ban on contract zoning to those instances wherein the legislative body itself, as 
opposed to some other governmental agency, is party to the illegal contract.
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zoning arose.236  In any case, there was no evidence of any agreement with the developer or to 
the comprehensive zoning was in anyway related to any past or future commitment by the 
developer.237  The rezoning was upheld.
                         V.  Conditional Zoning Specifically Held Valid
In recent decisions, despite the blurring of lines, courts have approved conditional zoning 
agreements where they find that under them, without legally committing itself to rezoned, the 
municipality bargains for a landowner’s promise to take remedial action to minimize the adverse 
effects of the proposed development or limit the proposed use in some way as a condition of 
approval so as to protect adjoining landowners, and in the public interest.238 Most courts rely on 
the public interest benefits resulting as reasons for upholding conditional zoning agreements.  To 
the extent that it involves promises from the landowner, without a reciprocal promise by the 
municipality, conditional zoning enables the municipality to retain and satisfy its police power 
responsibility to see that the zoning change is consistent with the public health, safety and 
welfare, and amounts to the exercise of the built-in flexibility in the zoning enabling acts.   “The 
virtue of allowing private agreements to underlie zoning is the flexibility and control of the 
development given to a municipality to meet the ever-increasing demands for rezoning in a 
235Id. at 673, 670 A.2d at 506.
236Id. at 671, 670 A.2d at 506.
237Id;see also Attman/Glazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor and Alderman of Annapolis, 314 Md. 675, 685, 552 A.2d 
1277, 1283 (1989)(The court held that the policy that prohibits a municipality from contracting away its zoning 
power applies to special exceptions, variances and conditional uses, meaning that the zoning authority must exercise 
independent judgment in deciding requests.  The court noted that conditional zoning, once roundly condemned, 
appears to be in the ascendancy and in Maryland, the concept had evolved indirectly through the use of various 
zoning devices such as planned developments, and had found some favor with the state legislature, in Article 66B, 
4.01(b), which permits a county or municipal corporation to impose certain conditions at the time of zoning or 
rezoning land, under certain circumstances). 
238Ryan at ----.
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rapidly changing area.”239
In Gofinnet v. County of Christian,240 the court departed from the views expressed in 
earlier Illinois decisions,241 rejecting per se invalidity of conditional zoning.  The challenged 
action was a zoning ordinance to rezone 236 acres of farmland in a rural section of the county 
from agricultural to heavy industrial.  The ordinance was adopted pursuant to a plan prepared by 
a consulting firm.  The challengers, owners of land adjoining the property argued that the 
ordinance was invalid for the reason that it contained unauthorized restrictions and hence 
constituted conditional rezoning and also because it constituted spot zoning.242
The court pointed out that there was a suitable and proper place for utilization of the 
process as some conditional rezoning may be in the public good, subservient to a comprehensive 
plan in the best interest of the public health, safety, and welfare and enacted in recognition of 
239State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 28 (Wis. 1970); See Church v. Town of Islip 8 N.Y. 2d 
254 (1960); Hudson Oil Co. v.Wichita, 193 Kan. 623, 396 P.2d 271 (1964)(granting rezoning only upon 
landowner’s agreement to dedicate a 10-foot strip along the highway for an access road, apparently to conform to 
the city’s comprehensive plan for the remainder of the street footage, upheld); Arkenberg v. Topeka, 197 Kan. 731, 
421 P.2d 213 (1966)(zoning ordinance adopted on landowner’s promise to convey a right of way to the city along 
one of the streets upon which the property fronted, upheld; contract zoning argument rejected); Transamerica Title 
Ins. Co., 23 Ariz. App. 385, 533P.2d 693(1975)(stating its agreement with other courts, including California, that 
have upheld conditional zoning, as an exercise of the police power); Glendon Civic Ass'n v. Glendon, 132 Pa. 
Commw. 307, 311-12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)(“[F]rom our review of the record it is clear that, by enacting the 
ordinance, the Borough specifically designated the site for which the conditional use was authorized; the Borough 
controlled the use by imposing requirements in the ordinance and the Agreement to prevent the facility from 
becoming noxious or offensive by reason of dust, odor, smoke, gas, vibration or noise); see also 2 RATHKOPF, The 
Law of Zoning and Planning §§27.55[4][5] (1988).
24030 Ill.App.3d 108, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1975).
241 Andreas v. Flossmor, supra text at note ----(decided two years earlier).
242The disputed ordinance contained four articles; the first essentially finding that the best interest of the 
county would be served by permitting the rezoning and variance requested; the second limiting the use of the 
premises to only allow the storage of naptha, petroleum products, similar hydrocarbon products, and the processing 
of the same into pipeline quality gas suitable for distribution, utility, and industrial purposes; limiting the height of 
structures; requiring compliance with local, state and federal air, water, noise, sewage pollution and on handling, 
processing, and storage of the products; providing for reversion of the previous zoning if the property is not used for 
gasification plant facilities as proposed.   Id. 
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changing circumstances.243  In the court’s view, not all conditional rezoning is onerous, 
destructive or an abandonment of the power of the zoning agency, nor does it stem from 
improper motives.244 Instead, under proper circumstances conditional rezoning can be a flexible 
land-use technique of considerable utility and may constitute a valuable tool in the hands of a 
zoning authority in the proper exercise of their police power.245  The court approved the rezoning 
ordinance.246   The conditions permitted the land to be used to accomplish a good for the general 
public, yet, preserve the integrity of the comprehensive plan.  The ordinance evidenced a real 
concern for public health, safety and welfare; indeed that appeared to be the rationale for the 
enactment.  Such benefits should not be denied because of the use of the particular tract is 
restricted unlike other areas similarly zoned.  The comprehensive plan already contemplated that 
there would eventually be industrial development in the vicinity and under the comprehensive 
plan, the county held the power, authority and duty to control special uses under the zoning 
classification with the use intended there.  The benefits received from the rezoning ordinance 
there far outweighed any evil that might be said to flow from conditional rezoning per se. The 
conditions were not onerous to the property owner or incompatible with the comprehensive plan, 
did not constitute an abandonment of the zoning power, were not contractual in nature, or limited 
in their terms and did not constitute an attempt upon the part of the zoning authority to control 
the use of the land.  The ordinance appeared to have been enacted in good faith and not as a 
243Id. 
244Id. at 1095, 333 N.E.2d at 736.
245Id.
246It was adopted on the basis of the detailed findings showing a genuine need for the products to be 
produced by the plant, which would unquestionably serve the public health, safety and welfare.  The conditions 
imposed took advantage of the unique situation presented by the near confluence of pipelines which made the 
particular location highly advantageous for the gas processing plant location.
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result of negotiations or improper conduct by officials of the zoning authority and the conditions 
imposed had a reasonable and direct relationship to the purpose for which the zoning was 
granted.247
 In Benton v. Chattanooga,248 the court found the use of conditional zoning not an 
247Id, at 1096, 736.  Nor was the rezoning ordinance invalid as spot zoning under the five tests for spot 
zoning: in addition to the size of the tract involved include the questions whether the requirements of the 
comprehensive plan are met by the ordinance; the particular use for the spot; whether there are changes in conditions 
in the zoning district; where the spot is located; whether a hardship was created by any individual.  The shift toward 
industry was recognized in the comprehensive plan for the county.  The comprehensive plan emphasized the shift 
from agricultural to industry and the desirability of industry for economic growth and for keeping young people in 
the community.  Though location of the tract on the fringe between two zones might have more strongly supported a 
rezoning a tract not on the fringe.  In making this determination, the conditions of the entire region and anticipation 
of future needs is to be considered.  There was no particular hardship on any individual.  Id. at 1097, 737.  The 
rezoning ordinance at issue was not out of harmony with the comprehensive planning for the good of the 
community.  Id. at 1098, 738.  See also Thornber v. Village of North Barrington,  321 Ill. App.3d 318, 747 N.E.2d 
513 (2001)(The appellate court stating that “conditional zoning is not invalid per se”.  Rather, the focus must be on 
the application of the traditional zoning factors in an earlier Illinois Supreme court opinion.  Applying those factors 
to the ordinance, the court found the trial court’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; the 
test is whether the ordinance is consistent with comprehensive plan for use of property in the locality.  The change 
here impacted all property zoned residential, not just the village hall site.  Nor was the rezoning an instance of spot 
zoning, which is a change in zoning applied to a small area.  It is unlawful when the change violates a zoning pattern 
that is homogenous, compact and uniform.  at 328, 523.  See also Notan v. City of Taylorville, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 
1103, 420 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (conditional zoning not invalid per se, but suspect and subject to special scrutiny.  
Conditions that are general and relate to satisfying existing statutes and regulations of environmental protection 
agencies are permissible, but conditions placed in the rezoning ordinance introducing elements of contract, which 
have no place in the legislative process is an abuse of the zoning authority); see also Lurie v. Village of Skokie, 64 
Ill. App. 3d 217, 380 N.E. 2d 1120, 1127 (1978).  In Lurie, the challenged ordinance permitted sale of certain 
municipal property to a developer for the construction of low-income housing for the elderly.  Negotiations and  
discussions between the town and the developer occurred before the ordinance was passed after a sales contract was 
entered into, but the sale was offered to public bid.  The court, in upholding the ordinance, pointed out the 
developer’s proposal was developed over the course of those meetings, which gave the village officials an 
opportunity to express their need and desired requirements for the project and the developer’s proposal was not 
submitted for deliberation prior to the board’s public meeting. 
2481988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). There, the Plaintiff-Appellant, Irene Benton, and the 
Defendant, were owners of property in the City of Chattanooga.  Each of the properties was adjacent to Bonny Oaks 
Drive and they were separated by a jointly used roadway.  At the time defendant acquired its property in 1985 both 
tracts of land were zoned R-1 Residential. Soon after defendant acquired its property it filed a request with the 
Chattanooga Planning Commission to rezone its property from R-1 Residential to C-2 Commercial.  The Planning 
Commission recommended the rezoning and thereafter, the Board of Commissioners for the city passed an 
ordinance to amend earlier ordinance, to rezone the defendant’s property from R-1 to C-2.  However, the rezoning 
was subject to certain conditions.  Upon the trial of the case the chancellor held it was not necessary to pass on the 
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance to make a proper determination of the case.  He resolved each of the other 
issues in favor of the Defendants and found the ordinance was valid.  The Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend 
the judgment, which was overruled, and she appealed, arguing among other things that the alleged rezoning was 
impermissible contract zoning.  On appeal, the court ruled determined it not necessary to rule on the constitutional 
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abrogation of police power, but an exercise of it. 249 In a footnote to the decision, the court also 
stated: Nothing in this opinion is to be construed as holding that a planning commission without 
a covenant cannot prescribe reasonable conditions for the benefit of the general public.250  It is 
the use of governmental power as a bargaining chip that earlier cases criticized as the unsavory 
aspect of contract zoning.  When a government negotiates in this manner it agrees to limit its 
right and duty to act on behalf of the public.  “Rezoning is approved, not based upon the merits 
of the zone change request nor because it is in the public interest, but because a deal has been 
struck.”251  On the other hand, the court stated, that the mere unilateral imposition of conditions 
for public benefit is quite different.  In contract zoning the government entity sacrifices its 
authority. In conditional zoning, it exercises it.  By imposing conditions under which defendant’s 
property could be rezoned, Chattanooga did not bargain away its authority, but rather exercised it 
for public safety reasons.252  The court went on to conclude, the conditions in the ordinance 
issue that contract zoning is violative of the Constitution of Tennessee, since there is no contract zoning.  The 
general law, as the Court has noted, authorizes conditional zoning which was what was done in this case.
249Id. at *4-5. The court distinguished the cases on which the appellant relied,  City of Knoxville v. 
Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953) and Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn.App. 
1973). The Ambrister case arose when the City of Knoxville sought to enforce an agreement it made with a land 
developer.  The city rezoned single dwelling residential property so a multiple dwelling unit could be built.  In 
consideration for the rezoning, the property owner promised to dedicate part of the rezoned land to the city 
sometime in the future.  The dedicated property was to be used as a public park.  The property owner reneged on his 
promise to dedicate.  The city filed suit to enforce the agreement.  The supreme court held this was an example of 
contract zoning and could not be enforced.” 196 Tenn.  at 5-6. In Haymon, the property owners agreed to execute a 
25-year covenant to run with the land to maintain a 200-foot buffer zone of vacant property between their apartment 
buildings and adjoining land, which was given in exchange for rezoning. The court of appeals said this amounted to 
contract zoning which was contrary to public policy and illegal in Tennessee.  It stated: “[t]he same rule with respect 
to the validity of contracts to influence zoning seems to prevail in numerous other jurisdictions, the consensus being 
that contracts entered into in consideration of concessions made favoring the applicant are frowned upon as against 
public policy [because] zoning is an instrument of public authority to be used only for the common welfare of all the 
people.” Id. at 188.
250at  188, n.1.
251
 at 6-7.
252The Zoning Administrator for the Regional Planning Commission, testified that the use proposed for 
defendant’s property was appropriate; however, a blanket approval without conditions was not. Problems posing a 
threat to public safety needed to be rectified before the property could be put to commercial use.   The Regional 
68
require that before the property is rezoned, safer access to it had to be provided.  The proof 
showed no evidence of a bilateral agreement.  Defendant followed customary procedure in an 
attempt to have its property rezoned.  There was no evidence of negotiations between the parties
and there was no quid pro quo.  There were only unilateral conditions requiring that necessary 
improvements be made.  The court held that the chancellor properly construed the facts to 
involve only conditional zoning.  Despite the appeal of this purported distinction, the question 
remains whether the developer would have offered the condition absent the real prospect of a 
rezoning by the municipality.  If not, then the arrangement does not differ substantially from 
what is viewed as contract zoning.253
The Massachusetts courts also have found conditional zoning valid, departing from the 
views expressed by the Connecticut and  Maryland courts.  In Town of Randolph v. Town of 
Stoughton,254 The court stated that “[c]ontract zoning” is the term given to acts of rezoning 
Traffic Engineer with the Tennessee Department of Transportation, testified to the dangerousness of the existing 
access drive, irrespective of the zoning.  A professional engineer from the private sector, corroborated that 
testimony.  The existing drive was located amidst an interchange area.  It directly crossed an exit ramp from a busy 
highway before connecting into Bonny Oaks Drive, the public road from which Appellant ingressed and egressed 
her property.  This posed a danger because vehicles from two different roads converge onto Bonny Oaks Drive at 
the same point. There were visibility or ‘sight distance’ problems.  Commercial traffic would only augment those 
problems.”  Id. at 7-8.
253Id. at 8-9; The Tennessee Code authorizes the city to engage in conditional zoning.  Since conditional 
zoning is consistent with Tennessee law, the constitutionality of the provision was not required to be reached in this 
case. Id.  See also Copeland v. City of Chattanooga ex rel. its Board of Comm’rs, 866 S.W.2d 565 (Tenn. ----)(the 
conditional zoning by Appellee was a proper exercise of government police power, where the testimony revealed 
that the development of Appellants’ property would create a problem remedied by the exaction and although the 
videotapes of the two city counsel meetings revealed a concern by some members that the City might need the 
property in the future and, therefore, be required to purchase it, the overwhelming evidence supports a finding that it 
is this particular development that will create a problem remedied by the construction of an acceleration/deceleration 
lane).
2541997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 410.  There, defendant (the Trust), the owner of two parcels of land in the 
Stoughton Technology Center in the Town of Stoughton, undertook a project to construct and operate a cinema, in 
the “Center.”  The land owned by the Trust was located in an “Industrial” zoning district in which the proposed 
cinema project was a prohibited use.  The Stoughton Planning Board convened a public hearing to consider an 
amendment to the Zoning Map rezoning the Land to a “Highway Business” zoning district in which a cinema would 
be permissible.   The Town voted to enact the Zoning Map amendment. Thereafter, the Trust applied to the 
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granted on the express condition that owners impose certain restrictions on their land in order to 
obtain the desired rezoning.  An example of invalid contract zoning would be if the Town had 
conditioned the rezoning of the locus on a landowner’s dedication of land for public use 
elsewhere in the town.255  However, here, the plaintiff’s allegation that the town rezoned the land 
from “Industrial” to “Business Highway” on the condition that the landowner build a movie 
theater there, conferring tax benefits on the town, simply did not constitute the type of 
extraneous consideration unrelated to the locus necessary to establish contract zoning.256   The 
proposed use of the particular land was intimately related to a locus and would always be a 
relevant area of concern for zoning authorities so that the imposition of conditions on the 
proposed use of a locus cannot be considered “extraneous.”257
In a well-articulated justification for conditional zoning, the New York Court of Appeals 
Stoughton Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a 13.5-foot variance from the 30-foot height restriction imposed on 
all buildings in the “Highway Business” zoning district.  The ZBA found that in view of conditions and 
circumstances uniquely affecting the Land, the Trust was entitled to the requested height variance, but conditioned 
the variance on, among other things, the construction of a pedestrian overpass across Technology Center Drive, a 
four-lane street separating the proposed cinema building from the cinema parking lot).   Thereafter, the Town of 
Randolph filed the present action against the Town of Stoughton, the ZBA, the Planning Board and the Trust, 
alleging that the rezoning of the Land from “Industrial” to “Business Highway” was invalid either as spot zoning or 
contract zoning.  The Massachusetts Code provided that “any zoning ordinance or by-law which divides cities and 
towns into districts shall be uniform within the district for each class or kind of structures or uses permitted.” G.L. 
40A, 4 (1994).  The court construed this provision as prohibiting “spot zoning,” defined as a legislative change to 
existing zoning restrictions which arbitrarily and unreasonably singles out one parcel of land for treatment 
differently from that accorded surrounding parcels in the same district indistinguishable in character.  Randolph’s 
allegation of unconstitutional contract zoning failed to state a cognizable claim because it did not allege that the 
rezoning of the land was conditioned on extraneous considerations. Id. at *36.  The court held that although 
Randolph was an abutter to the rezoned parcel at issue, Randolph clearly did not own property in the same zoning 
district or even within the same municipality as the Trust’s land, and thus had no standing under the code,  which 
requires uniformity within each zoning district of a city or town and to a lesser extent, uniformity among districts 
within a single city or town.   Id at *34.
255Id. at *37
256Id. at *36-37
257Id. at 37; see also Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App.2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969) 
supra note    ; Konkel v. Common Council, Delafield, 68 Wis.2d 574 (1975)(upholding re-zoning ordinance 
contingent of landowner’s fulfilling certain conditions, where the ordinance was otherwise not arbitrary or 
capricious).
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upheld such an ordinance, in Collard v. Flower Hill.258  The Court of Appeals began its 
discussion of the issues by stating that, “[p]rior to our decision in Church v Town of Islip,259 in 
which we upheld rezoning of property subject to reasonable conditions, conditional rezoning had 
been almost uniformly condemned by courts of all jurisdictions a position to which a majority of 
States appear to continue to adhere.  Since Church, however, the practice of conditional zoning 
has become increasingly widespread in this State, as well as having gained popularity in other 
jurisdictions.”260 The court pointed out that “[p]robably the principal objection to conditional 
rezoning is that it constitutes illegal spot zoning, thus violating the legislative mandate requiring 
that there be a comprehensive plan for, and that all conditions be uniform within a given zoning 
25852 N.Y.2d 594 (N.Y. 1981). There, the earlier owners of the subject premises and appellants’ 
predecessors in title, applied to the village board of trustees to rezone the property from a General Municipal and 
Public Purposes District to a Business District.  That year the village board granted the rezoning application, subject 
to various conditions.  Previously, the subject premises, then vacant, had been zoned for single-family dwellings 
with a minimum lot size of 7,500 square feet.  In that year the then owners applied to the village board to rezone a 
portion of the property and place it in the General Municipal and Public Purposes District so that a private 
sanitarium might be constructed. Concurrently with that application a declaration of covenants restricting the use of 
the property to a sanitarium was recorded in the county clerk’s office.  The village board then granted the rezoning 
application, but limited the property’s use to the purposes set forth in the declaration of covenants.  The later 
rezoning application, which as conditionally granted was the subject of this suit, was made because the private 
sanitarium had fallen into disuse and it was asserted that without rezoning the property could neither be sold nor 
leased.  Subsequently, appellants’ predecessors in title entered into the contemplated declaration of covenants which 
was recorded some twelve years later. Consistent with the board’s resolution, that declaration provided that “[no] 
building or structure situated on the Subject Premises on the date of this Declaration of Covenants will be altered, 
extended, rebuilt, renovated or enlarged without the prior consent of the Board of Trustees of the Village.”  
Appellants, after acquiring title, made application two years later to the village board for approval to enlarge and 
extend the existing structure on the premises. Without any reason being given, that application was denied.  
Appellants then commenced this action to have the board’s determination declared arbitrary, capricious, 
unreasonable, and unconstitutional and sought by way of ultimate relief an order directing the board to issue the 
necessary building permits.  The appellants contended that the conditions imposed amounted to invalid spot zoning 
and conditional zoning.   Asserting that the board’s denial of the application was beyond review as to 
reasonableness, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. That motion was 
denied, that court equating appellants’ allegation that the board’s action was arbitrary and capricious with an 
allegation that such action was lacking in good faith and fair dealing, an allegation which it found raised triable 
issues of fact.  The appellate court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the allegation of arbitrary and 
capricious action by the board was not the equivalent of an allegation that the board breached an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.
2598 NY2d 254 (1960).
26052 N.Y.2d at 599 [citations omitted].
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district. The court explained when courts have considered the issue the assumptions have been 
made that conditional zoning benefits particular landowners rather than the community as a 
whole and that it undermines the foundation upon which comprehensive zoning depends by 
destroying uniformity within use districts.  But, such unexamined assumptions are questionable.  
First, the court said, it is a downward change to a less restrictive zoning classification that 
benefits the property rezoned and not the opposite imposition of greater restrictions on land use.  
Indeed, imposing limiting conditions, while benefiting surrounding properties, normally 
adversely affects the premises on which the conditions are imposed.  Second, the court ruled, 
zoning is not invalid per se merely because only a single parcel is involved or benefited,  the real 
test for spot zoning is whether the change is other than part of a well-considered and 
comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the community261  Such a 
determination, in turn, depends on the reasonableness of the rezoning in relation to neighboring 
uses, an inquiry required regardless of whether the change in zone is conditional in form. Third, 
the court stated, if it is initially proper to change a zoning classification without the imposition of 
restrictive conditions notwithstanding that such change may depart from uniformity, then no 
reason exists why accomplishing that change subject to condition should automatically be 
classified as impermissible spot zoning.”262  The court continued, “[b]oth conditional and 
unconditional rezoning involve essentially the same legislative act, an amendment of the zoning 
ordinance.  The standards for judging the validity of conditional rezoning are no different from 
the standards used to judge whether unconditional rezoning is illegal. If modification to a less 
261Id. at ---, citing  Rodgers v Village of Tarrytown, 302 NY 115 (1950).
262Id. at 600-01..
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restrictive zoning classification is warranted, then a fortiori conditions imposed by a local 
legislature to minimize conflicts among districts should not in and of themselves violate any 
prohibition against spot zoning.”263
Additionally, the court found, because no municipal government has the power to make 
contracts that control or limit it in the exercise of its legislative powers and duties, restrictive 
agreements made by a municipality in conjunction with a rezoning are sometimes said to violate 
public policy.264  While permitting citizens to be governed by the best bargain they can strike 
with a local legislature would not be consonant with notions of good government, absent proof of 
a contract purporting to bind the local legislature in advance to exercise its zoning authority in a 
bargained-for manner, a rule which would have the effect of forbidding a municipality from 
trying to protect landowners in the vicinity of a zoning change by imposing protective conditions 
based on the assertion that that body is bargaining away its discretion, would not be in the best 
interests of the public.  The imposition of conditions on property sought to be rezoned may not 
be classified as a prospective commitment on the part of the municipality to zone as requested if 
the conditions are met; nor would the municipality necessarily be precluded on this account from 
later reversing or altering its decision.265
The court concluded, conditional rezoning is a means of achieving some degree of 
263Id. at 601.
264Id. at ---, citing see, e.g., Hartnett v Austin, 93 So 2d 86 (Fla ; Baylis v City of Baltimore, 219 Md 164, 
Ziemer v County of Peoria, 33 Ill App 3d 612 (Ill. App. 1975) 
265 Id; cf. Matter of  Grimpel Assoc. v. Cohalan, 41 NY2d 431 (1977). Further, the court found, while it is 
accurate to say there exists no explicit authorization that a legislative body may attach conditions to zoning 
amendments, Id. citing e.g., Village Law, § 7-700 et seq., neither is there any language which expressly forbids a 
local legislature to do so. Id.; Baylis v City of Baltimore, 219 Md 164, 148 A.2d 429 (Md. Ct. App. 1959). Statutory 
silence is not necessarily a denial of the authority to engage in such a practice.  Where in the face of nonaddress in 
the enabling legislation there exists independent justification for the practice as an appropriate exercise of municipal 
power, that power will be implied.  Id. at 602. 
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flexibility in land-use control by minimizing the potentially deleterious effect of a zoning change 
on neighboring properties; reasonably conceived conditions harmonize the landowner’s need for 
rezoning with the public interest and certainly fall within the spirit of the enabling legislation266
The Collard decision should not be regarded as far reaching as it first seems.  First, the 
court seems to place great significance on the fact the conditions operated to restrict uses of the 
land otherwise not permitted, not to allow different uses.  Second, to the extent that the standards 
266The court then stated, “[o]ne final concern of those reluctant to uphold the practice is that resort to 
conditional rezoning carries with it no inherent restrictions apart from the restrictive agreement itself. This fear, 
however, is justifiable only if conditional rezoning is considered a contractual relationship between municipality and 
private party, outside the scope of the zoning power, a view to which the court did not subscribe. When conditions 
are incorporated in an amending ordinance, the result is as much a “zoning regulation” as an ordinance adopted 
without conditions.  Just as the scope of all zoning regulation is limited by the police power, and thus local 
legislative bodies must act reasonably and in the best interests of public safety, welfare and convenience, id. at 602, 
citing Church v Town of Islip, 8 NY2d 254, supra), the scope of permissible conditions must of necessity be 
similarly limited.  If, upon proper proof, the conditions imposed are found unreasonable, the rezoning amendment as 
well as the required conditions would have to be nullified, with the affected property reverting to the pre-amendment 
zoning classification.” Id. at 603, citing  Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Matter of 
New York Inst. of Technology v Le Boutillier, 33 NY2d 125, 130 (N.Y. 1973); Matter of Concordia Coll. Inst. v 
Miller, 301 NY 189, 196)(N.Y. 1950).  The court then discussed Appellant’s argument by stating that it “proceeded 
along two paths: first, that as a matter of construction the added prescription should be read into the provision; 
second, that because of limitations associated with the exercise of municipal zoning power the village board would 
have been required to include such a prescription.” The court found this argument to be without merit.  “Appellants' 
construction argument must fail. The terminology employed in the declaration is explicit.  The concept that 
appellants would invoke is not obscure and language to give it effect was readily available had it been the intention 
of the parties to include this added stipulation. Appellants point to no canon of construction in the law of real 
property or of contracts which would call for judicial insertion of the missing clause.  Where language has been 
chosen containing no inherent ambiguity or uncertainty, courts are properly hesitant, under the guise of judicial 
construction, to imply additional requirements to relieve a party from asserted disadvantage flowing from the terms 
actually used (cf. Dress Shirt Sales v Martinque Assoc., 12 NY2d 339).  The second path either leads nowhere or 
else goes too far. If it is appellants’ assertion that the village board was legally required to insist on inclusion of the 
desired prescription, there is no authority in the court to reform the zoning enactment of 1976 retroactively to 
impose the omitted clause.  Whether the village board at that time would have enacted a different resolution in the 
form now desired by appellants is open only to speculation; the certainty is that they did not then take such 
legislative action.  On the other hand, acceptance of appellants’ proposition would produce as the other possible 
consequence the conclusion that the 1976 enactment was illegal, throwing appellants unhappily back to the pre-1976 
zoning of their premises, a destination which they assuredly wish[ed] to sidestep.” Id. at 603-04.  The court 
concluded that it agreed with the Appellate Division’s finding “that the allegation of the complaint that the village 
board in denying appellants’ application acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner is not an allegation that the 
board acted in bad faith or its equivalent.” Id. at 604.  “For the reasons stated, the Board of Trustees of the 
Incorporated Village of Flower Hill may not now be compelled to issue its consent to the proposed enlargement and 
extension of the existing structure on the premises or in the alternative give an acceptable reason for failing to do so.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.” Id.
74
for judging the validity of conditional rezoning are no different from the standards used to judge 
whether unconditional rezoning is illegal, the municipality concedes nothing in its decision to 
rezone, but obtains a benefit for surrounding properties. Third, the court pointed out that the 
municipality was not bound by the rezoning but was in fact free to rezone the rezoned property 
as it saw fit and at the same time free to insist upon adherence to the conditions as was the case 
here.  As a criticism of the reasoning, does not the imposition of conditions suggest that the 
municipality would not have rezoned absent the landowner’s agreement to the conditions?  This 
seems like an inducement to rezone, yet not one that should be condemned where the conditions 
serve the public interest. 267
267See also Church v. Islip , 8 N.Y. 254 (1960). There, the town board acted unanimously to rezone a corner 
lot, an irregular strip.  The Board’s consent to the rezoning was conditioned on the building not being more than 
25% of the areas; the anchor post fence, equal, six feet high, was to be erected five feet within the boundary line of 
the property; live shrubbery to be planted; and the above being put into effect before carrying on any retail business 
on the property.  Zoning being a legislative act, (not a variance) is entitled to the strongest possible presumption of 
validity and must stand if there is any factual basis therefor, the court rejected the argument that the this was contract 
zoning; all the appellants arguments revolved about the idea that this was illegal contract zoning because the town 
board, as a condition, for rezoning required the owners to record restrictive covenants as to maximum area to be 
occupied by the buildings and as  a fence and shrubbery. The court reasoned, “[s]urely these conditions were 
intended to be and are for the benefit of the neighbors.  Since the town board could have, presumably, zoned this 
corner for business without any restrictions, the court held “we fail to see how reasonable conditions invalidate the 
legislation.” The court explained, what “contract zoning” means is unclear and there are no New York law on the 
subject.  All legislation by “contract” is invalid in the sense that a legislature cannot bargain away or sell it powers.  
But the court would deal here with actualities and not phrases. To meet increasing needs of the county’s own 
population explosion, and at the same time to make as gradual and as little of an annoyance as possible the change 
from residence to business on the main highways, the Town imposes conditions, there was nothing unconstitutional 
about it.  Incidentally, the record did not show any agreement in the sense that the owners made an offer accepted by 
the board. Id. at ---;  see also In re City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 1076 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963), the City sought and 
acquired title to five parcels of real estate for street widening purposes. The property owners disagreed with the City 
as to how much they should be compensated for the taking of their property by the City. The only significant issue 
involved a determination of damages for the parcel of real estate that was occupied by a bowling alley, which was a 
nonconforming use to the residential zoning of the property.  The claimant contended that the agreement of April 18, 
1956, waiving enhancement of value of the strip taken by reason of the zoning change for retail use is not binding 
for the reason, among other things that if the waiver was a condition imposed by the Board of Estimate such 
condition would be illegal as constituting so-called “contract zoning”.  The court rejected plaintiff’s argument 
holding that even assuming that the Board of Estimates had imposed the waiver agreement as a condition for the 
change, it does not necessarily follow that such condition was not validly imposed in the best interests of the citizens 
of the City of New York.  Id. at 1079, citing  (Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N Y 2d 254; Point Lookout Civic Assn. v.
Town of Hempstead, 22 Misc 2d 757, affd 12 A D 2d 505, affd 9 N Y 2d 961);  But see Levine v. Town of Oyster 
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Relying on Collard, in Holmes v. Planning Bd. of New Castle,268 the court held in a 
lengthy opinion, that, “[c]onditions imposed as an incident of approval in a developmental 
permit control system are a major weapon in a planner’s arsenal.  Conditions allow flexibility 
and fairness in land use and development control decisions, and provide the ability to deal with 
problems such as traffic congestion, something barely contemplated under zoning schemes.269
The most common utilizations of conditions in land use and development decisions occur in 
nondiscretionary determinations which are made subject to conditions publicly specified in 
Bay, 26 A.D.2d 583, 272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1966), where the court distinguished Church v. Town of Islip.  There, after a 
public hearing the town voted to adopt a resolution amending the building zone ordinance changing landowner’s 
approximately 14 acres from residential to industrial.  One of four conditions attached to the amendment was that 
the grade of the affected piece be reduced to that of the road on which it fronted.  The existing grade was 15 to 18 
feet higher than the road and would require the removal of approximately 267,000 cubic yards of earth.  
Homeowners whose residences were adjacent or in the immediate vicinity of the rezoned parcel challenged the 
rezoning.  The amendment was struck down on the ground that the condition concerning the grade was in futuro.  
The court stating that Church teaches that conditions per se do not void zoning amendments.  However, in this case, 
the condition was proposed by applicants for the downzoning and was adopted in toto by the town board.  The 
rezoned parcel was the first industrial intrusion in the area and seriously upset the use balance that had been advised 
and maintained with respect to the zoning on each side of the road.  In sum, it rezoning appeared not made for the 
general welfare of the town but for the personal benefit of the landowner who petitioned for precisely the change 
and conditions that were adopted.  This constituted spot or contract zoning. However, this case can be criticized for 
finding contract zoning without finding a reciprocal promise by the town to rezone.  Instead, the better basis for 
striking down the rezoning should have been on its merits as not reflecting concern for the public interest; See also 
Hiscox v. Levine, 31 Misc. 2d 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) where the court distinguished Church v. Islip on the facts 
where the  town authorized the respondent planning board to make reasonable changes in zoning regulations, but it 
required the maintenance of the average population density and strict conformance with Town Law § 281.  The 
developer offered land for a park in exchange for a variance to develop the rest of the property.  The court noted that 
“[i]n support of their positions both sides place some reliance on Church v. Town of Islip (8 N Y 2d 254), but 
explained the in that case the Town Board granted a change of zoning from residence to business on condition that 
the owner comply with stated requirements.  As against an argument that the board engaged in ‘contract zoning,’ the 
court upheld the change.  In Hiscox, the court stated, that contrary to the respondents’ belief, the Church case does 
not support their positions.  In the first place, the action therein reviewed was legislative action by the Town Board, 
not administrative action.  In the second place, the Church court specifically noted that the conditions “‘were 
intended to be and are for the benefit of the neighbors’” and that the Town Board “‘could have, presumably, zoned 
this Bay Shore Road corner for business without any restriction.’”  The respondents in Hiscox could not make either 
claim.  Except for the conclusion that the plans “‘appropriately and adequately safeguard the use of adjoining 
lands’” there was “not one shred of evidence to show benefit or even regard for the neighbors.  Nor have 
respondents argued that all the lands zoned ‘A’ could have been zoned ‘B’ by the board absent the park element.”  
The court concluded that there could be no doubt that the board’s sole motivation was the lure of a large park, the 
dedication of which was not imposed by the board as a condition, but offered by the developers as the price for 
rezoning. Id. at 152-53.
26878 A.D.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1980).
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advance, e.g., special permits, or discretionary determinations subject to stipulated conditions, 
e.g., variances or site plan approval [citations omitted].”270  The court then held that, “[i]n New 
York, the use of reasonable conditions as a land control device has been long upheld.271
VI.  Conditional Use District Zoning in North Carolina 
Upheld as Not Involving Contract Zoning
In North Carolina, there is a land use device called “conditional use district zoning.”  
Under this device, the landowner requests a rezoning to a conditional use district.  Under this 
scheme, a landowner must request a rezoning to a conditional use district and the local 
government must issue a conditional use permit before any desired use will be permitted. 
Conditions are placed in the permit, not in the zoning ordinance, thereby on its face, avoiding the 
claim of conditional zoning.  The “conditional use district zoning” differs from contract zoning 
in that the former features merely a unilateral promise from the landowner regarding future use.  
269Id. at 14.  [citation omitted]
270 Id. at 14-15.
271Id. at 15, citing Matter of Reed v Board of Standards & Appeals of City of N. Y., 255 NY 126); Church v 
Town of Islip, 8 NY2d 254 (1960).  The Holmes court went on to reject the petitioners claim that the condition that 
they consent to an easement as a requisite for the approval of the site plan imposed on them was unreasonable 
because it was arbitrary.  Petitioners argued that the condition must be stricken because it was not ‘directly related to 
and incidental to the proposed use’ of their property. The test for determining whether such a requirement is invalid 
is derived from the fundamental rule regarding the exercise of police power, i.e., “that there is some evil extant or 
reasonably to be apprehended which the police power may be invoked to prevent and that the remedy proposed must 
be generally adapted to that purpose.” Id.  The court went on to state, “[t]he petitioners contend that no condition 
may be imposed which alleviates public needs other than those which are “uniquely and specifically attributable” to 
the development proposed in their application. The corollary to this rule is that the benefit deriving from a condition 
must accrue to the development rather than the public as a whole.  These criteria posed great difficulties for 
municipal authorities confronted by small residential subdivisions which could not contribute properly sized 
recreational facilities but whose presence still generated need, by industrial subdivisions which caused 
environmental needs not within the category of assessment soluble problems, and by the inability to equate the cost 
of the exaction with the benefit to or need created by the development being accessed. As a result of these 
difficulties, another approach was generated, the “rational nexus test”.  This test draws support from the police 
power in allowing conditions based on future oriented planning.  Thus, a subdivider can “be compelled only to bear 
that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the 
subdivision”  The rational nexus test relieves the highly constricting uniqueness factor and allows some incidental 
benefit to the general public.  Id. at 18-19.  Here, the condition was imposed to alleviate traffic congestion posed by 
the development. Id.  
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There is no bilateral contract binding the zoning authority.  At the same time, the “conditional 
use district zoning” allows the local government to consider proposed land use when evaluating a 
zoning application.272 As originally conceived, conditional use district zoning consisted of two 
steps:  1) a legislative process to consider the rezoning request, and 2) a quasi-judicial 
proceeding to determine whether  a permit is appropriate under the circumstances presented by 
the application.  It was held the without out the second step, the zoning decision would be based 
on the proposed use of the property -- a classic illustration of illegal contract zoning.273
The North Carolina Supreme Court dealt with the concept and the question whether it 
constitutes illegal contract zoning in Chrismon v. Guilford County.274 The court stated that it was 
272 Charlotte, N.C., Code of Ordinances 6.101-6.208 (2000).
273 Massey v. City of Charlotte, 2000 N.C. Ct. 4 (April 17, 2000).  However, the North Carolina Legislature 
amended the zoning laws to authorize conditional zoning in Mecklenburg County until 2001, thus providing for 
parallel rules, one set for Mecklenburg County and another for the rest of the state.  In most of the state, local 
governments employ a legislative process to make zoning decisions and may not consider a specific use in making 
that zoning decision.  Once the rezoning has occurred, the municipality than holds a quasi-judicial hearing to issue a 
conditional use permit for the specific use.  Within the county, local governments had the temporary statutory 
authority to approve a rezoning using a single-step, purely legislative process, subject to a deferential judicial review 
and may consider the tract’s proposed used in making the zoning decision.  That is, the new law can be viewed as 
authorizing conditional zoning and contract zoning in the county.  See Stepen C. Keadey, “Into the Danger Zone: 
Massey v. City of Charlotte and the Fate of Conditional Zoning in North Carolina”, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1155 (2001); 
But see Massey v. City of Charlotte, 145 N.C. App. 345 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)(overruling trial court’s conclusions 
that the courts and the legislature have limited such approval of conditional use district zoning to systems which 
utilize a two step process - a legislative rezoning decision followed by a quasi-judicial determination of whether to 
issue a conditional use permit, finding that the ordinance on conditional use permits allows an applicant to apply 
separately for rezoning and a conditional use permit, but that the ordinance allowed for both to be approved or 
disapproved in a single public hearing held before the Board of Commissioners, and that Board was within its 
powers to create a special use district that would not require a special use permit).
274322 N.C. 611 (N.C. 1988). There, beginning in 1980, landowner moved some portion of his business 
operation from the 3.18-acre tract north of Gun Shop Road to the 5.06-acre tract south of Gun Shop Road, directly 
adjacent to plaintiffs’ lot.  Subsequently, landowner constructed some new buildings on this larger tract, erected 
several grain bins, and generally enlarged his operation. Concerned by the increased noise, dust, and traffic caused 
by landowner’s expansion, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Guilford County Inspections Department.  The 
Inspections Department subsequently notified landowner by letter dated that the expansion of the agricultural 
chemical operation to the larger tract adjacent to plaintiffs’ lot constituted an impermissible expansion of a 
nonconforming use. The same letter informed landowner further that, though his activity was impermissible under 
the ordinance, he could request a rezoning of the property.  Shortly thereafter, landowner applied to have both of the 
tracts in question rezoned from A-1 to “Conditional Use Industrial District” (hereinafter CU-M-2).    He also applied 
for a conditional use permit, specifying in the application that he would use the property as it was then being used 
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necessary to consider two very different concepts -- namely, valid conditional use zoning and 
illegal contract zoning. In fact, said the court, the two concepts are not to be considered 
synonymous.  The court held that the rezoning at issue in this case -- namely, the rezoning of 
[landowner’s] two tracts of land from A-1 to CU-M-2 -- was, in truth, valid conditional use 
zoning and not illegal contract zoning.275  The court continued, “[i]llegal contract zoning 
properly connotes a transaction wherein both the landowner who is seeking a certain zoning 
action and the zoning authority itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral
contract.276 The court stated that most courts would conclude that by agreeing to curtail its 
legislative power, the Council acted ultra vires.  Such contract zoning is illegal and the rezoning 
is therefore a nullity.277  Contract zoning of this type is objectionable primarily because it 
represents an abandonment on the part of the zoning authority of its duty to exercise independent 
judgment in making zoning decisions.278  As the court had indicated, valid conditional use 
zoning, on the other hand, is an entirely different matter.  Conditional use zoning is an outgrowth 
of the need for a compromise between the interests of the developer who is seeking appropriate 
and listing those improvements he would like to make in the next five years. Under the CU-M-2 classification, 
landowner’s agricultural chemical operation would become a permitted use upon the issuance of the conditional use 
permit. The Guilford County Planning Board met and voted to approve the recommendation of the Planning 
Division that the property be rezoned consistent with landowner’s request.  The trial court  affirmed the validity of 
the rezoning in question.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, first, that the rezoning in question constituted 
illegal “spot zoning” and, second, that it also constituted illegal “contract zoning.”  The Court of Appeals found that 
the rezoning was accomplished upon the assurance that landowner would submit an application for a conditional use 
permit specifying that he would use the property only in a certain manner.  The Court of Appeals concluded that, in 
essence, the rezoning here was accomplished through a bargain between the applicant and the Board rather than 
through a proper and valid exercise of the county’s legislative discretion.  According to the Court of Appeals, this 
activity constituted illegal “contract zoning” and was therefore void.
275Id. at 634-35.
276 Id. , citing Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 Temp. L.Q. 267 (1968); D. Mandelker, Land 
Use Law § 6.59 (1982)
277Id. at   -, citing  Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 Temp. L.Q. 267, 269 (1968).
278Id. at ---, citing generally Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, 
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Governmental Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 957 
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rezoning for his tract and the community on the one hand and the interests of the neighboring 
landowners who will suffer if the most intensive use permitted by the new classification is 
instituted.279  One commentator has described its mechanics as follows: An orthodox conditional 
zoning situation occurs when a zoning authority, without committing its own power, secures a 
property owner’s agreement to subject his tract to certain restrictions as a prerequisite to 
rezoning. These restrictions may require that the rezoned property be limited to just one of the 
uses permitted in the new classification; or particular physical improvements and maintenance 
requirements may be imposed.280  In the court’s view, therefore, 
The principal differences between valid conditional use zoning and illegal contract 
zoning are related and are essentially two in number.  First, valid conditional use zoning features 
merely a unilateral promise from the landowner to the local zoning authority as to the 
landowner’s intended use of the land in question, while illegal contract zoning anticipates a 
bilateral contract in which the landowner and the zoning authority make reciprocal promises. 
Second, in the context of conditional use zoning, the local zoning authority maintains its 
independent decision-making authority, while in the contract zoning scenario, it abandons that 
authority by binding itself contractually with the landowner seeking a zoning amendment.281
(1987).
279Id. at 636.
280Id. at 635-36, citing Shapiro, The Case For Conditional Zoning, 41 Temp. L.Q. 267, 270-71 (1968) 
(emphasis added).” Id. at 635-36.
281
 The Court of Appeals, in its opinion in this case, determined that “[t]he rezoning here was accomplished 
as a direct consequence of the conditions agreed to by the applicant rather than as a valid exercise of the county’s 
legislative discretion.” In so doing, it concluded, in essence, that the zoning authority here -- namely, the Guilford 
County Board of Commissioners -- entered into a bilateral agreement, thereby abandoning its proper role as an 
independent decision-maker and rendering this rezoning action void as illegal contract zoning. Chrismon v.Guilford 
County, 85 N.C. App. 211, 219, 354 S.E. 2d 309, 314. Justice Webb dissented by stating, “[i]t appears to me the 
majority has overruled Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E. 2d 35 (1972) and Allred v. City of Raleigh, 
277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E. 2d 432 (1971).  In an attempt to distinguish Blades and Allred from this case the majority 
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VII.  Concomitant Agreements Withstanding a Charge of Contract Zoning
In the state of Washington, there is the concept of zoning with concomitant agreements.  
The enactment of the zoning amendment occurs concurrently with the entering into of an 
agreement between the developer and the city; the agreement imposing on the developer 
requirements in addition to those otherwise contained in the zoning ordinance.282 In State ex. rel. 
Myhre v. City of Spokane,283 the court upheld such an agreement, finding that the indicia of the 
validity of such agreements include whether the performance called for is directly related to 
goes to some length in explaining the difference between what it says is valid conditional use zoning and illegal 
contract zoning.  The difficulty for me with the majority opinion is that the definitions it uses for conditional use 
zoning and contract zoning are contrary to the holdings of Blades and Allred. Id. at 641-42.  Justice Webb continued, 
“[t]he facts in each of those two cases were that a landowner petitioned the City of Raleigh for a change in the 
zoning ordinance.  In each case the landowner submitted plans for the buildings he would construct if the change 
was made.  The City Council in each case rezoned the property as requested by the landowner.  This Court in each 
case held this was illegal contract zoning.  There was no more evidence in either case that there was a bilateral 
contract or any reciprocal promises than there is in this case.  There was no more evidence in those cases than there 
is in this case that the zoning board abandoned its independent decision making authority.  In my opinion Blades and 
Allred are indistinguishable from this case.  I believe that prior to today the rule was that if a person requested a 
zoning change and submitted plans of the type building he would construct if the change were granted, and the 
zoning authority made the change based on the promise to construct such a building, that would be contract zoning.  
We have held contrary to this and in doing so have overruled Blades and Allred.  I vote to affirm the Court of 
Appeals.” Id. at 642. The court conflagration’s of the conditional use district zoning with conditional  zoning left an 
ad hoc zoning regime in North Carolina, resulting in local governments employing a wide variety of conditional use 
district zoning procedures. Stephen C. Keadey, supra  note ----- at 1166. Developer championed Charlotte’s 
rezoning procedure because it had the capacity to expedite growth, i.e., by condensing the process to one step, 
foregoing the potentially time-consuming quasi-judicial requirements, developers could receive the zoning decision 
and conditional use permit quickly.  The additional step required by Massey constituted, to some developers, an 
“additional procedural hurdle” that merely slows and complicates the process. Id. at 1171.
282State ex. rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790, 794 (Wash. 1967)(upholding 
such an agreement, finding it not contract zoning, not treated as a bilateral contract. Instead, these are mechanisms 
designed to prevent the negative effects of certain types of development.  As such, a valid and permissible exercise 
of police power.  Court explained that its power to review the validity of zoning accompanied by concomitant 
agreements was limited to invalidating an ordinance only if there was no reason for the change or the agreement was 
in fact for the primary or sole benefit of the developer. The concomitant agreement required the owners of 
reclassified property to pay $75,000 toward the construction costs of certain streets which would be needed because 
of the development of a shopping center in the rezoned area; “[w]hen the city requires that the cost of such safety 
measures be borne by the company, it is not bargaining away its regulatory police power but, rather, determining 
that the cost should be borne by the person who created the necessity for the expenditure of such funds, instead of 
the city).  422 P. 2d at 796.  See also Redmond v. Kezner, 10 Wash. App. 332, 517 P.2d 625 (1973)(court held valid 
an agreement between property owners and developer which imposed conditions and a dedication of land held 
concomitant, but the rezoning valid where the agreement was designed to neutralize any negative impact from 
development and not one seeking to extract some collateral benefit from the property owner)..
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public needs which may be expected to result from the proposed usage of the property to be 
rezoned; the fulfillment of these needs is an appropriate function of the contracting governmental 
body; performance will mitigate the burden in meeting those resulting needs by placing it more 
directly on the party whose property use will give rise to them; the agreement involves no 
purported relinquishment by the governing body of its discretionary zoning power.284
Concomitant agreements provide a source of flexibility by allowing an intermediate use permit, 
between absolute denial and complete approval of a petition.285  In other words, a “contract to 
rezone” or concomitant agreement, is invalid only if it can be shown that there was no valid 
reason for a zoning change and the authorities are using the contract for bargaining and sale to 
the highest bidder or solely for the benefit of private speculators.286 In City of Redmond v. 
Kezner,287  the concomitant agreement contained no express promise by the city to rezone.  
Instead, the agreement was conditioned upon the city rezoning.  The court pointed out though, 
that the distinction was unimportant.  “If there is no promise to rezone, there is no promise to 
relinquish legislative power.  … If the city ha[d] made the promises claimed, they [would] not 
illegal under the Mhyre , in which the city promised to rezone.”288
In Maine, the zoning enabling act permits a municipality to enter into a contract zoning 
agreement with a landowner for the rezoning of land which may contain conditions for final 
283
 70 Wash.2d 207, 422 P.2d 790.
284 Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn.2d 858, 889, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
285 State ex. rel. Myhre v. Spokane, 70 Wn. 2d 707, 716 (1967). 
286 Id.  
287
 10 Wn. App. 332; 517 2d 625 (1973).
288 City of Redmond v. Kezner, 10 Wash. App. 332, 340, 517 P.2d 625 (1973). Where the city agreed to 
apply for and the administration agreed to support the rezoning of property, there is not a promise or guarantee that 
the rezone would be granted for the property because the administration does not have the power to rezone; it is the 
City council’s authority.  Id.
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approval.289   Under a town’s contract zoning provisions, the planning board is required to 
conduct a public hearing on a developer’s proposed contract zoning agreement and to provide 
notice of this hearing to the public and the neighboring landowners.290  The Pennsylvania courts 
have held that rezoning which is otherwise valid concomitant with agreements between a 
developer and the municipality concerning the use of the land, is not invalid merely because of 
the existence of an agreement.291
VIII.  The Questions Earlier Posed
Given the confusion and overlapping nature of the concepts of contract zoning and 
conditional zoning, the answer to the questions earlier posed is that there is a fine and superficial  
distinction between the two.  The difference in large measure is semantical.   Conditional zoning 
is upheld where even though there is no express promise by the municipality to rezone, but based 
upon conditions  agreed to by the developer, the municipality does rezone to allow the proposed 
development, based on those conditions.  As such, there seems no good reason to outlaw contract 
zoning where the promise to rezone based on similar promises by the developer is express, the 
promise is otherwise in the public interest, the consideration offered and received pertains to the 
property at issue, and the zoning authority exercises its independent judgment in acting on the 
zoning application.  That is, a contractual promise is made but is subject to public comment 
before the contract become final seems not to offend any of the rules regarding the public trust 
289See 30-A M.R.S.A.§ 4404(9).
290See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4352 (8).  See also Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 1999 Me 112, 736 A.2d 241 
(1999).  The town’s contract zoning ordinance there provided: “contract zoning ... is authorized for zoning map 
changes when the town council, exercising its sole and exclusive judgment, ... determines that it is appropriate to 
change the zoning district classification of a parcel of land to allow reasonable uses of land ... which remain 
consistent with the Town’s ... comprehensive plan.”
291Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Lower Merion, 409 Pa. 441, 187 A.2d 549 (1963)(owner agreed to grant the 
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under which the zoning power exists any more than rezoning based on conditions suggested by 
or to the zoning authority.
IX.  Why Development Agreements are Not Contract or Conditional Zoning
As the cases state, contract zoning refers to an agreement between a municipality and a 
developer whereby the developer offers consideration often but not necessarily extraneous to the 
property for zoning, ad hoc.  As a general proposition, ad hoc zoning agreements are invalid to 
the extent that a municipality promises to re-zone land by bypassing the notice and hearing 
requirements of the legislative process, or makes a decision to rezone before public hearing, or 
agrees to rezone in exchange for some benefit having nothing to do with the rezoning.  Ad hoc
zoning may also be invalid where it conflicts with the municipality’s comprehensive plan in a 
way that results in the discriminatory treatment of persons and projects or where the rezoning 
does not further the public interest, safety, or welfare.  But, the mere act of re-zoning is not 
contract zoning and it is a different issue if the zoning regulations and comprehensive plan 
specifically contemplate rezoning affecting a specific parcel with the imposition of conditions.   
In fact, the cases upholding conditional zoning, hold that rezoning in this fashion, that is, with 
conditions attached that limit the use of the rezoned land in a way designed to minimize adverse 
impact on the surrounding area, furthers the municipality’s interest in achieving desirable and 
beneficial land use.292  In the same sense, development agreements should not be regarded as a 
form of ad hoc zoning since they contemplate the developer’s compliance with the existing 
town a right of way, an access road, and to convey and site if demanded by the city).
292Cram v. Town of Geneva, 190 A.D.2d 1028 (4th Dept. 1993).   A further discussion of the powers of 
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zoning scheme (although they may involve variances and exceptions) and are approved by public 
hearing.   They are nonetheless subject to challenge if the decision to freeze the zoning is based 
on offers or agreements that inhibit the municipality’s police powers, the municipality promising 
in the resulting ordinance not to apply new zoning restrictions to the development.293 Courts 
have recognized the need for land-use agreements between developers and municipalities to 
assure stability in permitting large projects.  Thus, the trend has been to allow such agreements 
unless they constitute a usurpation of the municipality’s zoning authority.294  In fact, as described 
earlier, several states have codified the process for entering into development agreements.295
While these statutes generally authorize local governments to assure developers that zoning 
regulations in effect at the time of an agreement will remain in effect until the project is 
completed, they also require provisions in the agreements that pertain to the duration of the 
agreement and the conditions upon which the agreement may be terminated, that is to protect the 
health, safety or welfare of the public.296  The extent to which a local government may validly 
restrict or limit its future use of the police power by freezing the zoning under statutorily 
authorized development agreements is an issue that has been resolved by a few courts.297
local governments in New York to re-zone on a site-by-site basis, although with conditions, appears supra, at 31-37.
2933 A. Rathkopf & D. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 29A.03[1][b], [f], at 27, 33-34 (1990).
294Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 568. (Vt. 2001); Giger v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 676, 442 
N.W.2d 182 (1989).
295Id., citing See Rathkopf & Rathkopf, supra, § 29A.03[1][a], [c], at 22-23, 30. Id. § 29A.03[1][g][i], at 
34-35.
296Id. citing Rathkopf  at 35 n.50.
297 In Morgran Company, Inc. v. Orange County, 818 So.2d 640 (Fla. 2002), the Court also acknowledged 
that development agreements are expressly permitted by the Florida Statutes.  Development agreements are defined 
as a “contract between a [local government] and a property owner/developer, which provides the developer with 
vested rights by freezing the existing zoning regulations applicable to a property in exchange for public benefits.  
Florida Law permits local governments to impose “conditions, terms, and restrictions” as part of these agreements, 
where necessary for the public health, safety or welfare of its citizens. But, the problem in that case was the city’s 
agreement to support rezoning as part of that development agreement, beforehand, rather than after hearings on the 
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If development agreements are distinguished from contract zoning by the absence of any 
commitment on the part of the municipality to act in accordance with the developer’s wishes, 
making them a form of conditional zoning, then they may be of little benefit to the developer 
where the municipality promises nothing in return.  Yet, as a form of conditional rezoning, they 
would be upheld, it seems, in the majority of jurisdictions.  On the other hand, a binding promise 
by the municipality made before rezoning to act in a certain way, would be regarded as illegal 
contract zoning.  But this would be the case only if the municipality has by-passed the public 
hearing procedures, the public interest is not served, it is disruptive of the comprehensive plan 
and the municipality has surrendered its power to rezone if the public interest so requires. 
Development agreements authorized by statute, by their terms, meet all these provisos.  They 
specifically  reserve some governmental control over the project, such as by provisions that 
specify the duration and grounds for unilateral termination in order to protect the public interest, 
health and welfare.  By statute, they must be consistent with the comprehensive plan, and they 
are approved through public hearing.298
agreement.  The court did not otherwise distinguish development agreements where the city agrees to freeze existing 
regulations from contract zoning in which the city agrees to rezone based on a developer's promises.  The difference 
is a subtle one since bilateral promises are precisely at the heart of development agreements, although the 
municipality reserves some residual power to act should the public, health and welfare require it, thereby avoiding 
the bargaining away police powers charge.    
298Larkin, 172 Vt. at 568, 772 A.2d at 558(deciding the case on another ground that plaintiff who  
purchased the original developer’s rights in a foreclosure sale did not acquire rights under a development agreement 
with the city);  see also Bollech v. Charles County, Maryland, 166 F. Supp.2d 443 (D. Md. 2001) (where agreement 
itself stated that development would be subject to any changes in state or federal law and that it did not require 
absolute deference to the existing zoning, the county did not illegally abdicate its police powers by entering into the 
agreement); DePaolo v. Town of Ithaca, 258 A.D.2d 68 (3d Dept. 1999)(“agreement” by developer to grant town a 
99 year license to use certain property as a park, conditioned upon landowner’s receipt of all approvals for a 
development project, did not present a situation of “legislating pursuant to the terms of a contract”, nor one in which 
town agreed “in exchange for a predetermined consideration for expedited and favorable determination, as would be 
illegal, but instead was only an  agreement that furthered the town’s longstanding objective stated in the 
comprehensive plan, of ensuring public use and enjoyment of the donated land); Stephens v. City of Vista, 994 F.2d 
650 (9th Cir. 1993)(no bargaining away of police power where city could exercise discretion over the site 
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In fact, development agreements, not authorized by special legislation  have been 
specifically upheld as not involving contract, but conditional zoning.  In Giger v. City of 
Omaha,299 the developer applied to the city for a rezoning of property to permit the construction 
of a mixed-used development consisting of retail, office and residential buildings.  As part of the 
application process, the developer submitted several development plans, the final plan including 
the construction of a public park.  In a new procedure, the developer and the city entered into 
four agreements which incorporated the plan.  The four agreements were collectively known as 
the “development agreement” and were submitted to the city for approval.  The city passed an 
ordinance approving the “development agreement,” incorporating it as part of the ordinance and 
passed five separate ordinances rezoning the property.  Clearly, the agreements formed the basis 
of the city’s decision to rezone, i.e., the parties had worked out the terms of the rezoning before it 
occurred.  The agreement could be interpreted as a promise by the city to rezone based upon the 
agreed upon conditions.300
The challengers contended that  rezoning by agreement was illegal contract zoning and 
was therefore invalid per se,  as an ultra vires act, and fostered the “appearance of evil.”301 The 
court found that distinction between contract zoning and conditional zoning academic because its 
scope of review was limited to determining whether the conditions imposed by the city for 
development process); Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 
(1976)(reserved powers doctrine voids only a contract which amounts to a city’s “surrender” or  “abrogation” of its 
control of a proper municipal function; annexation agreement was “just, reasonable, fair and equitable” even though 
some of the executory features might have extended beyond the terms of current legislative body members).
299232 Neb. 676, 442 N.W.2d 182 (1989).
300 Neighboring property owners challenged the rezoning on the ground, inter alia, the city acted in an 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner in adopting the rezoning ordinance.  Specifically, the challengers 
alleged that the city entered into a development agreement with the developer, adopted a rezoning ordinance which 
incorporated that agreement, and rezoned the property pursuant to that agreement and that the city rezoned the 
property without giving adequate consideration to the risk of flood created by the project.
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rezoning were reasonably related to the interest of public health, safety, morals, and the general 
welfare.302 Accordingly, the city should be permitted to condition rezoning ordinances on the 
adoption of an agreement between the developer and the city, or any other means assuring the 
developer builds the project as represented.  Otherwise, the city would be stripped of the power 
to act for the benefit of the general welfare.303 At the risk of confusion, but for the sake of 
convenience, the court referred to this zoning arrangement as conditional zoning. Quoting a 
treatise, the court explained that the purpose of conditional rezoning is to minimize that negative 
externalities caused by land development which otherwise benefits the community.304  In this 
way, the developer might agree to restrict development of its property, make certain 
improvements, dedicate a portion on of land to the municipality, or make payments to the 
government.305
The court pointed out that conditional zoning is valuable as a planning tool because it
permits municipality greater flexibility in balancing developing demands against fiscal and 
environmental concerns. It provides a municipality with flexibility to meet specific rezoning 
requests while preserving the integrity of adjacent property.  For example, the agreement could 
mitigate the harshness of commercial or industrial rezoning on neighboring residential property 
301Id. at 681-82, 442 N.W.2d at 189. 
302Id. at 682, 442 N.W.2d at 189. The court gave great deference to the city’s determination of which laws 
should be enacted for the welfare of the people.  Therefore, when the city considers a request for rezoning based 
upon a plan or representation by the developer, it is presumed that the city granted the request after making the 
determination that the plan as represented was in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, and the general 
welfare and the developer was not permitted to develop the property in a manner inconsistent with the plan or 
representation in which the rezoning was based, despite the fact that inconsistent uses may be permissible under the 
new zoning classification. Id. at 683, 442 N.W.2d at 189.
303Id. at 683, 442 N.W.2d at 189.
304Id. at 683, 442 N.W.2d at 189, citing 2 A. Rathkopf and D. Rathkopf, Rathkopf’s the Law of Zoning & 
Planning §27.05at 27-45 (rev.ed, 1989).
305Id at 684. 442 N.W.2d at 189.
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by requiring a buffer on the zone boundaries.  Finally, conditional zoning allows a municipality 
to maintain greater control over the development process.306  In sum, conditional zoning is a 
device that allows the city flexibility to extract improvements that bare zoning ordinances do not 
provide, grants greater means of control over the development of the city, and gives the city a 
remedy to enforce the developer’s plans and representations.307
However, the court cautioned, conditional rezoning is a legislative function and therefore 
must be with the proper exercise of the police power, i.e, must be reasonably related to the 
interest of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.308  Here, the development 
agreement could not be construed as bargaining away the city’s police power where it was 
established that the agreement provided more restrictive ceilings and development regulations 
than the current underlying zoning regulation.309  The evidence clearly showed that the city’s 
police powers were not abridged in any manner and that “the agreement was expressly subject to 
the remedies available to the city under the Omaha Municipal Code. Further, the court found that 
“the agreement actually enhanced the city’s regulatory control over the development rather than 
limiting it.”310
306Id. at 684, citing 2 A. Rathkopf and D. Rathkopf, Rathkopf’s the Law of Zoning & Planning §27.05at 27-
45 (rev.ed, 1989).
307Theoretically, if the rezoning ordinance adopts the plan, as in this case, the city could institute legal 
proceedings if the developer builds a project inconsistent with the plans without resorting to rezoning the property.  
For these reasons, the court held conditional rezoning to be valid. Id. at 685, 442 N.W.2d 190.
308Id. at 685, 442 N.W.2d 190.
309Id. at 690, 442 N.W.2d 193. 
310Id. at 688, 442 N.W.2d 191. The court also rejected the argument that the city engaged in an ultra vires
act because there was no statutory enabling act permitting conditional zoning.  Finding that in addition to these 
powers granted by the express words, the city also has those powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the 
powers expressly granted, as well as those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not 
simply convenient, but indispensable.  Here, the legislature has given the city broad powers to regulate land use, 
without specifying what regulations the city is permitted to use, coupled with a grant of power to implement, amend, 
supplement, change, modify, and  repeal, these regulations, along with the implied grant of power to enact all 
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The court took great pains to avoid any finding of a restriction on the government’s 
exercise of its police powers by the agreement, as opposed to a broadening of such powers.  This 
seems to minimize the benefits of a development agreement, except to the extent that the 
developer knows beforehand the range of permitted uses.  But what if the city decided to rezone 
again.  Could it have agreed not to apply the rezoning to the project?  That is not clear from 
Giger.  
In  Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Bd. of 
Supervisors,311 a California appellate court expressly rejected a challenge to development 
agreements authorized by statute on the ground that such agreements amounted to illegal 
contract zoning.  It ruled that a zoning freeze was not a surrender or abnegation of political 
power, but that it in fact advanced the public interest, since the project was still required to be 
developed in accordance with the county’s general plan and the agreement did not permit 
construction until the county had approved detailed building plans.  The agreement also retained 
the county’s discretionary authority in the future and in any event, the zoning freeze was only for 
necessary zoning regulation including conditional zoning, as long as those regulations are within the proper exercise 
of the police power. Id. at 690, 442 N.W.2d at 193. The final contention made by the challengers was that the city 
fostered “an appearance of evil” by engaging in conditional zoning that it could result in the corruption of officials; 
that officials will concentrate more on what they can extract from the developer than on proper rezoning criteria.  
The court found the argument lacking in merit.  There was no evidence of graft or corruption in the case and the 
mere appearance of evil is insufficient basis for striking down an ordinance. Id. The regulation, by imposing 
restrictions not generally applicable to other property within the district also did not violate the uniformity 
requirement of the zoning laws, the court pointing out that the uniformity requirement did not preclude different 
uses within the same district so long as it is reasonable and based on the public policy to be served.  In fact, the court 
thought allowing reasonable classifications within a district was a good rule, especially in view of the broad 
delegation of authority given by the legislature to the city in making zoning regulations.  Accordingly, the 
uniformity requirement did not prohibit reasonable classification with a director.  Here, there was no evidence that 
the city acted unreasonably. Id. at --. Nor, was the zoning ordinance an example of spot zoning. The challengers 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the rezoning ordinance was illegal spot zoning and therefore 
violative of the comprehensive plan.  Id.  at    , citing Hagmen, Urban Planning & Development Control Law, at 93, 
at 1969.
31184 Cal. App. 4th at 233.
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a period of five years, not unlimited.312
X.  Conclusion
Development agreements are a form of land use bargaining, consistent with modern 
land use planning, which is fundamentally an exercise in bargaining.   Yet, they should not be 
regarded as a form of contract zoning for these reasons: 1) while they involve an agreement, 
the city does not bargain away it legislative discretion to the extent that they reserve the 
power unilaterally to terminate the agreement if required by the public safety, health or 
welfare; 2) they do not involve an agreement in advance of rezoning, since the agreements 
become final only after public hearing; 3) they not involve extraneous considerations, since 
the promises made by the developer pertain only to subject property; 4) they are a valuable 
312Id. at 233; see also Warner Co. v. Sutton, 274 N.J. Super. 464, 644 A.2d 656  (Super. N.J. App. Div. 
1994) where the court distinguished a development agreement from these proscriptions, against contract zoning, 
holding that, “[u]nlike ‘contract zoning,’ there is no legal impediment to a development agreement between a 
municipality and a property owner which provides for rezoning of certain tracts to accommodate a particular 
residential plan, where all negotiations and decision with respect to the rezoning amendments were taken at public 
meetings of the governing body and all statutory requirements relating to the amendment to the master plan and 
adoption of amending ordinances were properly followed.” Id. at 471; 479-80; 644 A.2d at 660; see also William M. 
Cox, Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 34-8.2 at 522-23 (1994). See further Terminal Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Jersey City, 54 N.J. 568 (N.J. 1969)(challenge to adoption of an ordinance and resolution by the City and County 
Board, whereby the City and the County entered into certain agreements with the Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corporation (PATH) relating to the construction and operation of a proposed Transportation Center in the Journal 
Square area and to entrance improvements at the Grove-Henderson Street Station.  Appellants, individual and board 
of trade, challenged the agreement claiming that the agreements with PATH were invalid for several reasons, 
including that the defendants have invalidly obligated themselves to legislate and zone in the future concerning 
public streets, building codes, and bus and taxi operations; that the defendants have unlawfully delegated power to 
PATH; that the agreements were invalid on their face since their fulfillment by PATH was optional.  The court 
affirmed the lower court.  It stated that “[i]nitially, it should be noted that the officers of a municipal corporation 
may limit by contract their own police powers as well as those of their successors where the agreement is authorized 
by statute.” Id. at 575.  The court then held that, “[t]here can be no doubt that PATH has statutory authority to 
construct and operate a Transportation Center at Journal Square. N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.52; N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.51. To aid 
PATH in achieving this objective, we think it clear that the Legislature authorized the City and County to relinquish 
some of their police powers.” Id.  The court went on to state, “the Legislature has given the City and County broad 
powers to cooperate with PATH in the construction and operation of the Transportation Center so long as resulting 
agreements contain ‘reasonable terms.’” Id. at 576.  “We think that the terms of the agreements relating to bus 
operations and public streets are fully within the legislative contemplation.  Since these various guarantees which the 
City and County gave PATH were authorized by the statutes, plaintiffs” reliance on cases which prohibit contract 
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land use device, enabling the city to achieve benefits and to mitigate the effects of the 
rezoning; and 5) they must be consistent with the comprehensive plan.  They should also not 
be considered simply as a form of conditional zoning under which the municipality imposes  
restrictions on land use rather than permitting different uses proposed for development and 
the municipality is free to rezone at any time.  Some binding obligation on the municipality is 
necessary if development agreements are to have their intended benefit.  But a binding 
obligation having been fully considered and undergone the public notice and hearing process 
and undertaken in the public interest should be upheld as not running afoul of the basic 
principle prohibiting the contracting away of police powers.  Indeed, they should be regarded 
as an exercise of it.
Development agreements both fit within and advance existing land use planning, 
by encouraging development through security to developers of the progression of the 
development project without fear of subsequent zoning changes.  At the same time, 
municipalities retain control over the project and are able to negotiate for other public 
benefits.  The fact of an agreement should not act as an impediment to the use of development 
agreements any more than conditioning rezoning on promises made by the developer.
zoning and prevent binding the hands of successors is misplaced.” Id. 
